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ABSTRACT 
Diagnostic error makes a substantial contribution to harmful or potentially harmful events in 
emergency care. While there is knowledge about some of the cognitive thought processes 
involved in diagnostic decision making, little is known about the role that affect plays in 
diagnostic judgements, despite research outside healthcare suggesting that decisions involving 
risk and uncertainty are sometimes driven by affect-based, rather than cognitive-based (rational 
thinking) features. The aim of this research was to identify some of the affective influences in 
the diagnostic decision making process and to explore the role that affect played in diagnostic 
judgement.   
 
The narrative review in Chapter 2 uses psychological dual process theories as a theoretical 
framework to bring together literatures from within and outside healthcare to explain the 
potential role of affect in diagnostic decision making.  The review provides examples of how 
theory and empirical evidence is relevant to diagnostic decision making and highlights the 
current gaps in knowledge. The epistemological underpinnings of methodological approaches 
adopted in the empirical studies, definition of key concepts and justification of research 
methods and measures are discussed in the following chapter.   
 
Studies 1 - 3 present the results of online experimental studies (two pilot studies with doctors 
and medical students and one main study with 77 doctors across two NHS Hospital Trusts). 
These drew upon the distinct diagnostic stage of information gathering in order to try and 
identify whether types (mood, anticipatory affect, anticipated affect) and positive and negative 
sources (patient factors, team factors, previous experience) of affect influenced clinicians’ 
decision-making for diagnosis. Findings suggested that affect may influence thoroughness and 
order of information gathered for diagnosis. Team factors appeared to evoke the most intense 
affective reactions and specific emotions were identified as being potentially important in 
diagnostic decision making.  
iii 
 
 
Study 4 used clinical simulation to explore differences in perceptions of affect and whether 
affect played a role in the perceptions of factors critical for effective clinical decision making 
during critical incidents in 54 healthcare professionals (27 junior doctors and 27 nurses or allied 
health professions).  Findings indicated that both individual and social affect were associated 
with perceptions of clinical performance and suggested that the two groups of healthcare 
professionals focused on different affective cues. Cooperation was an important predictor of 
perceptions of individual and team communication behaviour and team effectiveness for both 
professional groups.      
 
Sixteen semi-structured interviews with doctors working in Accident and Emergency or 
Anaesthetic departments in two NHS Hospital were conducted in Study 5. Critical Decision 
Method and the analytic strategy of Framework Approach were used to interrogate the affective 
features in diagnostic and case management decision making during incidents in emergency 
care. Eight sources and 5 types of affect were identified and both positive and negative emotions 
featured in diagnostic and case management decisions. Doctors discussed how affect informed 
and motivated decisions and also how the intensity of affect, the lack of affect as a conscious 
process and the rational processes involved in clinical decision making meant that it was not 
always perceived to play a role.    
 
The thesis identified sources and types of affect that feature in diagnostic decision making and 
findings suggest that affect does influence diagnostic judgements. The thesis concludes by 
discussing the implications and recommendations for clinical practice and future research.   
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CHAPTER 1 
INTRODUCTION AND OVERVIEW 
 
1.1  Introduction  
The aim of this chapter is to briefly summarise the rationale for this research and to provide a 
brief description of the content of the chapters in the thesis.  
 
 
1.2  Background and rationale  
Patient safety is an important area of research which influences new policy and practice in 
healthcare (Department of Health (DoH), 2000, 2001, 2006; National Patient Safety Agency, 
(NPSA) 2005).  The decisions that healthcare professionals make are central to the delivery of 
timely, comprehensive, safe care.  However, clinical decisions are vulnerable to oversights and 
inaccuracies (Bion & Heffner, 2004; DoH, 2000, 2006; Institute of Medicine, 1999; Weingart, 
Wilson, Gibberd, & Harrison, 2000), and the catastrophic outcomes that result from erroneous 
healthcare decisions are well documented in academic research (Bion & Heffner, 2004; 
Weingart et al., 2000) and polices on safer patient care (DOH, 2000, 2001, 2006).  
 
Diagnostic decision making is pivotal to healthcare practice.  It forms the basis of how patients 
are assessed and managed, and determines their treatment, referral, and follow-up.  However, 
diagnostic error is a significant cause of adverse events in healthcare (Graber, Franklin, & 
Gordon, 2005; Schiff et al., 2009).  This can occur through misdiagnosis (e.g. inaccurately 
determining that a patient’s intermittent pelvic discomfort is due to menstrual pain rather than 
an ectopic pregnancy), delayed diagnosis (e.g. not determining that a patient’s chronic cough 
might be due to a malignant lung tumour until their fourth consultation for the same symptoms, 
by which time only palliative, rather than curative treatment can be offered), and failed 
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diagnosis (e.g. not recognising that a patient required assessment for the treatable condition of 
pernicious anaemia leading to the development of neurological damage).  
 
Studies indicate that diagnostic error occurred in 6% of patients admitted to 2 NHS hospitals in 
the UK (Neale, Woloshynowych, & Vincent, 2001) and accounted for 29.7% preventable deaths 
across 1000 adult patients in a recent retrospective case record review across 10 acute hospitals 
in England (Hogan et al, 2012).  In the U.S, between 40,000 and 80,000 annual hospital deaths 
are due to misdiagnosis (Leape, Berwick, & Bates, 2002). A review of medical error in primary 
care also revealed that diagnostic error was attributed to between 26% to 78% of all identified 
errors, and was found to be more likely to culminate in significant patient harm or admission to 
hospital than other types of medical error in a primary care setting (Sanders & Esmail, 2003).
  
As misdiagnosis, delayed and failed diagnosis make a substantial contribution to adverse events 
in clinical medicine (Graber et al., 2005; Schiff et al., 2009) a greater understanding of the 
factors involved in diagnostic error is required (Berner, 2009; Crandall & Wears, 2008; Graber, 
Gordon, & Franklin, 2002; Newman-Toker & Provonost, 2009).  
 
Clinical decision making is generally considered to be a rational process.  Work which has 
highlighted how cognitive sequences may contribute to both failure and efficiency in clinical 
judgement (Pani & Chariker, 2004; Parker & Lawton, 2003) still dominates current 
understanding of the processes involved, and has identified cognitive biases and the use of 
heuristics as important factors in diagnostic error (Croskerry, 2009a, 2013; Elstein, 1999; 
Norman, 2009).  However, while healthcare professionals may strive to make diagnostic and 
case management decisions which are grounded in a systematic appraisal of clinically relevant 
facts (e.g. referring the patient for an immediate second opinion due to their subtle but persistent 
symptoms), diagnostic judgements and case management choices may sometimes be influenced 
by non-rational, affect-based processes and factors (e.g. discharging the patient with instructions 
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to return if symptoms become worse because the referring consultant on the current shift is 
known to be intimidating and unpleasant).  
 
Despite this, there has been scant attention given to studies that specifically examine the 
influence of affect on diagnostic decision making in clinical practice (Croskerry, Abbass, & Wu, 
2010).  This is contrary to growing empirical evidence that under certain circumstances, it is 
how a behaviour makes individuals feel, rather than a logical appraisal of the potential risks to 
their health, that is pivotal in explaining erroneous judgements and risky actions involving 
health related behaviour such as speeding and smoking (Lawton, Conner, & Parker, 2007) and 
across a wide range of situations and settings (Bechara, Damasio, Tranel, & Damasio, 1997; 
Ditto, Pizarro, Epstein, Jacobson, & MacDonald, 2006; Hsee & Kunreuther, 2000).  
 
With increasing awareness and evidence that multifarious, and often overlapping factors impact 
diagnostic decision making (Ely, Kaldjian, & D’Alessandro, 2012; Kostopoulou, Delaney, & 
Munro, 2008; Schiff et al, 2009; Siminoff, Rogers, Thomson, Dumenci, & Harris-Haywood, 
2011), there has been an emphasis on the need to adopt new approaches to increase 
understanding of the complex issues and processes involved in clinical judgement, in order to 
improve clinical performance and healthcare delivery (Croskerry et al., 2010; Fischer & Ereaut, 
2012; Institute of Medicine, 1999).  To Err is Human (Institute of Medicine, 1999) pioneered 
such an approach.  It focused on why errors occur within healthcare practice and highlighted the 
importance of identifying and pre-empting the elements within clinical practice and clinical 
settings that contribute to sub-optimal decision making and other active failures.  This new 
direction has encouraged the use of psychological theory to help understand the contributory 
factors for error in organizations where individuals have to make judgements and decisions 
under conditions of risk and uncertainty (Reason, 1990, 1997).  
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As the research detailed here examines whether affect influences the diagnostic decision making 
process, two important psychological dual process theories; Cognitive-Experiential Self-Theory 
(CEST: Epstein, 1994) and Risk as Feelings (Loewenstein, Weber, Hsee, & Welch, 2001) were 
drawn upon in this thesis.  These theories were chosen as they propose that everyday decisions 
are derived from a complex interplay between emotion-based and cognitive-based processing 
and evaluative systems, thus providing an insight into the processes involved in clinical decision 
making.  
 
The research presented in this thesis employs a range of methods to explore the role that affect 
plays in diagnostic judgement and to identify some of the affective influences involved during 
the diagnostic decision making process.  It utilises current understanding of affect and decision 
making from both within and outside healthcare.  
 
 
1.3  Thesis aims 
This thesis has six main research aims: 
 
1. To bring together two literatures (within and outside healthcare) to explain the potential  
    role of affect in diagnostic decision making. 
2. To develop and test methods for conducting research to examine the role of affect in 
    diagnostic decision making. 
3. To understand and explain the main sources and types of affect that influence diagnostic  
    decision making and the interplay between them. 
4. To identify the discrete emotions (e.g. anger, happiness etc.) that feature in diagnostic 
    decision making and consider their role. 
5. To examine the relationships between affect and perceptions of team factors that are 
    critical for effective clinical decision making.   
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6. To explore to what extent healthcare professionals are able to reflect on the role of  
    affect in the decisions they make.   
 
1.4  Outline of thesis      
The structure of the thesis and chapter summaries are presented below: 
 
Chapter 2 – A narrative literature review of the role of affect in diagnostic decision 
making: Current understanding and knowledge gaps  
This chapter addresses the first research aim of bringing together two literatures to explain the 
potential role of affect in diagnostic decision making.  It describes how the limited literature 
from within healthcare suggests that affect impacts clinical judgement, and illustrates how 
further understanding of affective influences on diagnostic decision making can be derived from 
research outside healthcare.  The role of affect in a dual process model of decision making and 
the importance of different types of affect experienced by an individual during decision making 
(mood, anticipatory affect and anticipated affect) is highlighted.  The review provides examples 
of how theory and empirical evidence outside healthcare is relevant to diagnostic decision 
making and highlights the current gaps in knowledge.  It concludes by setting out a research 
plan to address the main research aims of the thesis.  
 
Chapter 3 – Methodological and contextual considerations 
In this chapter the second research aim of developing and testing new methods for conducting 
research to examine the role of affect in diagnostic decision making is considered.  This begins 
with a discussion of the epistemological underpinnings of methodological approaches adopted 
in each of the six empirical studies, and is followed by the definition of key concepts and 
justification of research methods and measures.  The challenges of patient safety research, 
conducting research in a healthcare setting, and studying affect are also considered.      
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Chapter 4 – Using experimental methodology to examine the influence of affect on facts 
chosen for information gathering in diagnosis 
Here, the results of two online experimental studies designed to serve as manipulation checks 
and pilots for the main experimental study with doctors described in Chapter 5 are discussed.  
These two studies addressed the second research aim, by presenting and testing a new 
experimental method for conducting research to examine the role of affect in diagnostic 
decision making.  The findings of the studies also contribute to the third research aim which is 
to understand and explain the main sources and types of affect that influence diagnostic decision 
making and the interplay between them, and the fourth research aim which attempts to identify 
the discrete emotions (e.g. anger, happiness etc.) that feature in diagnostic decision making and 
to consider their role. 
 
The first study involved a sample of 129 participants (31 doctors across all departments from 
one NHS Hospital Trust and 98 Year 4 and Year 5 medical students across four UK medical 
schools).  This presents findings which assessed whether emergency care vignettes used in the 
studies evoked the intended general emotional response, and whether specific negative and 
positive emotions were induced by the vignettes.  
 
The second study involved the sample of 98 Year 4 and Year 5 medical students across four UK 
medical schools to further examine whether types (mood, anticipatory affect, anticipated affect) 
and positive and negative sources (patient factors, team factors, previous clinical experience) of 
affect influenced medical students’ decision-making regarding the facts considered important 
for diagnosis.  It concludes by discussing the findings of the two pilot studies and the 
implications for the design and analysis of the main online study described in Chapter 5.   
 
Chapter 5 – The influence of affect on thoroughness and order of information gathering 
for diagnosis and case management  
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This chapter presents the findings of the main experimental online study with 77 doctors across 
two NHS Hospital Trusts and addresses the same research aims of the two pilot experimental 
studies described in the previous chapter.  This study drew upon the distinct diagnostic stage of 
information gathering, in order to try and identify whether types (mood, anticipatory affect, 
anticipated affect) and positive and negative sources (patient factors, team factors) of affect 
influence clinicians’ decision-making for diagnosis.  It concludes by discussing the significance 
and limitations of the results obtained from this study and those from the online experimental 
studies described in Chapter 4.   
 
Chapter 6 – Does affect play a role in perceptions of communication behaviour and team 
effectiveness during critical incidents?  
This chapter describes a study that used simulation to explore whether affect influenced the 
perception of individual and team performance and team effectiveness during critical incidents 
in 54 healthcare professionals (27 junior doctors and 27 nurses or allied health professions) 
from one NHS Hospital Trust.  As well as contributing further to the second, third and fourth 
main research aims considered in the online experimental studies, the studies presented in this 
chapter also address the fifth research aim to examine the relationships between affect and 
perceptions of team factors that are critical for effective clinical decision making.  The findings 
also elicit knowledge for the sixth main research aim, which is to explore to what extent 
healthcare professionals are able to reflect on the role of affect in the decisions they make.  
 
Chapter 7 – Do affective influences feature in diagnostic and case management decision 
making in emergency care? A qualitative approach  
The study presented in this chapter reports the findings from 16 individual interviews with 
Accident and Emergency doctors and Anaesthetists across two NHS Hospital Trusts.  The 
qualitative method of Critical Decision Making and the analytic strategy of Framework 
Approach are described, before themes concerning source and type of affect that influence 
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diagnostic and case management decision making in emergency care are discussed.  This study 
assists in providing further knowledge for 2-6 of the main research aims.    
   
Chapter 8 – Thesis summary  
This final chapter synthesises the research findings from the entire thesis and evaluates their 
contribution to the six main research aims and to extending knowledge on the influence of affect 
on diagnostic decision making.  It identifies the limitations of the methods and findings, before 
implications for future research and practice are discussed.   
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CHAPTER 2 
A NARRATIVE LITERATURE REVIEW OF THE ROLE OF AFFECT IN 
DIAGNOSTIC DECISION MAKING: CURRENT UNDERSTANDING AND 
KNOWLEDGE GAPS 
 
2.1  Overview 
This chapter presents a review of the current understanding of the role of affect in diagnostic 
decision making.  The objectives of this review were: 1) To establish what is currently known 
about affect and diagnostic decision making; 2) to demonstrate how psychological theory may 
inform our understanding about affect and diagnostic decision making; and 3) to determine what 
knowledge gaps still remain and to develop a research plan to address these.  
 
In order to address objectives 1-3 above it was necessary to draw together literature that would 
help to understand relevant theory, methods and the practical implications for diagnostic 
decision making.  As this would require a comprehensive coverage of relevant literature, a 
systematic review that employed a limited focus that is confined by the purpose of the specific 
research question and imposed strict quantitative appraisal of the quality of studies was not 
appropriate to the type of review required (Collins and Fauser, 2005). Therefore, it was decided 
that a narrative review would be more conducive to the breadth of understanding required to 
address the objectives of the review.   
 
The review considered both theoretical and empirical literature from both within the healthcare 
domain focusing specifically on diagnostic decision making, and from outside the healthcare 
domain focusing on decision making under uncertainty, and was organised into two distinct but 
related sections.  Firstly, empirical evidence of the influence of affect on diagnostic decision 
making within the healthcare domain was assessed, and the application of psychological theory 
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to the influence of affect on diagnostic judgement was appraised.  Secondly, theoretical and 
empirical psychological research from outside the healthcare domain was examined.  This 
allowed for the synthesis of existing knowledge and identification of prevailing approaches and 
knowledge gaps to be assimilated across evidence from clinical diagnosis, psychological, and 
decision making literature.  Importantly, a review of the literature outside the healthcare domain 
also assisted in highlighting the areas where theory and empirical evidence from another arena 
may potentially help to explain the complexities involved in clinical decision making.  This 
strategy also provided insight into what mental processes and workplace settings and conditions 
appear to have a positive or negative impact upon diagnostic performance.  A summation of the 
literature and rationale for the research is set out, before culminating in the generation of a 
research plan to address the main research questions for this thesis.   
 
 
2.2  Method 
2.2.1  Inclusion and exclusion criteria 
Although a narrative literature review was undertaken, parameters were set in order to identify 
relevant literature (Green, Johnson, and Adams, 2005).  As this research draws upon theory and 
empirical evidence from both within and outside the healthcare arena, literature from both wider 
industry and from healthcare-specific settings was included.  Therefore, published articles of 
psychologically-based theoretical discussions, reviews, commentary and empirical studies that 
examined the influence of affect on decision making and/or behaviour were included in this 
review.  Secondary sources, articles in foreign languages, and articles unconnected to affect and 
decision making were excluded.  
 
2.2.2  Search strategy 
A number of electronic databases were searched for literature within and outside healthcare.  
The databases were: Web of Science; Psycinfo; Medline; EMBASE; Pubmed and Cochrane 
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Library. Searches were restricted to articles published between 1980-2013.  Search terms were 
informed by two important psychological theories; Cognitive-Experiential Self-Theory, (CEST: 
Epstein, 1994) and Risk as Feelings (Loewenstein et al., 2001). These allowed for the creation 
of a framework which helped to guide the review.  For the review of the literature in the context 
of healthcare, titles were searched using the combined search terms: effect* OR influenc* OR 
assoc* OR impact* OR role* OR cause* OR factor* OR mislead* SAME/AND affect* OR 
emotion* OR gut* OR instinct* OR intuiti* OR mood* SAME/AND decision* OR judg* OR 
risk* OR reason* OR uncertain* SAME/AND clinic* OR medic* OR diagnos* OR physician* 
OR doctor* OR nurs* OR patient* OR shar* SAME/AND error* OR “adverse outcome*” OR 
“adverse event*” OR safe*. For the review of wider and generalised literature, titles were 
searched using the combined search terms: effect* OR influenc* OR assoc* OR impact* OR 
role* OR cause* OR factor* OR mislead* SAME/AND affect* OR emotion* OR feel* OR gut* 
OR instinct* OR intuiti* OR mood* SAME/AND decision* OR judg* OR risk* OR reason* 
OR uncertain*.  After extraction of duplicates, all article abstracts were read and assessed 
against the inclusion and exclusion criteria.  Relevant articles were downloaded and a manual 
checking of references for further suitable articles was carried out. Key concepts that emerged 
on reading the literature assisted in forming the structure of the review.  
 
 
2.3  Sources of affect in clinical decision making 
Healthcare professionals work in an emotionally-charged setting.  The need for urgent response, 
caring for patients in extreme pain or with life-threatening conditions, and discussing treatments 
and prognoses with patients and relatives are all features of the working experience of health 
professionals. Work by Croskerry, Abbass, and Wu (2008, 2010) has already acknowledged the 
potential for affect-based factors to influence clinical decision making.  Literature on clinical 
decision making suggests that when working in health care some of the more immediate sources 
of affect are patient factors, team factors and previous experience.  The literature on each of 
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these sources and how they may influence diagnostic decision making is summarised before 
describing how knowledge from outside healthcare may assist in developing understanding 
about the role of affect in diagnostic judgement.  
 
2.3.1  Patient factors  
Healthcare professionals can experience powerful instantaneous feelings in response to 
attending to patients and these emotional reactions may influence their clinical behaviour.  In a 
reflective account of her internship in an emergency department, Amato (2007) describes how 
the disgust she felt when examining a female patient’s maggot infested wound influenced her 
judgement of the patient, and resulted in her providing care that lacked in compassion. 
Similarly, the narratives of 24 newly qualified anaesthetists in which they reflected upon their 
experiences of clinical practice, demonstrated that feelings of horror were common occurrences 
(Iedema, Jorm, & Lum, 2009).        
 
Findings in primary care further highlight the important role of affect.  In a study involving 
physicians and diabetes patients, it was found that a physician’s rating of how much they liked a 
patient was positively correlated with both physician and patient ratings of the patient’s physical 
and mental health (Hall, Horgan, Stein, & Roter, 2002).  In another study exploring the 
emotions of 75 primary care physicians during consultations with frequent attender patients, 
higher positive emotions of happiness and pleasure, protection, and professional well-being 
were associated with the belief that the patient genuinely needed their help, while the negative 
emotions of increased sadness and discouragement were associated with higher referral of 
patients to specialists. Indifference, rage-anger, and anxiety-nervousness were also found to be 
related to feelings of exasperation, while increased levels of feeling guilt were associated with a 
reduced belief that they could solve the patient’s problem (Bellon & Fernandez-Asensio, 2002). 
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These studies suggest that affect may be a key component in the formation of a health 
professional’s perceptions concerning the health status of a particular patient.  Furthermore, they 
imply that the positive and negative feelings health professionals experience in response to a 
patient may influence their clinical management decisions and behaviour.  As health 
professionals care for different categories of patients (e.g. frequent vs infrequent attenders; 
chronic vs acute presentations) it is important to establish whether these patients provoke 
different affective responses, and whether these affect-based reactions impact diagnostic and 
case management decisions.     
 
2.3.2  Team factors 
Communication is critical for effective decision making (Christensen, et al., 2000; Leonard, 
Graham, & Bonacum, 2004; Reader, Flin, Lauche, & Cuthbertson, 2006).
  
In a clinical team 
context health professionals must share relevant clinical information, their interpretation of 
patient symptoms, and the desires and feelings of the patient.  How and whether important 
clinical information is shared may be influenced by affect-based responses and reactions of 
team members to the work climate.    
 
Systems factors such as a culture of blame, weak leadership or supervision, a lack of available 
equipment, or poor scheduling, may all impact on what it feels like to work in a particular 
specialty unit.  Research has suggested that the conditions and practices which may be inherent 
in clinical settings and organizations can impact upon health professionals’ affective states, 
which then hinders clinical performance (Burgess, 2010; Fogarty & McKeon, 2006; Mesman, 
2009; Nolan, 2000).  For example, a study involving 176 nurses across 11 hospitals in 
Queensland, Australia, found that poor organizational climate resulted in health professionals 
reporting low morale and distress, which produced more violations and consequential 
medication errors (Fogarty & McKeon, 2006).  
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Not only do healthcare professionals carry forward their own affect-based responses to systems 
factors (e.g. lack of available equipment) to the clinical teams they work in; they also have 
affect-based reactions when working in teams where colleagues may be unfriendly and 
intimidating or cheerful and supportive.  Effective communication and shared cognition within 
clinical teams is essential for optimal care (Flin, O’Connor, & Crichton, 2008).  The important 
role that team performance plays in providing safe patient care is reflected in the recent 
requirement for the WHO Surgical Safety Checklist (Haynes et al., 2009) to be used by surgical 
teams during all surgical interventions in the NHS in England and Wales (National Patient 
Safety Agency, NPSA, 2009)
 
as well as the call for a pre-list briefing and post-list de-briefing to 
be incorporated into the schedule of perioperative teams (NPSA, 2010).  It is also important to 
acknowledge that affective factors in team situations have the potential to compromise the 
sharing of clinical information.  In their theoretical model of team performance, Annett, 
Cunningham, and Mathias-Jones (2000), suggest that affective factors involved in team morale 
and cohesiveness, filter into all aspects of team processes, from cognition to communication and 
co-ordination, and ultimately shared goals. 
 
In many clinical contexts, those working together often vary on a daily basis between 
established and ad hoc teams.  In a setting, which involves health professional rotation, and the 
use of locum doctors and temporary agency staff, this distinction is particularly pertinent. 
According to Annett and Stanton (2000), 
 
  “Members of a group may share a number of common features but do not necessarily share a 
common goal and may well be in competition with each other. A work team, on the other hand, 
not only collaborates, but can succeed or fail as a whole and the members of the team share the 
benefits and costs of success or failure.” (p.1046)  
 
15 
 
Team factors such as incompatible goals (McDonald, Waring, Harrison, Walshe, & Boaden, 
2005) intergroup rivalry (Hewett, Watson, Gallois, Ward, & Leggett, 2009), and ineffective 
cross disciplinary communication (Murray & Enarson, 2007) are all cited as important 
underlying factors in medical errors.  
 
There is some emerging recognition of affect in models of non-technical skills in teamwork 
(Fletcher, Flin, McGeorge, Galvin, Maran, & Patey, 2003; Yule, Flin, Paterson-Brown, & 
Maran, 2006), but at present these models are largely framed within a cognitive tradition, and as 
such, the role of affect is not explicit.  As diagnosis often involves a team of health 
professionals across a range of disciplines, it is important to establish how, and what type of 
affect has a positive and negative impact upon established and ad hoc clinical teams; whether 
these types of affect influence the diagnosis that different disciplines make; or whether affect 
has an impact on the amount and quality of clinically important information that is shared 
within and between clinical teams. 
 
2.3.3  Previous experience  
Affective factors which stem from a health professional’s previous clinical experience may 
influence diagnosis in two distinct ways.  The qualitative feelings experienced by a health 
professional during a past patient presentation (whether the experience was associated with 
strong positive or negative emotions or involved particularly unusual or exceptional features) 
may lead to a current patient presentation that has a similar presentation or requires similar 
decisions, being guided by the feelings previously associated with the past case.  For example, a 
doctor who three months ago had experienced extreme anxiety when a young female patient 
was re-admitted to the A&E department with a suspected ectopic pregnancy, after they had 
discharged her earlier with instructions to take pain killers for menstrual pain following 
complaints of dull pelvic pain, may find that the similar anxiety she feels when another young 
female patient presents with similar symptoms, may lead her to unnecessarily order a pelvic 
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ultrasound.  Croskerry and colleagues (Croskerry et al., 2008, 2010) discuss this in terms of 
“counter transference”, suggesting that the positive or negative affect that a health professional 
may feel for a patient may reflect the positive or negative feelings they felt towards a previous 
patient who presented with similar signs and symptoms. A recent experimental study in which 
132 physicians provided treatment decisions in response to a computer based clinical scenario 
involving a patient with an abdominal aortic aneurysm, found that physicians who were 
presented with a bad patient outcome scenario experienced increased levels of anxiety and 
decision regret which influenced their choice of treatment strategy for the next patient with the 
same condition (Hemmerich, Elstein, Schwarze, Ghini Moliski, & Dale, 2012).    
  
Alternatively, a more quantitative type of experience (e.g. the amount and recency of exposure 
to a disease) may also have an affect-based impact on the clinical choices that physicians make 
(Berner & Graber, 2008; Norman & Eva, 2010).  The number of encounters with a specific 
disease is often a gauge of perceived expertise. Expertise has been linked to health 
professionals’ level of confidence (Croskerry, 2009a; Norman & Eva, 2010), and it is suggested 
that high confidence may result in an increased tendency to use rapid, intuitive-based decisions, 
rather than decisions based on reasoned and rational thinking (Berner & Graber, 2008). For 
example, during diagnostic reasoning for suspected bacteremia patients, Poses and Anthony 
(1991) found that doctors’ intuitive probability estimates were influenced by their recent 
experiences of the disease, leading to over-diagnosis.  Further studies have shown that more 
experienced physicians requested fewer cues of clinically relevant information than less 
experienced residents (Kostopoulou, et al., 2008b) and family physicians with more experience 
reported a higher number of cases when they used gut feelings for diagnostic decisions than 
family physicians with less experience (Woolley & Kostopoulou, 2013). These findings support 
Croskerry’s (2009a) claim that more experienced clinicians tend to adopt less systematic 
approaches.  Familiarity with a disease may therefore make experienced clinicians over-certain, 
due to being more vulnerable to the powerful influence of instincts or gut feelings that may be 
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generated by their immediate affective responses to patient presentations, rather than a slower, 
rational processing of clinical details. 
 
Under which circumstances less systematic, fast, instinctive judgement is beneficial or harmful 
for diagnostic decision making is unclear.  More knowledge about how experience and 
confidence impact affective factors, and how this influences the amount and type of information 
a health professional processes for diagnosis is now required.  This, along with increasing our 
understanding about whether expertise facilitates a more rapid assimilation of the most pertinent 
diagnostic cues, would clearly have important implications for the delivery of efficient and 
timely care.  
 
In summary, a doctor’s own affective response to their work environment may help to explain 
inappropriate information gathering or clinical behaviour and empirical studies which explicitly 
examine the role of affect in these processes are needed.  
 
 
2.4  How affect influences decision making: Knowledge from outside healthcare 
Although there are extensive gaps in the healthcare literature about the role of affect in decision 
making, there is knowledge that can be drawn upon from outside healthcare to better understand 
its influence.  In using this, it may be possible to develop a theory of affect in diagnostic 
decision making and identify testable hypotheses to guide future research.  Evidence for the role 
of affect in decision making and the potential for dual process models to help unpick the affect-
based processes which may be involved in diagnostic decision making will be described in the 
following section.  
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2.4.1  The case for the role of affect in decision making 
Research suggests that under conditions where there is risk and uncertainty, affect may drive 
behavioural decisions and judgements in unique and direct ways, above and beyond the 
influence of cognition (Ariely & Loewenstein, 2006; Ditto et al., 2006; Lawton et al., 2007, 
Lawton, Conner, & McEachan, 2009). Zajonc’s (1984) primacy-of-affect hypothesis postulates 
that in particular situations, affective evaluations may precede or are autonomous to cognitive 
appraisal.  This is supported across a number of studies (Ditto et al., 2006; Norton, Bogart, 
Cecil, & Pinkerton, 2005).
  
The somatic marker hypothesis (Damasio, 1996) proposes that 
bodily states which occur during the experience of situations are mapped in the brain and form a 
vital cortical link between a situation and visceral response.  As a result, whenever that situation 
is repeated, peripheral cues reactivate appropriate responses based on affect-based learning from 
previous experience (Damasio, 1996).  For example, if we are bitten by a dog we may 
experience fear. From this point onwards, whenever a dog approaches, our immediate reaction 
is to feel fear.  This, in turn guides our behavioural response to the stimulus (e.g. don’t stroke 
dogs) and our decision making (do not visit friend who has dog). Evidence for this hypothesis 
has been gathered during studies examining gambling task decisions (Bechara et al., 1997), and 
in cognitive neuroscientific findings (see Naqvi, Shiv, & Bechara, 2006).  As a health 
professional’s previous clinical experience may determine their affective response to a clinical 
situation, which in turn, guides the clinical decisions they make (Berner & Graber, 2008; 
Croskerry et al., 2008, 2010; Norman & Eva, 2010), then hypothetically, potential errors could 
be overcome through clinicians engaging in more reflective practice (Bradley, 2005; Epstein, 
1999; Mamede, Schmidt, & Rikers, 2007) or de-biasing strategies (Croskerry, 2002, 2003).   
 
Heuristics are also deemed to create biases in risky decision making which in turn can lead to 
judgemental errors across a variety of contexts and settings (Parker & Lawton, 2003; Tversky & 
Kahneman, 1974).  Outside healthcare, the concept of heuristics (Tversky & Kahneman, 1974) 
has been used to explain how attempts to overcome time constraints and cognitive overload 
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leads to shortcuts in mental processes for information gathering, information integration and 
action decisions (Kahneman, Slovic, & Tversky, 1982; Parker & Lawton, 2003; Tversky & 
Kahneman, 1974).  The use of heuristics has been implicated in creating biases in risky decision 
making which in turn can lead to judgemental errors and less optimal outcomes across a variety 
of contexts and settings (Parker & Lawton, 2003; Tversky & Kahneman, 1974).  While many 
cognitive heuristics have been identified and examined (see Tversky & Kahneman, 1974), the 
specific function and role of what has been termed the “affect heuristic” (Slovic, Peters, 
Finucane, & MacGregor, 2002) is paramount to this review. 
 
While cognitive heuristics enable individuals to employ quick and efficient processing strategies 
to appraise the costs and benefits of a particular choice or behaviour, the affect heuristic (Slovic 
et al., 2002) allows individuals to use their general affective reactions to stimuli as a judgement 
gauge and indicator (Slovic & Peters, 2006; Slovic et al., 2002).  The role of reflex affective 
responses in decisions concerning risky choice actions, has led to the affect as information 
hypothesis (Schwarz & Clore, 1983).  This asserts that positive or negative values are attributed 
to these affective responses, which then determines which of the choices available to us we 
approach and which we avoid (Weber & Johnson, 2009).  For example, whether or not you 
decide to accept a lift home from a friend who you know is probably over the drink-drive 
alcohol limit may be influenced by the instantaneous gut feelings you connect with the choice 
facing you which stem from your past experience of indulging in this risky behaviour. 
Therefore, if your previous experiences of accepting lifts from friends who are over the drink-
driving limit have been positive (e.g. you have enjoyed reminiscing about the night out on the 
drive back, and have always got home safely) you are more likely to accept the lift (approach 
the choice).  However, if your previous experiences have been negative (e.g. you have 
previously felt anxious for the entire journey home because you have narrowly avoided having 
road accidents) you are more likely to decline the lift (avoid the choice).  While there is much 
empirical evidence which would seem to support the idea that affect contributes to the rational 
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assessment of risk (Bechara et al., 1997; Lawton et al., 2007, 2009; Martinez, Bonnefon, & 
Hoskens, 2009; Parker, Stradling, & Manstead, 1996; Reid & Gonzalez-Vallejo, 2009), it is also 
clear that in some cases, the affective, rather than cognitive reaction to risk, drives decisions and 
behaviour which can lead to suboptimal outcomes (Ariely & Loewenstein, 2006; Lawton et al., 
2007, 2009).  As it is possible that the affect heuristic produces behavioural responses which are 
inconsistent with health professionals’ preferred course of action or clinical protocols and 
guidelines, it is important to understand the role affect plays in patient safety incidents which 
stem from such deviations in clinical practice.       
 
At an even more fundamental level, it has also been suggested that the visceral responses which 
are used to direct judgement may act as an attentional spotlight which highlights or blunts 
relevant information (Loewenstein et al., 2001; Peters, Vastfjall, Garling, & Slovic, 2006). 
There is support for this effect in studies which have shown that despite being aware of the 
potential risks involved in a particular behaviour, or more objective information on which a 
decision can be made, individuals will still choose to engage in a behaviour or make a decision 
that is based on their feelings (Ariely & Loewenstein, 2006; Lipshitz & Shulimovitz, 2007; 
Norton et al., 2005).  For example, bank loan officers were found to value the gut feelings they 
had about applicants above financial information when deciding whether to approve their 
applications for credit (Lipshitz & Shulimovitz, 2007).  In healthcare, the recognition or 
oversight of critical and appropriate clinical information and facts has important implications for 
the accuracy and timeliness of diagnosis (Kostopoulou et al., 2008b; Schiff et al., 2009; 
Siminoff et al., 2011).  As such, it is crucial that we understand the type of circumstances in 
which a health professional’s own affective response facilitates or hinders attention to relevant 
diagnostic information.  
 
It is also argued that decisions are influenced by the “vividness effect” (Nisbett & Ross, 1980). 
This suggests that information which has emotionality, provokes concrete images, and is 
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memorable, will influence judgement through being more salient than information which does 
not.  This may explain how, and to what extent, affective responses to stimuli and situational 
and environmental cues will influence decision making (Mann & Ward, 2007; Nisbett & Ross, 
1980).  Interestingly, vividness has been found to be important for predicting others’ likelihood 
of engaging in risk-taking.  For example, Hsee and Weber (1997) found that when another 
unknown individual was seen (concrete), participants tended to use their own feelings towards 
risk when predicting those of unknown others, while when the unknown individual was unseen 
(abstract), they did not refer to their own feelings.  This demonstration of “self-other 
discrepancies” for risk preference suggests that the visceral feelings which drive one’s own risk 
judgements are also used to empathise with the risky choices others have to make.  However, 
the intensity of the feelings required to predict decision making by others must match those that 
influence our own.  This may require others to be concrete and proximal, rather than abstract 
and distal (Hsee & Weber, 1997).  In a clinical context, a busy shift with a heavy case load, or 
time critical incidents, may mean that diagnostic decisions are sometimes based on written case 
notes and test results, rather than face-to-face consultations with patients.  To what extent this 
has an impact on a health professional’s use of empathetic feelings when making diagnostic 
decisions, and whether this affects outcomes in terms of desirability from the perspective of the 
patient, is an important consideration which is currently unknown.      
 
Prospect theory (Kahneman & Tversky, 1979) proposes that risk attitudes and choice can be 
influenced by the way decision options are framed. Across a number of studies it has been 
found that we demonstrate a tendency to be more risk-averse in the face of gains and risk-taking 
in the face of losses (Kuhberger, 1998).  One explanation for this finding is that the way an 
individual imagines that the consequences of their decision will make them feel, has a powerful 
impact on the choice they make (Fagley, Coleman, & Simon, 2010).  When faced with potential 
losses, individuals seem willing to choose riskier choices in an attempt to try to avoid the 
negative future affect they would feel due to their decision.  This suggests that a health 
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professional’s immediate affective response, when faced with the possible clinical consequences 
and outcomes of the decision they have to make, may guide the decision they chose.     
 
Furthermore, Thalmann and Wiedemann (2006) found that risk appraisals were affected by an 
individual’s established attitudes, and that divergences in existing attitudes resulted from 
individual responses to highly affective information.  It was found that when individuals who 
were assessed as being least concerned with the possible health risks of mobile 
telecommunication technology were provided with information that hinted that the technology 
caused alarming diseases, they regarded the risk as being less than it actually was, while those 
assessed as being most concerned, believed the risk to be higher.  This implies that decisions 
may also be influenced by our emotional response to a choice task (Peters & Slovic, 1996; 
Peters et al., 2006; Thalmann & Wiedemann, 2006). Such findings suggest that the non-rational, 
affect-based aspects of diagnostic decision making which stem from both the affective reactions 
a health professional experiences during the diagnostic decision making process, or due to the 
affect they bring to a diagnostic decision choice, may direct the type of information that they 
consider important when assessing patient presentations that involve risk and uncertainty.   
 
 
2.5  Can dual process theories outside healthcare help to further understand diagnostic 
decision making? 
2.5.1  Decision making and dual process theories 
Dual process theories propose that everyday decisional thought processes and behavioural 
outcomes can be understood in terms of a complex interplay between two separate but 
interacting processing and evaluative systems.  In decision making research, it is inferred that 
system 1 (an affective-based system characterised as being fast, intuitive, pattern-based and 
unconscious) and system 2 (a cognitive-based system considered to be slow, reasoned, 
normative and conscious) integrate and overlap to varying degrees during decision making 
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under risky and uncertain conditions (Epstein, 1994; Loewenstein et al., 2001; Smith & 
DeCoster, 2000; Strack & Deutsch, 2004).  
 
One dual process theory, the risk-as-feelings hypothesis (Loewenstein et al., 2001), draws clear 
distinctions between the determinants of these two systems.  It proposes that if the two 
evaluative systems conflict, how good we feel while engaging in the behaviour is often a more 
powerful behavioural determinant than whether it is the right thing to do.  Recent research 
across a number of health-risk behaviours has provided evidence supporting this.  Individuals’ 
affect-based beliefs were found to predict the likelihood of both self-reported and objectively 
measured engagement in the two risk behaviours of speeding and smoking (Lawton et al., 
2007), while in another study, affective attitudes were more powerful predictors than cognitive 
attitudes for self-reported binge drinking, daily alcohol use, smoking and speeding behaviour 
(Lawton et al., 2009).  These studies suggest that while these two systems may work in parallel, 
they may be distinguishable in terms of their evaluative contributions (Smith & DeCoster, 
2000); either judging risk through analytical reasoning (Finucane & Holup, 2006), or through 
subjective visceral feelings (Loewenstein et al., 2001).  
 
2.5.2  Dual process models and diagnostic decision making 
Dual process models have already been used to help construct theoretical accounts of the role of 
affect and cognition in diagnostic reasoning (Croskerry, 2009a, 2009b, 2013; Elstein, 1999, 
2009; Elstein & Schwarz, 2002; Norman, 2009).  Within these models, heuristics operate within 
system 1.  These rapid, pattern-based mental shortcuts based on previous experience are deemed 
necessary and useful problem solving strategies which assist in avoiding cognitive overload in 
demanding and time limited situations (Tversky & Kahneman, 1974). 
 
As discussed earlier, cognitive heuristics enable individuals to employ quick and efficient 
processing strategies to appraise the costs and benefits of a particular choice or behaviour, and 
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some theorists argue that in certain situations the affect heuristic plays a powerful role in 
decision making (Finucane, Alhakami, Slovic, & Johnson, et al., 2000; Slovic et al., 2005) by 
enabling individuals to use their emotional reactions to stimuli as a judgement gauge and 
indicator (Finucane et al, 2000; Slovic, Peters, Finucane, & MacGregor, 2005).  In a clinical 
setting, whether or not a junior doctor decides to consult a senior colleague about the 
significance of a patient’s vague symptoms, may be influenced by the instantaneous positive or 
negative gut feelings they connect with the choice facing them which is based on their past 
experience.  If their previous experience of consulting the senior colleague was positive (e.g. 
they felt proud because the senior colleague praised them for their assertiveness) they are more 
likely to consult the colleague.  If the doctor’s previous experience of consulting the senior 
colleague was negative (e.g. they felt embarrassed because the senior colleague spoke sharply to 
them for wasting their time) they are more likely to avoid seeking the colleague’s opinion.  As 
health professionals regularly work in highly emotional environments, under sustained stressful 
and time constrained conditions, the affect heuristic may direct judgement when urgent clinical 
decisions are required (Croskerry, 2002). 
 
It is unclear when heuristics are advantageous or detrimental in clinical judgement. 
Instantaneous judgement involved in heuristics may sometimes lead to biases and interpretation 
mistakes (Elstein, 1999; Finucane et al., 2000; Graber et al., 2002). Croskerry (2003) lists over 
thirty cognitive heuristics and biases which can result in diagnostic error.  He suggests that 
errors often occur due to a mismatch between clinical conditions, or social situations and an 
individual’s ability to accurately interpret information (Croskerry, 2009a; Croskerry, 2009b). 
For example, confirmatory bias may lead to health professionals fixating on an incorrect course 
of information gathering due to the initial diagnosis generated when first encountering a patient 
(Klein, 2005,) while hindsight bias has been implicated in contaminating diagnostic second 
opinions (Henriksen & Kaplan, 2003).   
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Less is known about the role of the affect heuristic in clinical judgement (Croskerry et al., 2008, 
2010), but it may be an important component when diagnosis requires a rapid reaction to the 
specific features and characteristics of a patient (Croskerry et al., 2008, 2010).  The initial 
perception of others and the immediate reactions to their specific features and characteristics 
may sometimes be based on stereotypes, and this process may have implications for diagnostic 
decision making (Bodenhausen, 2005; Geirsson, Hensing, & Spak, 2009). Bodenhausen (2005) 
suggests that stereotyping creates an “illusion of accuracy” (p.113), when faced with complex 
patient information.  During patient presentations, affect based heuristics may make a doctor 
focus on features or information which complement their own embedded affect-based beliefs or 
associations.  These features or information then become salient for diagnosis. An example of 
this was found in a study involving Swedish general practitioners, who were presented with 
vignettes of either male or female patients detailing symptoms and signs which indicated 
alcohol dependence, or symptoms without signs of alcohol dependence.  It was found that 
across both types of presentations while male patients, in comparison to female patients tended 
to be advised to cut down on their drinking, female patients in comparison to male patients were 
more likely to be advised to stop drinking altogether.  It was also found that female patients 
were more likely to be referred for complementary therapy in comparison to male patients.  This 
suggests that affect-based gendered perceptions concerning alcohol-related problems may have 
influenced their clinical management of male and female patients (Geirsson et al., 2009).  
 
Diagnostic overshadowing (Reiss, Levitan, & Szysko, 1982) may be another example of how 
affect-based heuristics can result in health professionals wrongly attributing a patient’s co-
existing or newly reported symptoms to a previously diagnosed condition.  This has been found 
to be prevalent in patients whose symptoms of mental or physical illness have been erroneously 
considered to be due to a known and established intellectual disability (Garner, Strohmer, 
Langford, & Boas, 1994; Spengler, Strohmer, & Prout, 1990) and is also considered to be a 
factor in the misdiagnosis of a range of co-morbid conditions in primary care (Kostopoulou et 
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al., 2008a).  As the positive and negative affect felt towards frequent attender patients have been 
shown to impact GPs’ clinical decisions and actions (Bellon et al., 2002), it is reasonable to 
assume that these feelings may have a role in diagnostic error and could account for some 
inequalities in healthcare.      
 
There is a need for more research which explores the use of, and interplay between, affect-based 
and cognitive-based heuristics in diagnostic decision making.  In particular, it is important to 
identify the clinical circumstances, contexts, for which type of patients they are used, and 
whether their use facilitates or jeopardizes diagnostic reasoning (Croskerry et al., 2010; Elstein, 
2009; Norman, 2009). 
 
 
2.6  Types of affect 
Research from outside healthcare also suggests that different types of affect that are experienced 
by an individual are important in decision making. Studies indicate that mood states, 
anticipatory affect (instantaneous visceral responses) and anticipated affect (thoughts of future 
feelings) all appear to impact judgement and choice and may help to provide further 
understanding of how affect influences diagnostic judgement.  
 
2.6.1  Mood states  
Mood is often viewed as an extension of core affect. Core affect can be considered as a general 
level of emotional equilibrium that the individual unconsciously tries to maintain (Russell, 
2003).  While it is posited that core affect is not generated in response to a particular stimulus, 
mood may often be traceable to a particular event or object (Russell, 2003).  According to 
Waters (2008), affective states are often regarded as either integral affect (the visceral feelings 
in direct response to the stimulus provoking a judgement or decision which is discussed in the 
following section on anticipatory affect); or as incidental affect (emotional states, such as mood, 
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which although may influence everyday decisions, originate from prior events unrelated to the 
stimulus requiring immediate judgement).  
 
Incidental affect is a transitory emotional state which originates from prior events unrelated to 
the stimulus requiring immediate judgement (e.g. receiving good news just before attending a 
patient consultation results in you attending the consultation in a happy mood) and has been 
found to influence a variety of risk perceptions (Bruyneel, Dewitte, Franses, & Dekimpe, 2008; 
Caruso & Shafir, 2006).  In a review of 34 experimental, quasi-experimental and correlational 
studies, Waters (2008) found that in general, studies demonstrated that negative mood was 
related to judging that more negative health hazards and life events would occur, and that 
positive hazards and events were less likely.  On the other hand, positive mood produced 
optimism so that more positive and less negative events were judged as being more likely.  
Research has also found that everyday behavioural choices may be driven by attempts to 
maintain a positive mood state or regulate negative affect.  For example, in one study, Caruso 
and Shafir (2006) found that when an individual’s positive current mood was made salient this 
tended to result in choices that corresponded with their current positive mood.  Alternatively, 
when the individual’s negative mood was made salient, this appeared to cause them to indulge 
in a behaviour which would help to regulate their negative mood.  Furthermore, Bruyneel et al. 
(2008) posit a much more complex explanation of risk-related decisions, arguing that the 
continual effort required in the regulation of negative affect leads to the draining of resources 
needed for self-control.  This process, also known as “ego depletion” (Baumeister, Bratslavsky, 
Muraven, & Tice, 1998), results in an inability to successfully resist risk.  
 
There is only limited research in healthcare suggesting that mood may be important in directing 
diagnostic decisions and behaviour.  Isen, Rosenzweig, & Young (1991), found a manipulation 
to increase positive emotion in doctors, resulted in faster diagnostic choices and a tendency to 
show more concern and interest in the case. Another study involved the completion of a self-
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report questionnaire exploring 188 primary care physicians’ perceptions of how their mood 
influenced their behaviour with patients (Kushnir, Kushnir, Sarel, & Cohen, 2011). It was found 
that the physicians perceived that on days when they were in a negative mood they talked less to 
patients and were more likely to refer them for laboratory or diagnostic tests, or for 
consultations with a specialist, while on positive mood days they perceived that they engaged in 
inverse behaviour. However, while this study demonstrates that primary care physicians 
perceive that their positive and negative mood produces different clinical behaviour, it does not 
provide direct evidence that mood would have the same effect during the real-time clinical 
decisions that they make. Further studies which assess the impact of positive and negative mood 
on real-time clinical decisions are required.  
 
Schwarz (1997) argues that mood directly alters the way an individual processes and reacts 
towards information. Martin, Ward, Achee and Wyer’s (1993) experimental study found that 
across stimulus-based and memory-based tasks, when asking to stop was an indication that 
adequate information had been gathered those in a positive mood requested stopping before 
those in a negative mood.  In contrast, when the stop request indicated cessation of task 
enjoyment doing the task, those in a negative mood requested stopping before those in a 
positive mood.  These findings suggest that positive and negative moods inform behavioural 
motivations and decisions by communicating current task progress or enjoyment of the task in 
hand, and in turn, whether information processing needs to be continued or stopped.  
 
In another study exploring perception and judgement of others, Avramova and Stapel (2008) 
found that positive affect tended to direct focus to broader, abstract features of the person, while 
induced negative affect directed focus to more specific, confined details.  These findings clearly 
have implications for the behavioural and decisional motivations of healthcare professionals 
during the diagnostic process.  In particular, they suggest that the positive or negative affect that 
a clinician may bring to a case may influence how much information the clinician gathers in 
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order to make a diagnosis and suggest that mood may have an important role in determining the 
type of details that become more noticeable when presented with clinical information. 
Furthermore, studies examining the processing of stereotypical features suggest that affect may 
also influence how such information is used in decision making.  Positive affect has been shown 
to make the use of heuristic-based stereotyping more likely, while negative affect appears to 
reduce its use (Park & Banaji, 2000).  There is also evidence to suggest that individuals in sad 
moods tend to adjust negative, but not positive stereotyping when making judgements (Lambert, 
Khan, Lickel, & Fricke, 1997).  This may indicate that whether information based on 
stereotyping is or is not used in clinical decision making, may be influenced by the affect that 
the healthcare professional is currently feeling.     
    
Although studies have found some evidence that negative mood states appear to increase the 
tendency to take more risks (Hockey, Maule, Clough, & Bdzola, 2000; Pezza Leith & 
Baumeister, 1996), there are discrepancies in the findings.  The work of Lerner and Keltner 
(2000, 2001)
 
demonstrates that different negative emotions lead to different appraisal 
tendencies.  So, while anger can cause individuals to consider they have more control over a 
situation, which leads to more risk-taking, anxiety can lead to feelings of low personal control, 
and therefore an aversion to risk.  This suggests that the relationship between positive and 
negative affect and information gathering may be much more complex. Lerner and Tiedens 
(2006) posit that such findings may be embedded in the temporal motivation and goals attached 
to different affect.  For example they suggest that the recollection of angry situations from the 
past tend to be associated with being unpleasant and devoid of reward, while the prospect of 
using anger in future situations may be associated with more pleasant feelings due to a sense of 
the possibility of potential reward.  Furthermore, Pezza Leith and Baumeister (1996) conclude 
that because anger (an emotion that is likely to induce high arousal in an individual) appears to 
increase risk-taking, while sadness (an emotion associated with low arousal) appears to produce 
a decrease in risky choice, that high arousal may be a contributing factor to risk-taking. 
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Indeed, Lerner and Keltner (2000) propose “a model of emotion-specific influences on 
judgement and choice” (p. 473). and emphasize the importance of establishing and identifying 
not only how positive and negative emotion influence decision making under different 
situations, but how specific emotions impact judgement and choice.  Such findings highlight 
that incorporating the different elements of positive or negative mood under one category of 
positive or negative affect is problematic.  It also emphasises the importance of establishing and 
identifying not only how positive and negative affect influence diagnostic decision making 
under different situations, but how specific emotions impact diagnostic judgement and choice.  
 
2.6.2  Anticipatory affect 
Immediate affective reactions to stimuli can produce strong visceral states (e.g. feeling anger 
when a patient is verbally abusive).  Evidence suggests that visceral states can direct decisions 
and behaviour in a number of settings and contexts (Ariely & Loewenstein, 2006; Nordgren, 
van der Pligt, & Harreveld, 2008).  Of particular interest, is the apparent capacity for visceral 
feelings to sometimes guide behaviour and decisions in favour of risk-taking behaviour and 
judgements which result in the least optimal outcomes.  
 
An important finding within literature examining visceral states and impulsive and risky 
behaviour is the “empathy-gap effect” (Ariely & Loewenstein, 2006; Nordgren, van Harreveld, 
& van der Pligt, 2009).  This refers to the finding that when individuals are asked to think about 
how a stimulus or situation may make them feel, when they are in a “cold” non-aroused state 
(e.g. a doctor writing up a patient management plan), they seem unable to invoke a feeling of 
visceral arousal and tend to misjudge how being in a “hot” aroused condition (e.g. the doctor 
performing CPR when the patient unexpectedly goes into cardiac arrest) impacts their decisions 
and actions.  In the area of health psychology, experiments which have used the manipulation 
and comparison of individuals in hot states (e.g. a smoker craving for a cigarette) and cold states 
(e.g. a smoker who has smoked and has satisfied their need for a cigarette) have found that 
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when an individual’s current state is one of heightened arousal (e.g. in a higher hot state), 
judgements concerning smoking and sexual behaviour appear to be driven by visceral state, 
rather than a more logical appraisal of whether the chosen behaviour or decision is most 
beneficial to one’s health or is in accordance to morally acceptable conduct (Ariely & 
Loewenstein, 2006; Nordgren et al., 2008).   
 
Furthermore, choice tasks in gambling games (Bechara, Damasio, Damasio, & Anderson, 1994; 
Bechara et al., 1997), have suggested that advantageous decision making is dependent upon the 
appropriate interpretation of affective-based physiological responses (Bechara et al., 1994, 
1997), and indicates that increased visceral arousal triggered by active involvement (e.g. 
unwrapping a pack of cigarettes and igniting a lighter) might explain the propensity to 
undertake higher risks (Martinez et al., 2009).  As detailed earlier, a healthcare provider’s 
immediate visceral reaction to patients (Amato, 2007; Bellon et al., 2002),  rather than a logical 
appraisal of their condition or injury, may drive clinical judgement and behaviour irrespective of 
whether these decisions and actions are the most beneficial or adhere to professionally 
acceptable conduct (Loewenstein, 2005).  For example, a patient who a healthcare provider feels 
is feigning pain may be given a lower dose of painkiller, or none at all.  
 
Outside healthcare, impulse-control beliefs have been tested with behavioural measures of self-
control for hunger and cigarette craving (Nordgren et al., 2009).  Evidence of a “restraint bias” 
(Nordgren et al., 2009) demonstrated that inaccurate beliefs that temptation can be withstood 
actually resulted in individuals being more likely to position themselves in high risk situations 
as part of their self-control strategies, and consequently indulging in the behaviour they believed 
they could resist.  This suggests that if it is possible to find a way for clinicians to employ more 
evaluative and calculated approaches which consciously counter-act the power of strong 
visceral impulses during the diagnostic process, erroneous diagnostic judgement may be 
reduced.  It also implies that to improve collective judgements, strategies which raise clinical 
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team members’ awareness of each individual’s tendency to be influenced by affective factors 
when making clinical decisions need to be developed (Croskerry et al., 2010).  
 
2.6.3  Anticipated affect 
Anticipated affect refers to an individual’s conscious consideration of how their current actions 
may make them feel in the future (e.g. If I do not order the test because I think I know what the 
problem is, but discover that my first guess was wrong, I will regret it later).  The role of regret 
and, in particular, avoidance of post-decisional regret, appears to play an important role in 
decisions involving risk and uncertainty.  For example, it has been found that individuals who 
watched a video in which a driver’s post-decisional regret of driving over the speed limit was 
made salient, become more risk-averse when considering their own driving behaviour (Parker et 
al., 1996).  In contrast, maximising anticipated pleasure and minimising displeasure has been 
found to influence decision making during gambling scenarios (Bonniot-Cabanac & Cabanac, 
2009; Mellers & McGraw, 2001).  Whether the anticipated emotion impacting risky decisions is 
positive or negative in nature, may also be a reflection of how frequently the behavioural 
outcome of the risky decision has actually been, or is likely to be experienced (Lawton et al., 
1997). 
 
Connolly and Zeelenberg (2002), suggest that decision justification theory explains the main 
components which lead to regret.  These are the tendency for individuals to weigh the outcome 
of the choice favoured against the choice discarded, and the inclination to blame themselves for 
choices made.  In a review of a number of studies of decision making under uncertainty, 
Zeelenberg (1999) showed that when individuals expected to learn the outcome of discarded 
choices, they engaged in either increased or decreased risk-taking, dependent on whether they 
believed that the risk choice chosen would protect them from experiencing the most regret. 
Selecting and discarding choices is a pivotal part of the diagnostic decision making process.  As 
such, more focused empirical research examining whether clinicians’ choices are based on 
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avoiding or experiencing specific future emotions, and whether those choices augment or 
compromise optimal diagnostic judgements, would progress understanding of the role of 
anticipated affect in diagnostic performance.      
 
Van Dijk and Zeelenberg (2006), demonstrated that students presented with scenarios where 
positive or negative outcomes were uncertain, had lower scores for both predicted positive 
anticipated feelings (satisfaction, happiness and feeling good) and predicted negative anticipated 
feelings (disappointment, unpleasantness and feeling bad), than students presented with 
scenarios where the outcome was certain.  The authors suggest that uncertain, as opposed to 
certain outcomes, blunts consideration of the outcomes, which consequently dulls emotional 
response.  This dulling effect on emotions, known as the disjunction effect (Tversky & Shafir, 
1992), may hinder the affective-based feedback crucial for generating the sense of 
comprehension and control which are important components in rational decision making, and 
may result in sub-optimal choices.  While little is known about the role of anticipated affect in 
diagnostic decision making, these findings have clear implications for medicine, where 
decisions with uncertain outcomes are routine, or where the feedback on outcomes of decisions 
may be delayed or unknown.  Further research now needs to establish what types of uncertain 
clinical outcomes increase or diminish affective-based feedback, and under what clinical 
circumstances this assists or impedes decision making.      
 
 
2.7  Current knowledge gaps 
This review of current knowledge from inside and outside healthcare highlighted that the role of 
affect in diagnostic decision making is still relatively unexplored (Croskerry et al., 2008, 2010; 
Iedema et al., 2009; Ubel, 2005).  So far, progress has mainly been theoretical or based on 
anecdotal evidence.  It is now important to extend knowledge of diagnostic decision making 
processes beyond a cognitive approach and to understand how and why affect influences 
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diagnostic performance.  In order to make progress, current models explaining how system 1 
and system 2 processing interacts during diagnostic decision making must be further refined. 
One way of achieving this is by identifying the sources and types of affect that influence 
diagnostic decision making, establishing the mechanisms involved in the processing of affective 
factors, and assessing how they affect clinical outcomes. 
 
 
2.8  Research plan 
In an attempt to address the main thesis aims described in Chapter 1, this research presents a set 
of empirical studies with health professionals and medical students that used clinical scenarios 
to examine the role of affect in diagnostic decision making in emergency care.  Due to the 
exploratory nature of the research, quantitative methodology using experimental methods 
(Chapters 4 and 5, correlational methods (Chapter 6), and qualitative methodology using 
individual interviews (Chapter 7) were utilised during this research.  A mixed methods approach 
was taken in order to attain an accurate, balanced, and thorough appraisal of the influence of 
affect on diagnostic judgement.  An explanation of the approach taken is described in Chapter 3.  
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CHAPTER 3 
METHODOLOGICAL AND CONTEXTUAL CONSIDERATIONS 
 
3.1  Introduction 
This chapter describes the epistemological approaches underlying the mixed methods employed 
in this research, and defines and explains key concepts and measures.  The challenges of patient 
safety research and conducting research in a healthcare setting are also discussed.      
 
 
3.2  Methodology 
3.2.1  Philosophical underpinnings 
It is suggested that a researcher should address the “philosophical worldview” (p.5) which 
shapes the design of a programme of research to help facilitate transparency in the reasoning 
behind the strategies and methods chosen (Creswell, 2009).  In this thesis, specific research 
methods will be discussed in the chapters describing each empirical study.  This section will 
explain the main philosophical considerations for taking a mixed method approach to examine 
the role of affect in diagnostic decision making.    
 
Traditionally, knowledge about decision making under risk and uncertainty has been informed 
by an experimental approach, taking place in lab-based, highly controlled conditions 
(Kahneman, 2011; Klein, 2008).  Experimental designs have been utilised in research testing 
judgement as a rational process based on algorithmic decision strategies of utility and 
probability (Von Neumann & Morgenstern, 1947), and in research examining non-rational 
processes in decision making such as heuristics (Tversky & Kahneman, 1973) and affect 
(Bechara et al., 1994; Finucane et al., 2000; Loewenstein et al., 2001).  However, the 
positivistic foundation of experimental strategies to obtain an understanding of decision making 
has been criticised for the lack of consideration of the domain, context, and setting which are 
36 
 
specific to the real-life situations where risky decisions are made (Crandall, Klein & Hoffman, 
2006; Klein, 2008).  This view is supported within clinical decision making literature.  For 
example, in “How Doctor’s Think”, Jerome Groopman (2008), provides numerous clinical 
examples where applying a Bayesian solution to diagnostic decision making does not account 
for the way that health professionals make diagnostic judgements with complex, dynamic, and 
conflicting information.             
 
In order to try and attain a plausible and comprehensive understanding of diagnostic decision 
making, on completion of the narrative literature review detailed in Chapter 2, it was decided 
that a mixed methods procedure utilising a Concurrent Transformative Strategy
1
 approach 
(Creswell, 2009) would: 1) enable the theoretical framework of Cognitive-Experiential Self-
Theory, (CEST: Epstein, 1994) and Risk as Feelings (Loewenstein et al., 2001) to shape the 
design of studies; and 2) allow for triangulation
2
 of data collected by quantitative and qualitative 
methods to interpret whether results refute or support theoretical perspectives, or suggest that 
current theoretical models should be extended.  
 
Crotty (1998) suggests that an epistemology, “is a way of understanding and explaining how we 
know what we know.” (p. 3).  This programme of research uses quantitative and qualitative 
methods underpinned by the epistemological perspective of subtle realism (Hammersley, 1990). 
The methods support the tenet of subtle realism that in order to gain a perspective of the reality 
of the phenomena under study, the context in which this process takes place should be 
                                                 
1
 Concurrent Transformative Strategy (Creswell, 2009) is a mixed methods approach that simultaneously 
collects quantitative and qualitative data in order to inform the research objectives derived from a 
theoretical framework. 
2
 Denzin (1970) splits triangulation into several types, and “methodological triangulation” is one of these. 
It is a technique for joining together the findings derived from various research methods. While it can be 
used to validate results, Pope & Mays (2006) suggest that for mixed methods, the data collected from 
different approaches should be viewed as complementary and combined to attain a broader insight into 
the phenomena in question. It is this use of triangulation that is employed for the data collected by 
quantitative and qualitative methods in this thesis.    
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authentically represented, reconstructed or reflected.  It also allowed for combining mixed 
methods to provide a more rich and varied insight into the research topic (Pope and Mays, 
2006).  Therefore, experimental studies in Chapter 4 and Chapter 5 explored the influence of 
affect on  information gathering for diagnosis by using every day clinical scenarios and 
diagnostic stages to elicit doctors’ and medical students’ responses.  In Chapter 6, clinical 
simulation was used to explore the influence of affect on perceptions of communication 
performance and team effectiveness during critical incidents in junior doctors and nurses.  This 
extracted knowledge from health professionals when they were interacting in, and responding 
to, situations that reflected their lived-in world.  Finally, the individual interviews with doctors 
are presented in Chapter 7.  These interviews drew on accounts of clinical practice to gain 
knowledge of the diagnostic decision making process that takes place within the social and 
situational context in which they occurred.   
 
 
3.3  Measures 
3.3.1  The measurement of affect 
Experiential self-reports, behaviour and physiological states are all ways in which affective 
response to stimuli can be measured.  In a recent review of these measures of emotion, Mauss &  
Robinson (2009) concluded that there was evidence to suggest that self-report measures 
appeared to be most suitable to capturing the current affective states of valence and arousal. 
They also determined that different types of behavioural and physiological measures 
demonstrated higher sensitivity to either valence (e.g. electromyography (EMG) of facial 
behaviours) or arousal (e.g. vocal pitch or amplitude).  However, they concluded that while 
current measures of emotion, such as self-report and autonomic nervous system (ANS), 
appeared to better reflect the affective dimensions of valence and arousal, rather than specific 
emotions (e.g. happiness, anger) “there is no ‘gold standard’ measure of emotional responding.” 
(p. 228).  
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While it may be desirable that methods be wholly guided by the theoretical framework 
underlying a programme of research, it is also acknowledged that in reality the demands of 
conducting research in an applied field necessitates that pragmatic aspects such as time, 
resources and inconvenience for participants are also considered (Brannen, 1992).  Therefore, 
when choosing measures of affect, the setting and context in which studies were conducted also 
played a significant role in determining the suitability of the possible choices.  As the target 
sample was doctors working in an acute hospital setting, attaining the support of clinical leads 
and doctors within participating Trusts was imperative to the success of the studies.  Therefore, 
clinicians were consulted in the design of each study (see individual empirical study method 
sections) to ascertain the feasibility and limitations of particular types of measurement.  As 
studies either took place on Trust premises, or recruitment materials were distributed within 
participating Trusts, feedback suggested that the time required for participation should be kept 
to a minimum so as not to be considered an unacceptable burden by both participating doctors 
and clinical leads.  The busy and changeable daily workloads of the doctors also meant that 
where possible, it was important to allow flexibility to participate, so that this could be done 
during their own free time. 
 
It was therefore decided that self-report measures of affect would be used in the research studies 
presented in this thesis as they would: 1) facilitate a consistent approach which would allow 
comparison and contrast of the influence of affect across samples and contexts; 2) enable the 
measurement of both the affective dimensions of valence and arousal; 3) assist in gaining 
knowledge about the role of specific discrete emotions in diagnostic decision making; 4) be 
amenable to all study designs and settings; and 5) be the least burdensome and efficient way to 
measure affective response in an applied, time-restrictive setting. 
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3.3.2  Defining affect 
Research examining affect and decision making has been criticised for incongruous and unclear 
use of terminology and a lack of emphasis on understanding both the unique roles of different 
types of affect, as well as the function and impact of interplay and feedback loops (Baumeister, 
DeWall, & Zhang, 2007a; Baumeister, Vohs, DeWall, & Zhang, 2007; Sjoberg, 2006). 
Baumeister et al. (2007a) argue that the tendency for theorists to use the terms affect and 
emotion synonymously hinders the understanding of the role of two fundamentally distinctive 
“emotional phenomena” (p. 12) related to decision making.  It is posited that affect is an 
instantaneous reaction to situations or stimuli which is largely devoid of mindful awareness.  
Thus, affect-based decision making is characterised by automaticity and speed. Emotion on the 
other hand, is regarded to be a more gradual, wholly mindful response to situations or stimuli.  
Emotion-based decision making is therefore characterised as being reflective and less rapid.  
Due to the use of these terms interchangeably in the literature, it is often not possible to 
distinguish their roles in decision making instances. While this distinction merits further 
investigation, the scope of this thesis does not allow for the examination of the individual roles 
of affect and emotion, as defined by Baumeister et al. (2007a), in diagnostic decision making.   
 
However, in the review, literature from within healthcare identified sources of affect that 
appeared to be pertinent for diagnostic judgement, while literature from outside healthcare 
determined an appropriate theoretical framework which could be used to explain how and why 
these affective sources influence diagnostic decision making.  Therefore, the studies included in 
this thesis do attempt to be explicit in terms of assessing the specific and interactional influences 
that sources (e.g. patient, team, previous experience) and types (e.g. mood, anticipatory affect, 
anticipated affect) of affect have on diagnostic decision making.  The studies also attempt to 
identify the specific emotions (e.g. anger, happiness etc.) that feature in diagnostic judgement, 
and to determine their role.  
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3.3.3  Defining and measuring diagnostic decision making 
It has been argued that much current work has incorrectly approached diagnosis as a static 
decision problem (Wears, 2009). Drawing upon Klein, Orasanu, Calderwood, & Zsambok’s, 
(1993) naturalistic decision making (NDM) approach and Rasmussen’s (1993) notion of 
decision making as process reliant on interconnected action sequences, Wears (2009) 
emphasises that in reality diagnostic decision making is a dynamic process.  He proposes that 
although reasoned diagnostic decision making is considered to follow a logical sequence 
moving from initial activation to observation and identification, and finally leading to task 
definition, step formulation and execution; real-life diagnostic decision making actually jumps 
between these stages, depending on continuous feedback from ever changing developments and 
outcomes.  
 
While diagnosis is a dynamic decision problem, researchers have broken the diagnostic decision 
making process into distinct stages (Kostopoulou et al., 2008b; Schiff et al., 2009; Wear, 2009).  
For example, Schiff et al. (2009) used the DEER taxonomy tool to divide the diagnostic process 
into seven distinct stages of access/presentation, history, physical exam, tests, assessment, 
referral/consultation and follow-up, in order to identify at what stage diagnostic error occurred 
and, what went wrong within each stage, across 669 cases which involved 310 clinicians.  As 
the objective of this thesis is to identify whether sources and types of affect influence the 
decisions made for diagnosis, it was helpful to draw upon the work described above to assist in 
clearly distinguishing distinct stages involved in the diagnostic process, and to determine the 
specific actions requiring decisions within each stage.  The stages and decision actions which 
formed the model used to distinguish the processes involved in diagnostic decision making in 
this thesis are shown in Figure 3.1.  
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Figure 3.1  Proposed rational stages and decision actions involved in the diagnostic process 
(adapted from Schiff et al., 2009; Rasmussen, 1993; Vicente, 1999; Wears, 2009). 
 
The approach of dividing the diagnostic process into distinct stages and actions allowed 
appropriate measures which would be able to single out specific decisions to be identified or 
developed.  This enabled the examination of whether, and what type of affect influenced a 
specific diagnostic stage or action; the exploration of what the implications of decision choices 
at a particular stage were; and to determine whether this would be likely to impact progression 
through further diagnostic decision stages (Kostopoulou et al., 2008b; Schiff et al., 2009; Wear, 
2009).          
 
3.3.4  Case management 
The complex nature of diagnosis, due to the need for constant reappraisal following assimilation 
and synthesis of intricate and changeable information, has already been discussed in section 
3.3.3.  In addition to this, when a patient presents with signs and symptoms for diagnosis, part 
of their healthcare also requires the clinician to stabilise or ameliorate their presenting 
symptoms, whether or not a clear diagnosis has been made.  Feedback was sought from both 
senior and junior doctors across three specialties regarding how decisions made for diagnosis 
would be most accurately reflected in the research contained in this thesis.  They indicated that 
INFORMATION 
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•ACTIVATION: 
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•OBSERVATION: History, 
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• IDENTIFICATION: 
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INFORMATION 
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INFORMATION 
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whether clinicians’ diagnosis was guided by an immediate intuitive response to a patient’s 
presentation, or whether it was ascertained through a slower and more logical process, possible 
differential diagnoses would be a central factor in the immediate treatment and/or actions 
implemented.  Feedback also suggested that in some cases, a patient’s response to either 
immediate treatment or a longer period of management may also assist in reaching a definitive 
diagnosis.  
 
The important link between diagnosis and case management for safe patient outcomes is further 
supported in research.  For example, one study found that when family doctors were presented 
with diagnostic scenarios, inappropriate management that could have been potentially harmful 
was planned in 78% of incorrectly diagnosed cases (Kostopoulou et al., 2008b).  Furthermore, it 
is also possible that a patient’s positive or negative response to treatment and actions may alter 
expected trajectories and may contribute to misdiagnosis or diagnostic delay.  Therefore, it was 
decided that where appropriate, case management decisions would be included as a distinct sub-
category of diagnostic decision making.       
 
3.3.5  Team communication  
Studies looking directly at clinical judgements suggest that team factors may play a role in 
decision making (Christensen et al., 2000; Leonard et al., 2004; Reader et al., 2006).  In a 
clinical team context, health professionals must communicate relevant clinical information and 
their interpretation of patient symptoms to each other to ensure timely and appropriate case 
management.  However, research has shown that health professionals sometimes hold different 
views concerning the need for emergency care for patients, despite all being presented with the 
same information (Gill, Reese & Diamond, 1996).  This highlights the importance of clear 
communication within clinical teams. 
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How and whether clinical information important for diagnosis and the most appropriate case 
management is shared, may be influenced by affective  responses and reactions of individuals to 
working in hostile and intimidating or cheerful and supportive teams.  Although team factors 
may be important sources of affect for clinical decision making, studies directly examining the 
role of affect in clinical team decision making, which replicate the real-life contexts and settings 
in which clinical teams make decisions, are scarce.  It was therefore decided that within the set 
of studies here, quantitative and qualitative methodologies would be used to address this 
knowledge gap in order to advance the understanding of the affective features of team 
communication.  More specifically, these methods would be used to assess whether there was a 
relationship between affect and perceptions of individual and team communication performance 
and effectiveness in clinical situations involving teams of healthcare professionals. 
 
 
3.4  Context 
3.4.1  Challenges of patient safety research 
The main aim of patient safety research is to identify factors involved in sub-optimal or unsafe 
clinical practices, cognition and behaviour, and to develop interventions which adjust, mitigate 
or defend against these harmful factors in order to improve clinical outcomes.  However, it is 
suggested that issues with, “visibility, ambiguity, complexity, and autonomy” (p. 2) contribute 
to difficulties with engaging healthcare professionals and organisations in patient safety 
research and initiatives (see Leistikow, Kalkman, & de Bruijn, 2011).  Therefore, it was 
possible that using a psychological approach to identify a potential patient safety problem may 
be interpreted by healthcare professionals and organisations as being forged purely to satisfy the 
perspective of the researcher’s discipline.  The success of any patient safety research is 
dependent on the support and uptake of Research Ethics Committees, Trust Research and 
Development departments, healthcare professionals, and managers.  Due to this, patient safety 
strategies must attempt to reconcile any tension between different perspectives. In order to 
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mitigate this, it was pivotal that approval bodies and healthcare professionals and managers 
were convinced of the relevance of the topic to patient safety.  In order to do this it was 
important that study research proposals demonstrated that the theoretical framework was 
founded on robust methods and explicit causal processes (Mark, Hughes, & Jones, 2004), and 
could be appraised through transparent, replicable methods (Foy et al., 2011).  
 
3.4.2  Applying theory and empirical evidence to the healthcare setting 
Contrasting opinions regarding the relevance of laboratory based, or other industry findings to a 
specific organizational context are rife in the research arena (Hodgkinson & Healey, 2008). 
While it is argued that transferability of results from different settings should be viewed with 
caution, there are increasing numbers of researchers and policy makers calling for healthcare 
quality and safety research to draw upon current knowledge, and the rigorously assessed 
methods and theories that underpin it (Foy et al., 2011; Mark et al., 2004; Parker & Lawton, 
2003).  Rather than being pre-occupied with highlighting the potential mismatches between 
different research approaches, the advancement of knowledge on how to provide safe healthcare 
is reliant on information from relevant past research and the ability to select and incorporate the 
most useful and previously tested approaches and methods: 
 
“Arbitrary distinctions between basic and applied health research obscure a balanced view of 
the scientific basis of health and health care. Indeed, a fundamental weakness of the past has 
been the failure to make appropriate use of scientific methods to ensure that the products of 
science and technology are fully exploited in practice.” (Peckham, 1996, Foreword)                        
 
Therefore, theory and empirical evidence are not only central to establishing and defining the 
variables that are important within a specific patient safety context; they also allow relational 
components and processes to be clearly illustrated, appropriately measured, tested, and modified 
(Mark et al., 2004).  
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This thesis examines how and why non-rational processes may be integral to clinical decision 
making, and in a large part, focuses on healthcare professionals at an individual level in order to 
identify which sources and types of affect impact their thought processes during everyday 
practice.  Therefore, it was important to consider how the research topic of affect and diagnostic 
decision making would be supported and received by healthcare professionals.  While 
supporting clinicians and review bodies approached the research with interest, one health 
professional expressed a more general response below,  
 
“Many (clinicians) may appreciate they have emotions, but few will appreciate the real or 
possible influence this will have on their decision making or their reaction to patients and 
colleagues around them.” (Consultant) 
 
As demonstrated in the literature review in Chapter 2, one explanation for this response may be 
that clinical decision making has traditionally been considered to be a wholly rational process 
(Croskerry et al., 2008, 2010; Pani & Chariker, 2004; Parker & Lawton, 2003).  Furthermore, 
the last decade has seen a shift from assigning clinical error to individual factors, to adopting a 
systems approach, where error in clinical judgement is attributed to the conditions and practices 
that are inherent in clinical settings and organisations (Burgess, 2009; Fogarty & McKeon, 
2006; Institute of Medicine, 1999; Mesman, 2009; Nolan, 2000; Reason, 1997, 2000). 
 
This research challenges the embedded belief that clinical decision making is a purely rational 
process and posits that alongside the current emphasis on a systems approach to patient safety 
research, there is also a need to further understand the role of healthcare professionals’ own 
thought processes in clinical decision making.  The tension between these different perspectives 
is acknowledged in healthcare literature (Croskerry et al., 2008, 2010; Esmail, 2006; Leistikow, 
Kalkman, & de Bruijn, 2011; Ubel, 2005).  Weick and Sutcliffe (2003) suggest that hospitals 
are organizations where “cultural entrapment” (p. 73) can lead to those that work within them to 
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fail to notice new or alternative approaches to safety problems due to a collective fixation on 
established practices and beliefs.  While prevailing assumptions about healthcare practice may 
still shape healthcare systems, the research presented in the remaining chapters examines the 
evidence for adopting a new approach to further our understanding of diagnostic decision 
making.     
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CHAPTER 4 
USING EXPERIMENTAL METHODOLOGY TO EXAMINE THE INFLUENCE OF 
AFFECT ON FACTS CHOSEN FOR INFORMATION GATHERING IN DIAGNOSIS 
 
4.1  Introduction 
In this and the next chapter, three experimental studies are presented which examine the role of 
affect in diagnostic information gathering.  This chapter describes the development of an online 
questionnaire that was used with medical students and doctors to examine the impact of affect 
on information gathering for diagnosis and case management.  The first section of this chapter 
presents the results of a preliminary study in which the manipulation of anticipatory affect in 
response to affective cues in written clinical scenarios was assessed.  The final section presents 
a second study which used the online questionnaire to examine affective responses to affective 
cues and sources of affect in written clinical scenarios in medical students.  It also details the 
results of methods designed to examine whether affect influenced the appropriateness of facts 
considered important for diagnosis and thoroughness of information gathering for diagnosis in 
medical students and discusses possible explanations of the findings.  Chapter 5 presents study 
3, an experimental study examining the influence of affect on thoroughness and order of 
information gathering for diagnosis and case management in a sample of doctors, before 
discussing the limitations and problems encountered with the experimental approaches taken. 
 
4.1.1  Affect and information gathering for diagnosis         
Deciding and acting upon the most likely diagnosis requires a combination of both rational and 
non-rational processing to confirm, disconfirm or reassess whether a diagnosis is correct, or 
when an alternative diagnosis should be considered (Rudolph, Morrison & Carroll, 2009; Wear, 
2009).  In the proposed rational stages and decision actions involved in the diagnostic process 
(see section 3.3.3) information gathering is activated by the initial presentation of the case.  The 
decisions and choices which stem from the initial presentation (e.g. whether to take a further 
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history; whether to perform a physical exam; what tests and investigations to order; what the 
differential diagnoses may be) are likely to be due to what are considered to be the most salient 
facts and features in the initial presentation.   
 
The review in Chapter 2, presented both theoretical and empirical evidence of how affect 
impacts judgement by influencing how and what information is processed.  Evidence that 
positive mood results in individuals focusing on broader, diffuse attributes, while negative 
mood guides individuals to focus on precise and confined details when gathering information 
(Avramova & Stapel, 2008; Isbell, Burns, & Haar, 2005), would appear to be pertinent in what 
is perceived to be the most important and appropriate features in the activation stage of the 
diagnostic decision making process.  Furthermore, as individuals have shown that they consider 
how they may feel in the future when making current decisions (see section 2.6.3), it is 
important to also gain knowledge of the role that anticipated affect plays in diagnostic and 
treatment decisions.      
 
The assertion that quicker, heuristic-based thinking is more likely to occur when individuals are 
feeling in a positive affective state (Isen et al., 1991, Park & Banaji, 2000) or are confident in 
their judgements (Berner & Graber, 2008) while slower, analytical reasoning is believed to 
occur when individuals are experiencing negative affective states (Park & Banaji, 2000) may 
also explain differences in the thoroughness of information gathering for diagnosis.  Diagnostic 
decision making research has used the measure of time to assess a number of clinically relevant 
outcomes such as diagnostic accuracy (Sherbino, Dore, Wood et al., 2012) and time taken to 
make a diagnosis (Kostopoulou et al., 2008b).  However, it is also feasible that differences in 
the time spent on diagnostic tasks may also indicate the thoroughness of information processing 
(Isen et al., 1991).  Similarly, in medical settings clinical notes concerning a patient’s 
presentation may also be hand-written or typed into a computer.  The number of words in 
clinical notes may denote the level of detail applied to processing clinical features.  Therefore it 
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is feasible that affect may influence thoroughness of information gathering which may be 
demonstrated through the number of words used and the time taken to detail clinical features.         
As actions which are directed by salient features in a patient presentation directly impact 
progression through further diagnostic stages (Kostopoulou, et al., 2008ab; Mamede et al., 
2013; Schiff et al., 2009), it is crucial that we understand whether affective factors influence 
clinicians’ perceptions and processing of salient facts, and the implications of decisions at this 
diagnostic stage.    
 
 
4.2  Study 1 
4.2.1  Aims 
The aim of study 1 was to serve as a manipulation check for both the study with medical 
students and study 3 with Acute NHS Hospital Trust doctors.  The main objective of this study 
was to examine whether the emergency care vignettes developed for these studies evoked the 
intended anticipatory response (negative, positive and neutral affect).   
 
4.2.2  Hypotheses 
As the main aim of Study 1 is to test the manipulation of affect using positive and negative 
affective cues in clinical case presentations, it was hypothesized that: 
1. Medical students and doctors in the positive affect condition would have higher positive 
anticipatory affect in comparison to medical students and doctors in the negative and 
neutral affect conditions. 
2. Medical students and doctors in the negative affect condition would have higher 
negative anticipatory affect in comparison to medical students and doctors in the 
positive and neutral affect conditions.  
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4.3  Method 
4.3.1  Participants 
Despite the recruitment methods described below, the number of doctors who agreed to 
participate in the study was low and only 31 doctors were recruited.  It was therefore decided 
that the relevant responses from medical students who participated in study 2 would be 
amalgamated with the responses from doctors in study 1 so that the manipulation check could 
be completed (see section 4.7.1 for recruitment of medical students). 
 
The final sample of 124 participants consisted of 25% (n = 31) doctors across all departments 
from one Acute NHS Hospital Trust and 75% (n = 93) Year 4 and Year 5 medical students 
across four UK medical schools.  There were 85 (69%) females and 38 (31) % males (based on 
123 participants due to missing data for 1 participant).  Age ranged from 20 to 54 years with a 
mean of 25.19 (SD = 5.39). 
 
The recruitment of doctors was carried out across one Acute NHS Hospital Trust. Due to the 
general clinical nature of the emergency care scenarios, doctors across all specialties and grades 
were included. Participants were recruited through a variety of methods.  The study advert and 
questionnaire link was posted on the Trust intranet and, on obtaining the Ward Sister’s 
permission was displayed in clinical specialty wards across the Trust. Permission was also 
gained to present brief details of the study and to hand out the study advert at Junior doctor 
sessions and, where permission was gained, at the beginning or end of departmental meetings. 
An email including brief details of the study and the study questionnaire link was also 
distributed on one occasion to University staff employed as doctors in the participating Trust. 
All methods of recruitment provided doctors with the option of completing a paper copy of the 
questionnaire if they felt that this would be more convenient.  No incentive for participation was 
offered.   
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4.3.2  Ethics 
Approval to undertake research with NHS health professionals was granted by NHS (Ref: 
10/H1302/65) and University of Leeds’ Institute of Psychological Sciences’ Research Ethics 
Committees (Ref: 12-0039) and the Trust Research and Development Department.  Approval to 
undertake research with medical students was granted by the Medicine and Dentistry 
Educational Research Ethics Committee at the University of Leeds (Ref: EDREC/10/017), prior 
to approaching and obtaining either further ethical approval or appropriate authorisation from 
individual medical schools.  Care was taken to address all potential ethical issues in the 
Participant Information Sheets and to remind participants of their right to withdraw at any time. 
To protect anonymity, codes made up of letters and numbers were used on all completed 
questionnaires and participants were assured that any email they chose to provide for 
participation in the prize draw would be used only for that purpose.  
 
4.3.3  Design 
The design was an experimental design with three between-participants conditions (whether the 
version of the emergency care scenario read by the participant was designed to promote positive 
affect, negative affect, neutral affect) and three within-participant conditions (all participants 
were presented with one scenario where affect was generated from a patient source, one 
scenario where affect was generated from a team source, and one scenario where affect was 
generated from previous experience).  The dependent variable was the affective response 
(general positive, general negative, hostility, and fear) to the emergency care scenarios. 
 
Block randomisation was used to randomly allocate participants to one of three conditions 
(positive affect, negative affect, or neutral affect).  This was used to balance potential 
extraneous variables across conditions and controlled for researcher bias in the recruitment 
process.  Order of scenario was counterbalanced over six sequences to control for any potential 
effect of order. 
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4.3.4  Materials 
4.3.4.1  Case presentations 
Three emergency care scenarios were developed in collaboration with healthcare professionals 
(Consultant Anaesthetist and Consultant in Elderly Care).  As it was intended that the scenarios 
would also be used in studies with Year 4 and 5 medical students and doctors across all grades 
and specialties, it was decided that the scenarios should contain common clinical presentations. 
The process of ensuring that the scenarios were suitable for Year 4 and Year 5 medical students 
is described in more detail in section 4.7.4.1. 
 
The scenarios were also designed to focus on a specific source of affect. Therefore one scenario 
presented a patient with stomach pain and focused on the patient as the source of affect, one 
scenario presented a patient with chest pain and focused on the clinical team as the source of 
affect, and one scenario presented a patient with respiratory symptoms and focused on previous 
experience as the source of affect.  As well as positive and negative affect versions of each 
scenario, a neutral affect version was also retained and included as one of the conditions in the 
study.  It was decided that the neutral affect condition would aid the evaluation of the 
manipulation of affect as well as potentially providing knowledge of affective reactions and 
decisions to a non-affective-laden source. The presentations are included in the appendices 
(appendix A).    
 
4.3.4.2  Online questionnaire 
An on-line and paper version of the questionnaire was developed for this study. This was 
designed with feedback from doctors (see section 4.3.5 below).  Technical help (e.g. computer 
programming and on-line set up) was provided by the IT department in the Institute of 
Psychological Sciences, University of Leeds. 
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4.3.5  Face validity 
Feedback concerning the content and structure of the questionnaire was obtained from a 
consultant and junior doctor working in an Acute NHS Hospital Trust.  After reading all 
versions of the case presentations and the proposed structure of the phase 2 questionnaire, both 
indicated that the neutral and affect versions of the scenarios were realistic and reflected true 
experience. They also confirmed that the scenarios were an appropriate length and that the 
clinical content was appropriate for all grades and specialties of doctors.   
 
4.3.6  Measures 
4.3.6.1  Demographics 
Each participant indicated their age, sex, clinical grade, number of years in present grade, total 
number of years postgraduate clinical experience and specialty by either clicking or ticking the 
appropriate answer from a choice of responses, or writing the relevant answer in the text space 
provided.  
 
4.3.6.2  Affective response 
4.3.6.2.1  Mood 
A two item scale was used to assess the mood of the participant before they read each 
emergency care vignette.  Valence had a score range of 1 = extremely sad to 7 = extremely 
happy, and arousal had a score range of 1 = extremely alert to 7 = extremely tired.  The arousal 
item was reverse-scored. The overall score range was 1-7.  A higher score indicated a more 
positive mood. 
 
4.3.6.2.2  Anticipatory affect 
Although 46 items of the 60 item version of the Positive and Negative Affect Schedule – 
Expanded Form (PANAS-X: Watson and Clark, 1994) were initially used to measure 
participants’ anticipatory affect after reading each emergency care vignette, only 29 doctors 
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completed the questionnaire.  Feedback from doctors suggested that they found the completion 
of the 46 items after each scenario too laborious.  Therefore in an attempt to boost low 
recruitment, this was reduced to the two main scales of General Positive and General Negative 
Affect.  This version of the questionnaire only resulted in the recruitment of 2 further doctors to 
the study.  As 93 medical students and 29 doctors had completed the four sub-scales of General 
Positive Affect, General Negative Affect, Hostility and Fear of the 46-items version of the 
Positive and Negative Affect Schedule – Expanded Form (PANAS-X: Watson & Clark, 1994), 
these scales were used in the analysis. 
 
The two sub-scales of General Positive Affect (α = .94; e.g. active, alert, attentive, determined, 
enthusiastic, excited, inspired, interested, proud, strong) and General Negative Affect (α = 95; 
e.g. afraid, scared, nervous, jittery, irritable, hostile, guilty, ashamed, upset, distressed) each had 
10 items.  The sub-scales of Hostility (α = 90; e.g. angry, hostile, irritable, scornful, disgusted, 
loathing) and Fear (α = 96; e.g. afraid, scared, frightened, nervous, jittery, shaky) each had 6 
items.  All items had a score range of 1 = very slightly or not at all, to 5 = extremely.  A higher 
score indicated a higher feeling of positive, negative, hostile, or fearful anticipatory affect.   
 
4.3.7  Procedure 
After reading either the online or paper copy of the participant information sheet and completing 
the online or paper copy of the consent form, participants were randomly allocated to one of 
three conditions (positive affect, negative affect, or neutral affect).  Participants then provided 
an anonymous participant code and demographic information.  They were then asked to read 
either three positive, negative, or neutral affect case presentations.  Before reading each case 
presentation, participants were asked to respond to two questions assessing their current mood. 
After each scenario, participants were asked to complete scales from the PANAS X. 
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4.3.8  Analysis 
The SPSS statistical software package (Version 19.0) was used for statistical analysis. 
Cronbach’s Alpha was used to assess the reliability of each measurement.  Differences between 
conditions and scenarios for anticipatory affect were assessed by examination of mean scores 
and a mixed design MANCOVA.  This was conducted to compare ratings of anticipatory affect 
(general positive, general negative, hostility and fear) across condition (positive, neutral and 
negative affect) and clinical scenario (patient, team and previous experience).  Cohen’s (1988) 
guidelines for eta squared were used to interpret the strength of partial eta squared. Participants’ 
baseline mood scores were used as the covariate in the analysis to control for the effect of 
existing mood on the affective response.  All mean scores presented in tables are adjusted for 
the covariate. Greenhouse-Geisser corrections were applied to variables that violated the 
assumption of sphericity. All additional univariate tests of between-subjects effects and post-
hoc comparisons controlled for Type 1 error by applying a Bonferroni correction for multiple 
analyses. 
 
 
4.4  Results 
4.4.1  Mood 
Baseline mood was generally moderate across all conditions.  A one-way between-groups 
ANOVA demonstrated that there were no differences in baseline mood between the positive (M 
= 4.58, SD = 1.00), neutral (M = 4.46, SD = 0.96) or negative affect (M = 4.54, SD = 1.13) 
conditions, F (2, 122) = 1.60, p = .853. 
 
4.4.2  Manipulation of affect  
The mean and standard error for ratings of general anticipatory affect across conditions are 
presented in Table 4.1.  The mean score responses were all below the mid-point score of 3 
indicating low arousal of anticipatory affect across all conditions.  Despite this, mean scores 
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were in the intended direction.  Medical students and doctors in the positive affect condition 
reported a higher mean score for positive anticipatory affect in response to scenarios than  
 
Table 4.1  Mean (Std. Error) general anticipatory affect across conditions 
 Positive 
N = 31 
             Neutral 
             N = 41 
Negative 
N = 32 
   
Positive  
Negative 
Hostility  
Fear 
2.60 (0.11)    
1.44 (0.09)    
1.18 (0.06)    
1.65 (0.13)   
              2.54 (0.09)    
              1.40 (0.08)    
              1.12 (0.05)    
              1.64 (0.11)   
              2.36 (0.11)    
              1.85 (0.09)    
              1.69 (0.06)    
              2.09 (0.13)   
 
 
medical students and doctors in the neutral and negative affect condition.  Conversely, medical 
students and doctors in the negative affect condition reported higher mean scores for negative, 
hostile and fearful anticipatory affect, than those in the neutral or positive affect conditions. 
While mean scores were greater between the negative affect condition and both the neutral and 
positive affect conditions, differences between the positive and neutral affect conditions were 
small.  This indicates that the positive and neutral affect scenarios generated similar levels of 
anticipatory affect.  
 
The mean and standard error for ratings of anticipatory affect for scenarios across conditions are 
presented in Table 4.2.  All mean scores were again below the mid-point of 3, suggesting that 
for all scenarios arousal of anticipatory affect was low. In the positive affect condition the 
patient source of affect elicited lower positive anticipatory affect than the team or previous 
experience source of affect scenarios.  The team source of affect scenario generated higher 
scores for negative, hostile and fearful anticipatory affect than either the patient or previous 
experience source of affect scenarios.  
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                         Table 4.2  Mean (Std. Error) general anticipatory affect within scenarios across conditions 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 Prev. Exp.: Previous experience 
 
 Positive 
   Patient         Team         Prev. Exp.     
Neutral 
Patient         Team         Prev. Exp. 
Negative 
Patient         Team         Prev. Exp. 
Positive   2.49 (0.12)   2.66 (0.13)   2.63 (0.12) 2.30 (0.10)   2.65 (0.11)   2.67 (0.11) 2.15 (0.12)   2.26 (0.12)   2.69 (0.12) 
Negative                      1.23 (0.08)   1.67 (0.12)   1.41 (0.09) 1.30 (0.07)   1.49 (0.10)   1.39 (0.08) 1.61 (0.08)   2.21 (0.12)   1.71 (0.09) 
Hostility 1.15 (0.09)   1.32 (0.10)   1.06 (0.04) 1.19 (0.08)   1.12 (0.09)   1.04 (0.04) 1.81 (0.09)   2.13 (0.10)   1.13 (0.04) 
Fear   1.32 (0.11)   1.98 (0.17)   1.63 (0.16) 1.41 (0.09)   1.87 (0.14)   1.66 (0.14) 1.66 (0.11)   2.44 (0.16)   2.17 (0.16) 
58 
 
A mixed design MANCOVA with mood as a covariate revealed that there was a significant 
interaction between condition and scenario for combined anticipatory affect, F  (16, 188) = 
4.53, p = < .001, with a large effect size (partial eta squared = .28).  There was a significant 
main effect for condition, F (8, 196) = 6.46, p = < .001, with a large effect size (partial eta 
squared = .21), but no main effect for clinical scenario, F (8, 93) = 1.78, p = .091.  Mood was 
not a significant covariate for condition, F (4, 97) = 0.92, p = .458, or clinical scenario F = (8, 
93) = 0.82, p = .585. 
 
With a Bonferroni adjusted alpha level of .013, the univariate effects for interaction showed 
positive anticipatory affect, F (4, 200) = 4.01, p = .004, with a medium effect size (partial eta 
squared = .07), negative anticipatory effect, F (3.28, 163.96) = 5.16, p = .001, with a medium 
effect size (partial eta squared = .09), and hostile anticipatory affect, F (3.75, 187.41) = 16.43, p 
= < .001, with a large effect size (partial eta squared = .25), to be significant.  Post-hoc 
comparisons indicated that there were no significant differences across scenarios for positive 
anticipatory affect.  The mean scores for negative and hostile anticipatory affect for both the 
patient and team source of affect scenarios were significantly higher for medical students and 
doctors in the negative condition than those in both the neutral and positive condition.   Medical 
students and doctors in the negative previous experience source of affect scenario felt 
significantly higher negative anticipatory affect than those in the neutral source of affect 
scenario.  There were no significant differences in mean scores for positive, negative or hostile 
anticipatory affect between medical students and doctors in the neutral condition and those in 
the positive condition for any of the three scenarios.   
 
4.5  Discussion 
The aim of study 1 was to assess the success of the manipulation of positive and negative affect 
across conditions and scenarios in preparation for study 2 with medical students and study 3 
with Acute NHS Hospital Trust doctors. 
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The difference in the mean scores, although not significant, demonstrated that medical students 
and doctors reported higher positive anticipatory affect in the positive affect condition than both 
the negative and neutral affect conditions. This implies that there was limited success in the 
manipulation of positive affect.  The significant difference in mean scores for negative affect 
indicated that medical students and doctors had higher negative and hostile anticipatory affect in 
the negative affect condition than both the negative and neutral affect conditions.  Therefore, 
while the hypotheses that medical students and doctors in the positive affect condition would 
have higher positive anticipatory affect than those in the negative and neutral affect condition 
was not supported by statistically significant differences, the hypothesis that medical students 
and doctors in the negative affect condition would have higher negative anticipatory affect in 
comparison to those in the positive and neutral affect conditions was supported.  However, the 
effect was dependent on the source of affect.  In particular, patient and team source of affect, 
evoked statistically significant higher negative and hostile anticipatory affect in medical 
students and doctors in the negative condition compared to those in in the positive and neutral 
conditions, while the previous experience source of affect scenario only elicited higher negative 
anticipatory affect in medical students and doctors in the negative affect condition, in 
comparison to those in the neutral condition.  The team source of affect appeared to evoke more 
intense negative, hostile and fearful responses than either the patient or previous experience 
source of affect scenarios.   
 
These findings therefore provide some preliminary support for the notion that the type and 
intensity of affective responses in medical students and doctors may be specific to particular 
sources of affect within a clinical setting.  Mean scores between the positive and neutral 
condition were often similar, and while there were significant differences between both the 
positive and neutral conditions when compared to the negative affect condition, there were no 
significant differences between the positive and neutral condition.  This suggests that scenarios 
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in the positive and neutral conditions were eliciting a similar affective response and may imply 
that an affective reaction to a stimulus or situation is never completely neutral.   
 
 
4.6  Study 2  
4.6.1  Aims 
This study used the online questionnaire described in the first part of this chapter, to further 
explore general affect and discrete emotions in medical students in response to clinical case 
presentations.  It also more specifically drew upon the distinct diagnostic stage of information 
gathering in order to identify whether types (mood, anticipatory affect, anticipated affect) and 
sources (patient factors, team factors, previous experience) of positive, negative and neutral 
affect influenced the appropriateness of facts deemed important for diagnostic decision making, 
and thoroughness of information gathering for diagnosis in a sample of medical students across 
four UK medical schools.  
 
The main objectives in this study were: 1) to examine whether affective cues presented in a 
clinical scenario influenced the appropriateness of facts considered important for diagnosis, and  
thoroughness of information gathering (e.g. number of words used and time taken to describe 
facts considered important for diagnosis) and 2) to assess whether, and to what extent, different 
affective cues and specific sources of affect induced general affect and discrete positive and 
negative emotions.    
 
4.6.2  Hypotheses 
As positive affect has been associated with heuristic based thinking and negative affect with 
systematic thought processes, it was hypothesized that: 
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1. Medical students in the positive affect condition would demonstrate faster, less 
methodical decision making than medical students in the negative or neutral affect 
conditions. 
2. Medical students in the negative affect condition would demonstrate slower, more 
considered decision making than medical students in the positive or neutral affect 
conditions.   
As it is reasonable to assume that positive affect leads to greater confidence, it was also 
hypothesized that: 
3. Medical students in the positive affect condition would have higher ratings for measures 
of confidence than medical students in the negative affect condition.   
While the role of discrete emotions, positive and negative anticipated affect, and specific 
sources of affect (e.g. patient factors, team factors, previous experience) were assessed in this 
study, the current dearth of research in this area meant that these were exploratory, and therefore 
hypotheses were not generated.  
 
 
4.7  Method 
4.7.1  Participants 
The sample
3
 consisted of 93 Year 4 and Year 5 medical students across four UK medical 
schools.  There were 67 (73%) females and 25 (27%) males (based on n = 92 due to missing 
data for 1 participant). Age ranged from 20 to 32 years with a mean of 22.87 (1.88). 
 
In order to establish the level of clinical knowledge and experience required to generate 
meaningful responses to the emergency care scenarios that were presented to participants in the 
                                                 
3
 Due to a dearth of empirical studies that have manipulated affect in scenarios and measured 
appropriateness of information gathering for diagnosis, a statistician was consulted in order to perform 
sample size calculations based on estimates of effect size. With an alpha level of 0.05, d = 1.00, a sample 
size of 20 in each group gave 80% power (Simulated power = 0.7980) to find a significant effect in an 
ANOVA test. 
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study, senior teaching staff involved in developing and delivering undergraduate medicine 
course modules in a UK university were consulted in order to ascertain which undergraduate 
medicine year groups would be suitable to be included in the study.  As a result of this 
consultation, it was decided that only medical students in Year 4 and Year 5 of a UK 
undergraduate Medicine degree should be recruited.  
 
Participants were recruited through two main methods. After gaining permission from each 
participating medical school, the study advert and questionnaire link was either posted on an 
electronic noticeboard that could be accessed by all Year 4 and Year 5 Undergraduate Medicine 
students, or was emailed directly to Year 4 and Year 5 students who had previously agreed to be 
sent details of current studies in which they could participate.  Clicking on the hypertext link 
took the medical student to the participant information sheet.  One main cash prize of £50 and 
two runners-up prizes of £25 were offered as an incentive for participation. 
 
4.7.2  Ethics 
The ethical approvals obtained for this study have been described in section 4.3.2. 
 
4.7.3  Design 
The design was an experimental design with three between-participants conditions (whether the 
version of the emergency care scenario read by the participant cued positive affect, negative 
affect, neutral affect) and three within-participant conditions (all participants were presented 
with one scenario where affect was generated from a patient source, one scenario where affect 
was generated from a team source, and one scenario where affect was generated from previous 
clinical experience).  The dependent variables were appropriateness of important facts chosen 
for diagnosis, and thoroughness of information gathering (e.g. number of words used to describe 
important facts for diagnosis, and time spent considering important facts for diagnosis).  
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Block randomisation was used to randomly allocate participants to one of three conditions 
(positive affect, negative affect, or neutral affect).  This was used to balance potential 
extraneous variables across conditions and controlled for researcher bias in the recruitment 
process. Order of scenario was counterbalanced over six sequences to control for any potential 
effect of order. 
 
4.7.4  Materials 
4.7.4.1  Case presentations 
The procedure involved in the development of the three emergency care presentations (see 
appendix A) is described in section 4.3.4.1.  A consultant who was involved in delivering 
undergraduate medicine course modules in a UK university was consulted in order to ascertain 
that the case presentations were suitable for Year 4 and Year 5 undergraduate medicine 
students. 
 
4.7.5  Measures 
4.7.5.1  Affect 
4.7.5.1.1  Mood  
The mood measure was identical to that detailed in section 4.3.6.2.1. 
 
4.7.5.1.2  Anticipatory affect 
Four sub-scales of the Positive and Negative Affect Schedule – Expanded Form (PANAS-X: 
Watson and Clark, 1994) were used to measure anticipatory affect.  These are described in 
section 4.3.6.2.2. 
 
4.7.5.1.3  Anticipated affect  
This measure contained 6 items with 2 sub-scales. Positive anticipated affect (e.g. “If the 
decisions that I made for the diagnosis and management of this patient were correct I would 
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feel…”) contained 3 items (e.g. α = .93; proud, confidence, self-respect) and negative 
anticipated affect (e.g. “If the decisions that I made for the diagnosis and management of this 
patient were incorrect I would feel…”) contained 3 items (α = .94; e.g. regret, shame, guilt). All 
items had a score range of 1 = not at all, to 7 = very much.  Higher scores indicated higher 
positive or negative anticipated affect. 
 
4.7.5.1.4  Confidence in most important facts for diagnosis 
This measure contained 1 item (e.g. “Please indicate how confident you are that you have 
chosen the 5 most important facts for making a diagnosis by clicking the most appropriate 
answer below”).  This had a score range of 1 = not at all confident to 7 = extremely confident. 
Higher scores signified higher confidence in the facts chosen for making a diagnosis. 
 
4.7.5.2  Appropriateness of information gathering 
4.7.5.2.1  Appropriateness of facts considered important for diagnosis 
In order to measure the appropriateness of the facts considered important for diagnosis, three 
consultant doctors (a consultant in anaesthesia, a consultant in accident and emergency, and a 
consultant in elderly care) each read the neutral versions of the three scenarios and 
independently provided the five facts that they would consider important for obtaining a 
diagnosis (pieces of information extracted from each scenario that are critical for proceeding 
along the correct diagnostic trajectory).  While the intention was to use each consultant’s 
opinion to form an expert consensus of the five most appropriate facts for diagnosis, it was 
apparent that while there was some agreement between the consultants, the differences in the 
facts each considered important for diagnosis, meant that a consensus would be difficult to 
attain, (see appendix B).  Due to this and time limitations with regard to the research 
programme, it was decided that all facts classed as appropriate by the  three consultants would 
be used when scoring medical students’ responses for important facts.     
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Appropriateness of facts was assessed by comparing the 5 facts chosen by each medical student 
with those provided by the expert panel.  Any fact that was on the expert panel’s list was given 
a score of 0 (appropriate), while any fact that was not on the list scored 1 (inappropriate).  Due 
to the fact that a number of medical students provided more than one fact in each of the five 
free-text spaces provided in the on-line questionnaire, only the first fact in each of the 5 free-
text spaces was given a score of 0 or 1.  The score range was 1 to 5. Higher scores indicated a 
higher number of inappropriate facts for diagnosis.  
 
4.7.5.3  Thoroughness of information gathering 
4.7.5.3.1  Number of words used to describe important facts 
This measure assessed the number of words that medical students used to describe the 5 most 
important facts for diagnosis for each of the 3 clinical scenarios.  An initial inspection of the 
completed online questionnaires revealed that there was some variation in the number of words 
used to describe the 5 most important facts. While some medical students appeared to cut and 
paste sections of text which included both relevant and irrelevant information, others seemed to 
be more selective in the words chosen. This variation may have been an indicator of the level of 
consideration given to the scenario. To ensure consistency across participants, a set of criteria 
for determining a word unit was followed and is included in appendix C.  A higher score 
indicated that a higher number of words were used to detail important facts.  
 
4.7.5.3.2  Time spent considering important facts (duration) 
This measure was the number of seconds taken to complete the questionnaire section which 
asked medical students to write the 5 most important facts for each of the 3 patient 
presentations.  The time each participant took to complete the list of 5 most important facts was 
logged automatically by the online questionnaire once the section had been completed.     
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4.7.5.4  Other 
4.7.5.4.1  Demographics 
Each participant indicated their age, sex, and level of study.   
 
4.7.6  Procedure  
After reading the on-line participant information sheet and completing the online consent form, 
participants were randomly allocated to one of three conditions (positive emotion, negative 
emotion, or neutral emotion).  Participants then provided an anonymous participant code and 
demographic information.  They were then asked to read either three positive, negative, or 
neutral emotion emergency care vignettes.  Before reading each scenario, participants were 
asked to respond to two questions assessing their current mood.  After each scenario, 
participants were then asked to complete scales from the Positive and Negative Affect Schedule 
Expanded Form (PANAS-X: Watson & Clark, 1994), before being asked to list the 5 facts from 
the case presentation that they considered most important for diagnosis.  Participants were then 
requested to indicate their level of confidence in the most important facts they had chosen for 
diagnosis. 
 
Participants were then asked to complete scales assessing their positive and negative anticipated 
affect. On completion of the questionnaire, participants had the option of providing an email 
address if they wished to be entered into the prize draw.  
 
4.7.7  Analysis 
The SPSS statistical software package (Version 19.0) was used for statistical analysis. 
Cronbach’s Alpha was used to assess the reliability of each measure.  Differences for general 
affective response (positive anticipatory affect, negative anticipatory affect, hostility 
anticipatory affect, fear anticipatory affect, positive anticipated affect, negative anticipated 
affect and confidence in the most important facts chosen for diagnosis) and discrete emotions 
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(positive, negative, hostile and fearful anticipatory affect, positive and negative anticipated 
affect) were assessed by examination of mean scores and mixed design MANCOVAs across 
condition (positive, neutral and negative affect) and clinical scenario (patient, team and previous 
experience).  Differences in the dependent variables of appropriateness of important facts for 
diagnosis, and thoroughness of information gathering (e.g. number of words used and time 
taken to describe important facts) across condition and clinical scenario were assessed by 
examination of mean scores and mixed design ANCOVAs. Cohen’s (1988) guidelines for eta 
squared were used to interpret the strength of partial eta squared.   
 
Participants’ baseline mood scores were used as the covariate in the analysis to control for the 
effect of existing mood on outcomes. All mean scores presented in tables are adjusted for the 
covariate. Greenhouse-Geisser corrections were applied to variables that violated the 
assumption of sphericity.  All additional univariate tests of between-subjects effects and post-
hoc comparisons controlled for Type 1 error by applying a Bonferroni correction for multiple 
analyses. 
 
Inspection of the free text revealed that in some instances long sections of text from the 
scenarios had been pasted into the free text spaces for the choice of important facts.  To control 
for this, extreme scores for the measure, ‘number of words used to describe important facts’, 
were removed from the analysis.  In order to control for unexpected distractions which may 
have prolonged the time taken to complete the answers, extreme scores for the measure of 
‘time’ were removed from the analysis. 
 
 
4.8  Results 
4.8.1  Affect 
4.8.1.1  Mood 
68 
 
Baseline mood was generally moderate across all conditions.  A one-way between-groups 
ANOVA demonstrated that there was no difference in baseline mood between the positive 
affect (M = 4.56, SD = 1.10), neutral affect (M = 4.44, SD = 0.92) or negative affect (M = 4.61, 
SD = 1.10) condition, F (2, 91) = 0.23, p = .793. 
 
4.8.1.2  General affective responses to clinical scenarios 
The mean and standard error for ratings of general affective responses across conditions are 
presented in Table 4.3.  The mean scores for general positive, negative, hostile and fearful  
 
Table 4.3  Mean (Std. Error) general affective response across conditions 
   Positive 
   N = 22 
            Neutral 
            N = 29 
         Negative 
         N = 28 
 
               
Positive  
Negative 
Hostility  
Fear 
Pos. Anticipated 
Neg. Anticipated  
Confidence 
2.66 (0.12)    
1.48 (0.11)    
1.15 (0.08)    
1.73 (0.16) 
5.69 (0.20) 
4.74 (0.30) 
3.87 (0.21) 
              2.51 (0.11)    
              1.40 (0.09)    
              1.10 (0.07)    
              1.68 (0.14) 
              5.50 (0.17) 
              3.88 (0.26) 
              4.16 (0.18) 
           2.34 (0.11)    
           1.89 (0.10)    
           1.69 (0.07)    
           2.17 (0.14)  
           5.39 (0.18) 
           4.15 (0.27) 
           4.27 (0.18) 
 
Pos. Anticipated: Positive Anticipated Affect; Neg. Anticipated: Negative Anticipated Affect 
anticipatory affect supported the findings from study 1and are therefore not discussed further 
here.  The mean scores for general anticipated affect showed that across conditions, medical 
students had higher levels of intensity for positive anticipated affect than negative anticipated 
affect.  The highest positive and negative anticipated affect scores were from medical students 
in the positive affect condition.  The lowest mean score for positive general anticipated affect 
was in the negative affect condition and the lowest score for negative general anticipated affect  
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was in the neutral affect condition. The mean scores for confidence in most important facts 
chosen for diagnosis show that levels of confidence were moderate.  Medical students had the 
most confidence in the negative affect condition and the least confidence in the positive affect 
condition.  
 
The mean and standard error for ratings for general affective responses are illustrated in Table 
4.4.  Both general positive and negative anticipated affect scores were higher across scenarios in 
the positive affect condition.  The lowest positive anticipated affect score was in the patient 
source of affect scenario in the negative affect condition.  There was more variation across 
scenarios for negative anticipated affect, with lower scores generally occurring in the scenarios 
in the neutral affect condition.  The patient source of affect scenario had the lowest scores for 
confidence across all conditions. 
 
A mixed design MANCOVA with mood as a covariate revealed that there was a significant 
interaction between condition and scenario for combined general affective responses, F (28, 
126) = 2.42, p = < .001, with a large effect size (partial eta squared = .35).  There was a 
significant main effect for condition, F (14 140) = 3.56, p = < .001, with a large effect size 
(partial eta squared = .26), but no significant main effect for clinical scenario, F (14, 62) = 1.42, 
p = .173. Mood was not a significant covariate for condition, F (7, 69) = 1.40, p = .218, or 
clinical scenario F (14, 62) = 1.18, p = .314.  
 
With a Bonferroni adjusted alpha level of 0.007, the univariate effects for interaction showed 
hostility, F (4,150) = 12.27, p = < .001, with a large effect size (partial eta squared = .25), to be 
significant.  Positive anticipatory affect was only marginally non-significant, F (4,150) = 3.57, p 
= .008, partial eta squared = .09.  Negative anticipatory affect (p = .027) was significant at the 
.05 alpha level. Post-hoc comparisons indicated that medical students in the negative affect  
 
70 
 
                       Table 4.4  Mean (Std. Error) general affective response within scenarios across conditions 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                       Prev. Exp.: Previous experience; Pos. Ant.: Positive anticipated affect; Neg. Ant. Negative anticipated affect 
 
 Positive 
   Patient         Team         Prev. Exp.     
Neutral 
Patient         Team         Prev. Exp. 
Negative 
Patient         Team         Prev. Exp. 
Positive   2.57 (0.13)   2.77 (0.14)   2.64 (0.15) 2.28 (0.11)   2.64 (0.13)   2.61 (0.13) 2.12 (0.12)   2.26 (0.13)   2.64 (0.13) 
Negative                      1.26 (0.10)   1.69 (0.15)   1.49 (0.11) 1.31 (0.09)   1.53 (0.13)   1.37 (0.10) 1.63 (0.09)   2.25 (0.13)   1.78 (0.10) 
Hostility 1.17 (0.12)   1.22 (0.13)   1.07 (0.06) 1.18 (0.10)   1.09 (0.11)   1.05 (0.05) 1.81 (0.10)   2.11 (0.11)   1.14 (0.05) 
Fear   1.38 (0.13)   2.07 (0.20)   1.73 (0.20) 1.44 (0.11)   1.99 (0.18)   1.62 (0.17) 1.69 (0.12)   2.53 (0.18)   2.30 (0.18) 
Pos. Ant. 5.51 (0.23)   5.75 (0.22)   5.82 (0.20) 5.33 (0.20)   5.68 (0.19)   5.50 (0.17) 5.00 (0.21)   5.58 (0.19)   5.57 (0.17) 
Neg. Ant. 4.64 (0.33)   4.80 (0.35)   4.79 (0.33) 3.85 (0.29)   3.92 (0.30)   3.86 (0.29) 4.10 (0.29)   3.90 (0.31)   4.45 (0.29) 
Confidence 3.63 (0.25)   3.81 (0.27)   4.17 (0.25) 4.23 (0.22)   4.02 (0.23)   4.23 (0.22) 4.27 (0.22)   4.06 (0.24)   4.48 (0.22) 
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condition had significantly higher feelings of hostility than medical students in either the 
positive or neutral affect condition in response to the patient and team source of affect scenarios. 
Positive anticipatory affect was higher for medical students in the positive affect condition in 
comparison to medical students in the negative, but not the neutral condition. However, this 
finding was marginally statistically not significant. Negative feelings were also higher in 
medical students responding to the negative affect versions of the patient and team source of 
affect scenarios than those responding to either the positive or neutral affect versions.  There 
was also a higher rating of general negative affect in the negative affect condition in comparison 
to the neutral affect condition in the previous experience source of affect scenario.  There were 
no significant differences in ratings of positive, negative, or hostile anticipatory affect between 
medical students in the neutral condition and those in the positive condition for any of the three 
scenarios.   
 
4.8.1.3  Discrete anticipatory emotions in response to clinical scenarios    
As can be seen in Table 4.5, medical students in the positive affect condition experienced higher 
discrete positive emotions in comparison to those in the neutral and negative conditions.  Mean 
score differences tended to be greater between the positive and negative conditions, than the 
positive and neutral conditions.  The only exception was for the emotion, active, for which 
medical students in the negative condition reported a higher mean score than those in the 
positive or neutral condition.  In general, patterns of scores for each discrete positive emotion 
were similar across all conditions. Intensity of response was particularly low for the emotions, 
excited, proud and inspired across all conditions, while alert, determined, attentive and 
interested tended to score above the mid-point score of 3 across most conditions.  The mean and 
standard error for ratings of discrete positive emotions for scenarios across conditions were also 
assessed.  As can be seen in Table 4.6, the scenarios in the positive affect condition generally 
received the highest ratings for discrete positive emotions.  The emotion alert scored above the 
mid-point of 3 in all scenarios across all conditions. 
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Table 4.5  Mean (Std. Error) discrete positive and negative anticipatory emotions across 
 conditions 
 Positive 
N = 21 
(N = 19) 
          Neutral 
           N = 26 
            (N = 29) 
Negative 
N = 28 
(N = 27) 
 
              
              
Positive 
Excited  
Strong 
Enthusiastic  
Alert 
Determined 
Proud 
Attentive 
Active 
Inspired 
Interested  
Negative 
Afraid  
Scared 
Nervous  
Jittery 
Irritable 
Hostile 
Guilty 
Ashamed 
Upset 
Distressed 
 
1.94 (0.15)    
2.18 (0.17)    
2.60 (0.18)    
3.59 (0.19)    
3.33 (0.20)    
1.61 (0.11)    
3.45 (0.20)    
2.78 (0.22)    
1.85 (0.15)    
3.32 (0.18)   
 
1.57 (0.18)    
1.58 (0.19)    
2.25 (0.21)    
1.53 (0.16)    
1.41 (0.13)    
1.09 (0.10)    
1.14 (0.07)    
1.20 (0.09)    
1.19 (0.16)    
1.81 (0.16)     
 
              1.77 (0.14)    
              2.02 (0.16)    
              2.41 (0.17)    
              3.29 (0.17)    
              3.10 (0.18)    
              1.26 (0.10)    
              3.30 (0.18)    
              2.76 (0.20)    
              1.68 (0.14)    
              3.14 (0.16)   
 
              1.66 (0.14)    
              1.59 (0.15)    
              2.08 (0.17)    
              1.48 (0.13)    
              1.25 (0.11)    
              1.09 (0.08)    
              1.06 (0.06)    
              1.06 (0.07)    
              1.16 (0.13)    
              1.55 (0.13)     
 
                  1.59 (0.13)    
                  2.05 (0.15)    
                  2.10 (0.16)    
                  3.29 (0.17)    
                  3.00 (0.17)    
                  1.19 (0.10)    
                  3.06 (0.17)    
                  2.80 (0.19)    
                  1.59 (0.13)    
                  2.74 (0.15)   
 
                  2.07 (0.15)    
                  2.12 (0.16)    
                  2.47 (0.17)    
                  1.98 (0.14)    
                  1.84 (0.11)    
                  1.67 (0.08)    
                  1.22 (0.06)    
                  1.25 (0.07)    
                  1.87 (0.13)    
                  2.06 (0.13)    
 
N in parentheses is for discrete negative anticipatory emotions 
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                       Table 4.6  Mean (Std. Error) discrete positive anticipatory emotions within scenarios across conditions 
 Positive  
   Patient          Team        Prev. Exp.   
Neutral 
   Patient           Team        Prev. Exp. 
Negative 
  Patient           Team         Prev. Exp. 
Excited  
Strong 
Enthusiastic  
Alert 
Determined 
Proud 
Attentive 
Active 
Inspired 
Interested  
1.95 (0.15)   1.89 (0.18)   1.98 (0.21) 
2.28 (0.23)   2.06 (0.19)   2.21 (0.20) 
2.59 (0.22)   2.48 (0.20)   2.74 (0.25) 
3.22 (0.23)   3.87 (0.23)   3.67 (0.24) 
3.28 (0.24)   3.37 (0.24)   3.34 (0.24) 
1.47 (0.13)   1.96 (0.16)   1.39 (0.14) 
3.33 (0.23)   3.54 (0.24)   3.48 (0.23) 
2.47 (0.25)   3.11 (0.28)   2.77 (0.25) 
1.62 (0.17)   2.28 (0.24)   1.66 (0.21) 
3.31 (0.24)   3.42 (0.22)   3.22 (0.25) 
1.43 (0.14)   2.02 (0.16)   1.88 (0.19) 
1.97 (0.21)   1.97 (0.17)   2.12 (0.18) 
1.97 (0.20)   2.60 (0.18)   2.65 (0.22) 
3.02 (0.21)   3.43 (0.21)   3.43 (0.22) 
2.78 (0.21)   3.44 (0.22)   3.07 (0.22) 
1.27 (0.12)   1.22 (0.15)   1.30 (0.12) 
3.09 (0.21)   3.35 (0.22)   3.46 (0.21) 
2.16 (0.23)   3.04 (0.25)   3.07 (0.22) 
1.50 (0.15)   1.82 (0.22)   1.71 (0.19) 
2.88 (0.21)   3.48 (0.20   3.06 (0.22) 
1.50 (0.13)   1.46 (0.16)   1.81 (0.18) 
2.14 (0.20)   1.98 (0.17)   2.02 (0.17) 
1.88 (0.19)   1.90 (0.18)   2.52 (0.21) 
3.14 (0.20)   3.27 (0.20)   3.46 (0.21) 
2.49 (0.20)   2.96 (0.21)   3.54 (0.21) 
1.18 (0.11)   1.19 (0.14)   1.22 (0.12) 
2.64 (0.20)   2.95 (0.21)   3.61 (0.20) 
2.46 (0.22)   2.81 (0.24)   3.15 (0.21) 
1.39 (0.14)   1.53 (0.21)   1.85 (0.18) 
2.38 (0.21)   2.60 (0.19)   3.24 (0.21) 
                       Prev. Exp.: Previous experience 
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A mixed design MANCOVA with mood as a covariate revealed that there was a significant 
interaction between condition and scenario for combined discrete positive emotions, F (40, 106) 
= 1.98, p = .003, with a large effect size (partial eta squared = .43).  There was no significant 
main effect for condition, F (20, 126) = 1.02, p = .448 or clinical scenario, F (20, 52) = 0.97, p = 
.512.  Mood was not a significant covariate for condition, F (10, 62) = 1.50, p = .163, or 
scenario F (20, 52) = 0.84, p = .654.  
 
With a Bonferroni adjusted alpha level of 0.005, the univariate effects for interaction showed 
determined, F (4, 142) = 4.82, p = .001, with a medium effect size (partial eta squared = .12), to 
be significant.  The emotion, interested was only marginally non-significant, F (4, 142) = 3.65, 
p = .007, partial eta squared = .09.  The emotions, attentive (p = .035), enthusiastic, (p = .044), 
excited, (p = .019), and proud, (p = .011) were significant at the .05 alpha level.  Post-hoc 
comparisons indicated that in response to the patient source of affect scenario the mean scores 
for the emotions, determined and interested were significantly higher in the positive affect 
condition than the negative affect condition.  Furthermore, the emotion, interested was also 
significantly higher in positive and neutral affect conditions in comparison to the negative affect 
condition for the team source of affect scenario.  There were no significant differences in mean 
scores for discrete positive emotions between participants in the neutral condition and those in 
the positive condition for any of the three scenarios.  
 
Medical students in the negative affect condition experienced higher discrete negative emotions 
in comparison to those in the positive and neutral conditions.  The emotion, nervous had the 
highest mean (M = 2.47, SE = 0.17) and was the only negative emotion to score above 2 across 
all of the three conditions.  The mean and standard error for ratings of discrete negative 
emotions for scenarios across conditions are illustrated in Table 4.7.  All mean scores for 
discrete negative emotions were below the mid-point score of 3 indicating that negative 
emotions were low in intensity.  Medical students in the negative affect condition generally had 
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higher mean scores than those in the positive and neutral condition, although ratings for the 
previous experience source of affect scenario were not consistently higher.  The highest ratings 
of discrete negative emotions occurred in the team source of affect scenario.     
 
A mixed design MANCOVA with mood as a covariate revealed that there was a significant 
interaction between condition and scenario, F (40, 106) = 1.58, p = .035, with a large effect size 
(partial eta squared = .37).  There was a significant main effect for condition, F (20, 126) = 
2.35, p = .002, with a large effect size (partial eta squared = .27), but not for clinical scenario, F 
(20, 52) = 0.84, p = .660.  Mood was not a significant covariate for condition, F (10, 62) = 1.42, 
p = .192, or clinical scenario F (20, 52) = 0.73, p = .778.  
 
With a Bonferroni adjusted alpha level of .005, the univariate effects for interaction showed the 
emotions,  irritable, F (4, 142) = 6.52, p = < .001, with a large effect size (partial eta squared = 
.16), hostile, F (3.51, 124.60) = 9.93, p = < .001, with a large effect size (partial eta squared = 
.22), and upset, F (3.66, 129.98) = 4.81, p = .002, with a medium effect size (partial eta squared 
= .12),  to be significant.  The emotion, ashamed (p = .024) was significant at the .05 alpha 
level.  Post-hoc comparisons indicated that medical students in the negative affect condition had 
significantly higher feelings for irritable and hostile than medical students in both the positive 
and neutral condition for the patient and team source of affect scenarios.  There were also 
significant differences for the emotion, upset with higher scores occurring in the negative affect 
condition in contrast to the positive affect condition for the patient and team source of affect 
scenarios, and higher scores emerging in the negative affect condition in comparison to the 
neutral affect condition in both the team and previous experience source of affect scenarios.  
There were no significant differences in mean scores for discrete negative emotions between 
participants in the neutral condition and those in the positive condition for any of the three 
scenarios.  
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                         Table 4.7  Mean (Std. Error) discrete negative anticipatory emotions within scenarios across conditions 
 Positive  
   Patient          Team         Prev. Exp.   
Neutral 
   Patient          Team         Prev. Exp.     
Negative 
  Patient          Team         Prev. Exp.   
Afraid  
Scared 
Nervous  
Jittery 
Irritable 
Hostile 
Guilty 
Ashamed 
Upset 
Distressed  
1.22 (0.16)   1.95 (0.23)   1.53 (0.24) 
1.27 (0.16)   1.90 (0.24)   1.58 (0.25) 
1.79 (0.22)   2.63 (0.25)   2.32 (0.27) 
1.27 (0.14)   1.79 (0.24)   1.53 (0.21) 
1.37 (0.20)   1.48 (0.20)   1.37 (0.14) 
1.16 (0.16)   1.05 (0.17)   1.05 (0.04) 
1.05 (0.07)   1.16 (0.16)   1.21 (0.07) 
1.27 (0.13)   1.11 (0.16)   1.21 (0.09) 
1.00 (0.17)   1.26 (0.22)   1.32 (0.17) 
1.37 (0.16)   2.26 (0.24)   1.80 (0.21) 
1.40 (0.13)   1.99 (0.19)   1.58 (0.19) 
1.37 (0.13)   1.82 (0.20)   1.58 (0.21) 
1.82 (0.18)   2.34 (0.20)   2.06 (0.22) 
1.27 (0.12)   1.69 (0.19)   1.48 (0.17) 
1.44 (0.16)   1.13 (0.16)   1.20 (0.11) 
1.20 (0.13)   1.07 (0.14)   1.00 (0.03) 
1.04 (0.06)   1.10 (0.13)   1.04 (0.06) 
1.03 (0.10)   1.05 (0.13)   1.10 (0.07) 
1.13 (0.14)   1.21 (0.18)   1.13 (0.13) 
1.33 (0.13)   1.83 (0.19)   1.50 (0.17) 
1.57 (0.13)   2.38 (0.19)   2.27 (0.20) 
1.57 (0.14)   2.45 (0.21)   2.34 (0.21) 
1.86 (0.18)   2.89 (0.21)   2.67 (0.22) 
1.53 (0.12)   2.41 (0.20)   2.01 (0.17) 
2.16 (0.16)   2.20 (0.17)   1.16 (0.11) 
1.78 (0.13)   2.19 (0.14)   1.04 (0.03) 
1.14 (0.06)   1.41 (0.13)   1.11 (0.06) 
1.15 (0.11)   1.57 (0.14)   1.04 (0.07) 
1.56 (0.14)   2.33 (0.18)   1.71 (0.14) 
1.57 (0.13)   2.59 (0.20)   2.02 (0.18) 
                        Prev. Exp.: Previous experience  
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As can be seen in Table 4.8, medical students in the negative affect condition provided higher 
ratings of discrete hostility and fear emotions than those who were in either the positive or 
neutral affect conditions.  In the negative affect condition the highest mean discrete hostility 
score was for anger, and the highest mean fear score was for nervous.  Interestingly, nervous 
also demonstrated the same high score pattern across all conditions.  When ratings of 
 
Table 4.8  Mean (Std. Error) discrete hostile and fear anticipatory emotions across  
conditions 
 Positive 
N = 21 
Neutral 
N = 28† 
Negative 
N = 28 
 
                
Hostility 
Angry  
Hostile 
Irritable 
Scornful 
Disgusted 
Loathing 
Fear 
Afraid  
Scared 
Frightened 
Nervous 
Jittery 
Shaky 
 
1.19 (0.11)    
1.08 (0.09)    
1.43 (0.13)    
1.11 (0.08)    
1.13 (0.10)    
1.02 (0.10) 
 
1.61 (0.17)    
1.62 (0.18)    
1.78 (0.19)    
2.25 (0.20)    
1.59 (0.16)       
1.67 (0.17)     
 
1.12 (0.09)    
1.10 (0.08)    
1.25 (0.11)    
1.04 (0.07)    
1.12 (0.08)    
1.01 (0.09) 
 
1.66 (0.15)    
1.60 (0.16)       
1.56 (0.16)    
2.08 (0.17)    
1.49 (0.14)    
1.71 (0.15)       
 
1.93 (0.09)    
1.70 (0.08)    
1.88 (0.11)    
1.46 (0.07)    
1.75 (0.08)    
1.40 (0.09)  
 
2.09 (0.15)    
2.15 (0.16)     
2.25 (0.16)    
2.50 (0.17)    
2.01 (0.14)    
2.04 (0.15)      
 
For † N = 29 for discrete fear anticipatory emotions 
discrete hostility emotions for scenarios across conditions were assessed (see Table 4.9), the 
team source of affect emerged as the scenario that evoked the most intense feelings of hostility 
within the negative affect condition, with angry being the highest rated discrete emotion.  The 
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previous experience source of affect scenario produced the lowest intensity for hostility 
emotions.  An inspection of mean scores for discrete fear emotions (see Table 4.10) also showed 
that the team source of affect scenario evoked the most intense feelings of fear, with nervous 
reported as the highest fear emotion.  In the case of fear, the patient source of affect scenario 
received the lowest ratings.  
 
A mixed design MANCOVA with mood as a covariate revealed that there was a significant 
interaction between condition and scenario for combined discrete hostile emotions, F (24, 126) 
= 2.06, p = .006, with a large effect size (partial eta squared = .28).  There was also a significant 
main effect for condition, F (12, 138) = 3.84, p = < .001, with a large effect size (partial eta 
squared = .25), but not for clinical scenario, F (12, 62) = 1.07, p = .401.  Mood was not a 
significant covariate for condition, F (6, 68) = 1.02, p = .422, or clinical scenario F (12, 62) = 
0.87, p = .579.  
 
With a Bonferroni adjusted alpha level of .008, the univariate effects for interaction showed the 
emotions,  angry, F (3.53, 128.91) = 10.84, p = < .001, with a large effect size (partial eta 
squared = .23), hostile, F (3.60, 131.32) = 9.58, p = < .001, with a large effect size (partial eta 
squared = .21), irritable, F (4, 146) = 5.69, p = <  .001, with a large effect size (partial eta 
squared = .14), and disgusted, F (3.59, 130.89) = 7.05, p = < .001, with a large effect size 
(partial eta squared = .16), to be significant.  The emotions, scornful (p = .019) and loathing (p = 
.020) were significant at the .05 alpha level.  Post-hoc comparisons indicated that feelings for 
angry, hostile, irritable, and disgusted were significantly higher for participants in the negative 
affect condition than those in both the neutral and positive affect conditions for both the patient 
source and team source of affect scenarios. There were no differences between conditions in the 
previous experience source of affect scenario. There was no significant difference between the 
mean scores for the discrete hostile emotions between participants in the neutral condition and 
those in the positive condition for any of the three scenarios. 
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                         Table 4.9  Mean (Std. Error) discrete hostile anticipatory emotions within scenarios across conditions 
 
 
Positive  
   Patient        Team          Prev. Exp.   
Neutral 
   Patient         Team         Prev. Exp. 
Negative 
  Patient         Team          Prev. Exp. 
Angry  
Hostile 
Irritable 
Scornful 
Disgusted 
Loathing 
1.29 (0.17)   1.29 (0.20)   1.00 (0.07) 
1.14 (0.15)   1.05 (0.16)   1.05 (0.06) 
1.43 (0.19)   1.53 (0.20)   1.34 (0.14) 
1.14 (0.13)   1.19 (0.13)   1.00 (0.06) 
1.05 (0.15)   1.29 (0.18)   1.05 (0.06) 
1.00 (0.12)   1.05 (0.16)   1.00 (0.07) 
1.21 (0.14)   1.11 (0.18)   1.04 (0.06) 
1.21 (0.13)   1.07 (0.14)   1.01 (0.05) 
1.42 (0.17)   1.14 (0.17)   1.21 (0.12) 
1.11 (0.11)   1.00 (0.12)   1.00 (0.05) 
1.11 (0.13)   1.22 (0.16)   1.04 (0.05) 
1.03 (0.10)   1.00 (0.14)   1.00 (0.06) 
1.97 (0.14)   2.67 (0.18)   1.14 (0.06) 
1.79 (0.13)   2.21 (0.14)   1.10 (0.05) 
2.18 (0.17)   2.22 (0.17)   1.22 (0.12) 
1.54 (0.11)   1.71 (0.12)   1.14 (0.05) 
1.96 (0.13)   2.21 (0.16)   1.07 (0.05) 
1.40 (0.10)   1.65 (0.14)   1.14 (0.06) 
                         Prev. Exp.: Previous experience
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                   Table 4.10  Mean (Std. Error) discrete fear anticipatory emotions within scenarios across conditions 
 
Fear 
Positive  
   Patient         Team         Prev. Exp.   
Neutral 
   Patient         Team         Prev. Exp. 
Negative 
   Patient         Team         Prev. Exp. 
Afraid  
Scared 
Frightened 
Nervous 
Jittery 
Shaky 
1.19 (0.15)   2.00 (0.22)   1.62 (0.23) 
1.24 (0.16)   2.00 (0.24)   1.62 (0.24) 
1.43 (0.15)   2.09 (0.26)   1.81 (0.23) 
1.76 (0.20)   2.67 (0.24)   2.34 (0.25) 
1.29 (0.14)   1.85 (0.23)   1.62 (0.21) 
1.43 (0.18)   2.09 (0.23)   1.48 (0.21) 
1.40 (0.13)   1.99 (0.19)   1.59 (0.20) 
1.37 (0.14)   1.84 (0.21)   1.58 (0.21) 
1.27 (0.13)   1.95 (0.22)   1.47 (0.20) 
1.83 (0.17)   2.35 (0.20)   2.06 (0.21) 
1.27 (0.12)   1.70 (0.20)   1.49 (0.18) 
1.48 (0.15)   2.11 (0.20)   1.55 (0.18) 
1.62 (0.13)   2.36 (0.19)   2.28 (0.20) 
1.62 (0.14)   2.46 (0.21)   2.36 (0.21) 
1.72 (0.13)   2.60 (0.22)   2.44 (0.20) 
1.89 (0.18)   2.93 (0.21)   2.69 (0.22) 
1.58 (0.12)   2.42 (0.20)   2.03 (0.18) 
1.72 (0.15)   2.39 (0.20)   2.00 (0.19) 
                  Prev. Exp.: Previous experience
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A mixed design MANCOVA with mood as covariate revealed that there was no significant 
interaction between condition and scenario for combined fear emotions, F (24, 128) = 0.69, p = 
.854, and no significant main effect for condition, F (12, 140) = 1.76, p = .061 or clinical 
scenario, F = (12, 63) = 1.46, p = .165.  Mood was not a significant covariate for condition, F 
(6, 69) = 0.31, p = .931, clinical scenario F (12, 63) = 1.27, p = .258.  
 
4.8.1.4  Discrete anticipated emotions in response to clinical scenarios    
The mean scores and standard error for discrete positive and negative anticipated emotions are 
illustrated in table 4.11.  While scores were higher in the positive affect condition for all three  
 
Table 4.11  Mean (Std. Error) discrete positive and negative  
anticipated emotions across conditions 
 Positive 
N = 21 
Neutral 
N = 28 
Negative 
N = 27 
  
Positive 
Proud  
Confidence 
Self-respect 
Negative 
Regret 
Shame 
Guilt 
 
5.64 (0.24)    
5.72 (0.21)    
5.64 (0.24)    
 
5.03 (0.30)       
4.64 (0.36)  
4.51 (0.34)   
 
5.45 (0.21)    
5.67 (0.18)       
5.34 (0.21)    
    
4.39 (0.26)    
3.62 (0.31) 
3.52 (0.30)      
 
5.50 (0.22)    
5.44 (0.18)     
5.07 (0.22)    
    
4.46 (0.27)    
3.74 (0.31) 
3.99 (0.31)      
 
 
 
discrete positive emotions, all emotions were above the mid-point of 4, indicating a moderate  
intensity for anticipated affect across all conditions.  Scores for discrete negative emotions were 
also highest in the positive affect condition.  The future emotion of regret was the highest of the 
three discrete negative emotions across all the conditions.  However, the discrete negative 
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emotions tended to have a lower mean score, suggesting that medical students experienced a 
lower intensity of feeling when considering negative future feelings. 
 
The mean and standard error for ratings of discrete positive and negative anticipated emotions 
for scenarios across conditions (see Table 4.12) show that positive anticipated affect had a 
generally consistent pattern and was high within all scenarios across all conditions.  The lowest 
score was for self-respect in the patient source of affect scenario.  In terms of the discrete 
negative emotions, all emotions scored above the mid-point of 4 in all scenarios in the positive 
affect condition, but shame and guilt fell below the mid-point in all scenarios in the neutral 
condition, and the patient and team source of affect scenario in the negative affect condition. 
The emotion, regret was highest in the team source of affect scenario in the positive affect 
condition, but was also the only negative emotion to consistently score above the mid-point of 4 
across all scenarios and conditions.  Medical students in the positive team scenario rated their 
anticipated feeling of shame almost 1.3 scale points above medical students in the negative team 
scenario.  The previous experience source of affect scenario scored highest for all discrete 
negative emotions in the negative affect condition.  
 
A mixed design MANCOVA with mood as covariate demonstrated that there was no significant 
interaction between condition and scenario for combined positive and negative anticipated 
emotions, F (24, 124) = 0.84, p = .685, and no significant main effect for condition, F (12 136) 
= 1.11, p = .356 or clinical scenario, F = (12, 61) = 1.51, p = .146.  Mood was not a significant 
covariate for condition, F (6, 67) = 1.70, p = .135, or clinical scenario, F (12, 61) = 0.16, p = 
.520.  
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            Table 4.12  Mean (Std. Error) discrete positive and negative anticipated emotions within scenarios across conditions 
 
 
Positive  
   Patient         Team         Prev. Exp.   
Neutral 
   Patient         Team         Prev. Exp. 
Negative 
  Patient         Team         Prev. Exp. 
Positive  
Proud  
Confidence 
Self-respect 
Negative 
Regret 
Shame 
Guilt 
 
5.38 (0.30)   5.76 (0.26)   5.76 (0.25) 
5.62 (0.23)   5.67 (0.24)   5.86 (0.22) 
5.38 (0.28)   5.81 (0.26)   5.72 (0.25) 
 
4.86 (0.33)   5.29 (0.38)   4.95 (0.37) 
4.48 (0.38)   4.67 (0.39)   4.76 (0.40) 
4.33 (0.39)   4.52 (0.40)   4.67 (0.37)  
 
5.17 (0.26)   5.70 (0.23)   5.49 (0.22) 
5.51 (0.20)   5.82 (0.21)   5.67 (0.19) 
5.25 (0.25)   5.50 (0.22)   5.28 (0.22) 
 
4.34 (0.29)   4.51 (0.33)   4.32 (0.32) 
3.56 (0.33)   3.70 (0.34)   3.59 (0.34) 
3.54 (0.34)   3.45 (0.35)   3.56 (0.33)  
 
5.05 (0.27)   5.79 (0.23)   5.68 (0.22) 
5.14 (0.20)   5.56 (0.22)   5.64 (0.19) 
4.59 (0.25)   5.30 (0.23)   5.31 (0.23) 
 
4.24 (0.30)   4.33 (0.33)   4.82 (0.32) 
3.79 (0.34)   3.38 (0.35)   4.06 (0.35) 
3.99 (0.35)   3.68 (0.35)   4.31 (0.33)  
            Prev. Exp.: Previous experience
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4.8.2  Appropriateness and thoroughness of information gathering for diagnosis 
The means and standard errors for appropriateness of important facts for diagnosis and 
thoroughness of information gathering (e.g. number of words used and time taken to list   
important facts) across condition (see Table 4.13) and scenario by condition are illustrated in 
Table 4.14.  
 
4.8.2.1  Appropriateness of important facts chosen for diagnosis 
Mean scores for inappropriate answers were very similar across conditions.  However, scores in 
the negative affect condition had a marginally higher mean than those in the positive and neutral  
       
Table 4.13  Mean (Std. Error) appropriateness and thoroughness scores across conditions 
 Positive 
N = 22 
     Neutral 
     N = 29 
    Negative 
      N = 28 
   
  
Appropriateness 
Number of words† 
Time (seconds)‡ 
    
    1.50  (0.18)    
  17.58  (1.17)    
173.52  (16.79)    
    
    1.58  (0.16)    
  15.16  (1.00)    
138.63  (13.89)    
    
    1.61  (0.16)    
  15.20  (1.00)   
138.49  (14.37)   
  
 
 
Note for † N = 20 (positive affect), N = 27 (neutral affect), N = 27 (negative affect), for ‡  
N = 19 (positive affect), N = 28 (neutral affect), N = 26 (negative affect) 
 
affect conditions.  Mean scores across scenarios showed that at least 1 out of 5 facts considered 
important for diagnosis was inappropriate for all scenarios across all conditions.  The patient 
source of affect scenario had the highest mean for inappropriate answers across all conditions.  
 
A mixed design ANCOVA showed that there was no significant interaction between condition 
and scenario for appropriate answers, F (4, 150) = 0.87, p = .482.  There was no significant 
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main effect for condition, F (2, 75) = 0.12, p = .888, or scenario, F (2, 74) = 0.09, p = .910.  
Mood was not a significant covariate for condition, F (1, 75) = 3.53, p = .064 or scenario, F (2, 
74) = 0.60, p = .553.  The lack of any significant difference in mean scores for appropriateness 
of the most important facts for diagnosis did not support the hypotheses that when gathering 
information for diagnosis, medical students in the positive affect conditions would use less 
methodical decision making processes, while medical students in the negative affect conditions 
would use more considered decision making processes.  
 
4.8.2.2  Number of words used to describe important facts for diagnosis 
The mean scores for the number of words show that medical students in the positive affect 
condition took an average of over 2 words more than participants in the negative affect 
condition to describe the most important facts for diagnosis.  Mean scores across scenarios (see 
Table 4.14) illustrates that medical students in the patient source of affect scenario in the 
positive affect condition used the highest number of words.  The lowest number of words used 
was from medical students in the previous experience source of affect scenarios in the negative 
affect condition.  A mixed design ANCOVA with mood as covariate demonstrated that there 
was no significant interaction between condition and scenario for number of words, F (4, 140) = 
1.32, p = .267.  There was no significant main effect for condition, F (2, 70) = 1.54, p = .222, or 
scenario, F (2, 69) = 0.36, p = .701.  Mood was not a significant covariate for condition, F (1, 
70) = 0.02, p = .904 or scenario, F (2, 69) = 0.46, p = .633. 
 
Although medical students in the positive condition used more words when describing 
important facts for diagnosis than medical students in the negative condition this was not 
statistically significant and therefore did not support the hypothesis.  When gathering   
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Table 4.14  Mean (Std. Error) appropriateness and thoroughness scores within scenarios across conditions 
 
 
Positive  
      Patient            Team             Prev. Exp.   
Neutral 
     Patient               Team            Prev. Exp. 
Negative 
     Patient              Team              Prev. Exp. 
  
Appro.  
Words  
Time   
 
   1.83 (0.22)        1.56 (0.25)      1.11 (0.25) 
  19.31 (1.65)      18.04 (1.20)    15.38 (1.37)  
173.06 (18.61)  176.42 (17.56)  171.07 (24.89)  
 
   1.85 (0.19)        1.35 (0.22)        1.55 (0.22) 
  14.60 (1.42)      16.03 (1.03)      14.85 (1.19)  
122.59 (15.39)  131.41 (14.53)  161.88 (20.59)    
 
   1.90 (0.20)       1.48 (0.22)         1.45 (0.23)        
  15.87 (1.42)      15.35 (1.03)      14.38 (1.18) 
135.47 (15.93)  134.78 (15.03)  145.20 (21.30)    
Prev. Exp.: Previous experience; Appro.: Appropriateness
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information for diagnosis, medical students in the positive affect conditions did not appear to 
use faster, less methodical decision making processes, and medical students in the negative 
affect conditions did not appear to use slower, more considered decision making processes. 
 
4.8.2.3  Time taken to list important facts for diagnosis 
The mean scores and standard error for time illustrate that medical students in the positive 
affect condition took the longest time to list the facts they considered important for diagnosis 
and took an average of around 35 seconds longer than medical students in the negative affect 
condition.  Medical students in the negative and neutral affect conditions had almost 
identical durations.  The mean and standard error scores in Table 4.14 show that the longest 
duration for all scenarios occurred in the positive affect condition.  A mixed design 
ANCOVA with mood as a covariate revealed that there was no significant interaction 
between condition and scenario for time, F (4, 138) = 0.67, p = .611. There was no 
significant main effect for condition, F (2, 69) = 1.60, p = .209, or scenario, F (2, 68) = 0.17, 
p = .844. Mood was not a significant covariate for condition, F (1, 69) = 0.08, p = .781, or 
scenario, F (2, 68) = 0.17, p = .841. 
 
Although medical students in the positive condition took longer to describe important facts 
for diagnosis than medical students in the negative condition this was not statistically 
significant and therefore did not support the hypothesis.  When gathering information for 
diagnosis, medical students in the positive affect conditions did not appear to use faster, less 
methodical decision making processes, and medical students in the negative affect 
conditions did not appear to use slower, more considered decision making processes.  
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4.9  Discussion 
The aim of study 2 was to examine whether affective and emotional responses influenced 
appropriateness of important facts for diagnosis, and thoroughness of information gathering 
for diagnosis (e.g. number of words used and time taken to describe facts considered 
important for diagnosis).  The study also examined differences between medical students’ 
affective and emotional response to positive, neutral and negative clinical case presentations 
and to assess whether source of affect played a role in these responses. 
 
4.9.1  General affective response to clinical scenarios 
Both positive and negative anticipated affect were felt more strongly by medical students in 
the positive affect condition than those in either the negative or neutral affect conditions. 
While mean score differences were generally small across conditions for positive anticipated 
affect, they were more pronounced for negative affect.  It would seem logical that patient 
cases which evoke a positive affective state (e.g. caring for a patient one has a rapport with, 
or working in a clinical team led by a consultant you respect and admire) might lead a 
medical student to consider that they would feel more positive anticipated affect due to 
making correct diagnostic and case management decisions, or more negative anticipated 
affect should these decisions be incorrect.  It is also possible that this pattern reflects 
previous findings which have shown that positive affective states lead to a higher interest in 
a clinical case (Isen et al., 1991).  As higher interest in a case may also increase emotional 
involvement, it is likely that this would evoke a stronger emotional reaction to the potential 
positive and negative outcomes of decisions.  
 
Although confidence in the most important facts chosen for diagnosis was higher for 
medical students in the negative affect condition this was not significant and did not support 
the hypothesis that higher confidence would arise from being in a more positive affective 
state.  This finding may support research linking confidence in clinical decisions with higher 
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levels of clinical experience (Croskerry, 2009a, Woolley & Kostopoulou, 2013).  While the 
experience of a large number of clinical encounters may enable senior doctors to be 
confident in using more pattern-based, and quick decision processes, the fact that medical 
students are novices in clinical decision making, may mean that confidence in clinical 
decisions comes from knowing that they have made judgements that are based on a more 
systematic consideration of the facts.  As negative affective states are associated with a 
slower more rational thought process, this may account for the finding in this study.    
       
4.9.2  Discrete positive and negative emotions in response to clinical scenarios 
Categorizing affect into positive or negative responses has limitations and fails to build on 
previous work which has highlighted the complexity of affect-based reactions and shown 
that specific emotions appear to elicit different levels of arousal, guide evaluation of 
information, and determine behaviour (Lerner & Keltner, 2000; Pezza Leith & Baumeister, 
1996; Van Kleef, Homan & Chesin, 2012).  This viewpoint was supported by the findings 
that medical students had moderate levels of arousal for a number of discrete positive and 
negative emotions across all affective conditions.  For example, across all conditions, the 
positive anticipatory emotions of alert, determined and attentive were all above the mid-
point score of 3, while the emotion, nervous was the only negative anticipatory emotion to 
score above the scale point of two.  Similarly all positive anticipated emotions were above 
the scale point of 5 across conditions.  This suggests that these emotions may be important in 
a clinical context.  Whether these emotions play a role in directing and regulating health 
professionals’ clinical response, appraisal and performance should be further explored. 
 
4.9.3  The influence of affect on appropriateness of important facts for diagnosis and 
thoroughness of information gathering 
The results for all outcomes do not support the hypotheses that medical students in the 
positive affect condition would demonstrate faster, less methodical decision making and that 
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students in the negative affect condition would demonstrate slower more considered decision 
making.  The similarity of mean scores for appropriateness of facts suggests that affect was 
not influencing medical students’ choice of facts considered important for diagnosis.  One 
explanation, which has already been discussed in section 4.9.1, is the role of experience in 
the use of faster, heuristic based processes (Croskerry, 2009a; Norman & Eva, 2010).  The 
hypothesis in this study was based on the expectation that medical students in the positive 
condition would have a higher number of inappropriate facts due to basing choices on quick, 
if-then, less rational thinking, in comparison to medical students in the negative condition 
employing slower, and more considered reasoning.  However, in order to apply heuristics to 
decisions, medical students would require a certain amount of clinical experience and 
knowledge in order for positive affect to exert an influence on the type of processing used. It 
is likely that Year 4 and Year 5 medical students have limited clinical experience and similar 
levels of knowledge.  Therefore, it would be reasonable to suggest that in tasks based on 
clinical knowledge, none of the medical students would use the fast, intuitive processes of 
system 1, and would instead have to base responses on a slower and more systematic 
processing of the features of the case presentation.  It is therefore possible, that when 
medical students were asked to select the 5 most important facts for diagnosis that the more 
cognitive-based processes of system 2 were overriding any potential influence of affect.  
One way of assessing whether this was occurring would be to compare the appropriateness 
of facts selected with medical students and experienced doctors.   
 
Similarly, it was expected that due to heuristic-based thought processes, medical students in 
the positive condition would use less words and take less time to list important facts than 
medical students in the negative or neutral affect conditions.  While it would seem that affect 
was not influencing whether heuristic-based or analytic-based information processing was 
used, it is possible that affect was still having an impact.  As it has been found that positive 
affect increases interest in clinical cases (Isen et al., 1991) and enjoyment in stimulus-based 
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tasks (Martin et al, 1993), it may be that a higher number of words and longer duration for 
medical students in the positive affect condition was a reflection of interest and enjoyment 
rather than decision processes.   
  
4.9.4  The role of specific sources of affect 
Anticipatory and anticipated affect appeared to be influenced by the source of affect. 
Previous research that has highlighted the need to acknowledge and understand the affective 
reaction to team factors was further supported (Annett et al., 2000; Annett & Stanton, 2000).  
The negative team source of affect scenario evoked higher general negative, hostile and fear 
anticipatory affect, while fear was higher in both the team and previous experience source of 
affect.  Seven of the ten discrete positive emotions were felt more intensely by medical 
students in the positive affect condition of the team scenario, and all of the discrete negative, 
hostile and fearful anticipatory emotions were felt more intensely in reaction to the negative 
team source of affect scenario.  While anticipated regret was highest in the positive team 
source of affect, all anticipatory fear emotions had increased scores across the negative, 
positive and neutral versions of the team source of affect scenario.  This would suggest that 
irrespective of the affective tone of the scenario, medical students associated interaction with 
a senior clinical colleague with feeling fear.  As fear is an emotion that has been shown to 
cause low personal control and withdrawal from situations (Lerner & Keltner, 2000, 2001), 
this could clearly have implications in situations where a junior clinician has to urgently 
seek the advice of an unfriendly or hostile senior colleague in order to provide correct and 
urgent care, and is a finding worthy of further investigation.  
 
There was some suggestion of unique affective reactions to the patient and previous 
experience source of affect scenarios.  For example, anticipatory hostile emotions were more 
aroused in the negative patient source of affect scenario, while anticipatory fear emotions 
were more aroused in the negative previous experience source of affect scenario.  With 
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regard to anticipated emotions, positive feelings were higher across all conditions for team 
and previous experience source of affect scenario, and negative anticipated emotions 
remained consistently moderate in both the positive and negative previous experience source 
of affect scenarios.  This finding may suggest that as both the positive and negative previous 
source of affect scenarios involved information concerning the outcome of a similar case, 
this may have elicited a heightened consideration of anticipated affect in medical students 
who read these versions. 
 
It is difficult to ascertain to what extent affective responses to individual scenarios 
influenced appropriateness, specificity and duration within each condition.  For example, 
patient source of affect scenario generally received the highest scores for inappropriate facts 
across all conditions, the least amount of detail in the positive and neutral affect condition, 
and was the scenario in which medical students in the positive and negative condition used 
the most words when describing facts.  In contrast, the previous source of affect scenario 
was the scenario that all students spent the most amount of time on when listing facts.  
While these findings may suggest that the patient source had an impact, the relatively small 
statistically non-significant mean score differences and the similarity of mean scores patterns 
would seem to support the suggestion that in general, medical students’ responses may have 
been due to case complexity, knowledge and experience.  The responses of the medical 
students may therefore have been based on the cognitive-based processes of system 2 rather 
than the affective-based processes of system 1.   
 
4.9.5  Mood   
Finally, there was no evidence that mood influenced affective responses or appropriateness, 
specificity or duration of the facts considered important for diagnosis.  As medical students’ 
mood was moderate across all conditions this was not a surprising finding.  While a measure 
of both valence and arousal were included in the 2-item measure of mood, it is possible that 
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this was too simple a measure and may not have been sensitive enough to capture the subtle 
deviations in the way medical students were feeling before they read and responded to the 
clinical presentations.    
 
 
4.10  Summary  
In summary, study 2 provided preliminary evidence that specific emotions may be 
consistently activated during clinical interactions and performance, and indications that 
different sources of affect may generate unique affective responses.  Team source of affect 
appeared to evoke the most intense affective reactions.  While there was no clear evidence 
that affect caused heuristic or analytic based decision making in the choice of facts 
considered important for diagnosis, it is possible that affect had an impact in other ways. 
The next chapter presents the final experimental study and describes how approaches were 
modified in light of knowledge gained from the first 2 experimental studies.  The findings 
from Study 3 are discussed before reflecting on both the limitations and implications of the 
results from all three experimental studies.          
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
94 
 
CHAPTER 5 
THE INFLUENCE OF AFFECT ON THOROUGHNESS AND ORDER OF 
INFORMATION GATHERING FOR DIAGNOSIS AND CASE MANAGEMENT 
 
5.1  Introduction 
The final experiment presented here was with a sample of NHS doctors and drew upon the 
knowledge gained from conducting the previous online studies with medical students and 
NHS doctors.  The design and methods used were modified after considering both pragmatic 
and methodological issues in both of the earlier studies and are explained in the method 
section below.  
 
As well as addressing barriers to recruitment, further consideration was given to the 
comparison of participants’ responses to those of an expert panel.  In study 2 it was 
impossible to achieve consensus across the expert panel about what facts were the most 
important for making a diagnosis.  This suggested that there was no objective way of 
measuring what is a correct or incorrect response to a case presentation and that subjective 
judgements based on expert opinion are also problematic.  It also suggested that a focus on 
diagnostic process (e.g. a set or sequence of actions to attain a diagnosis) rather than 
accuracy may be a more insightful and useful approach to better understand the factors that 
influence decision-based actions during diagnostic information gathering.  
 
There is increasing evidence that omissions and deviations within the process of information 
gathering contribute widely to diagnostic error (Kostopoulou et al., 2008b; Reilly & Von 
Feldt, 2013; Zwaan, Thijs, Wagner, van der Wal, & Timmermans, 2012).  For example, 
clinicians’ omissions in gathering critical information has been found to hinder diagnostic 
accuracy and appropriate management (Kostopoulou et al., 2008b; Schiff et al., 2009; 
Zwaan et al., 2012),  while the unnecessary ordering of tests and investigations to determine 
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the diagnosis has been linked with an increase in patient harm (Zwaan et al., 2012).  
Whether or not a doctor takes a thorough patient history or performs a physical examination 
has been associated with diagnostic delay (Siminoff et al., 2011), while differential 
diagnoses that are too narrow in scope have  been found to lead to cases of missed diagnosis 
(Ely et al., 2012).  This suggests that the thoroughness and sequence in which doctors gather 
clinically relevant information may have important implications for whether a doctor will be 
on the right trajectory for making an accurate diagnosis.  It is therefore critical to try and 
identify whether affective factors may play a role in thoroughness and order of information 
gathering for diagnosis.     
 
The quicker, heuristic-based and more global thinking that may occur when individuals are 
feeling in a positive or confident affective state (Avramova & Stapel, 2008; Berner & 
Graber, 2008; Isen et al., 1991, Park & Banaji, 2000), or the slower, analytical and more 
focused reasoning that may occur when individuals are in negative affective states (Park & 
Banaji, 2000) may play an important role in the thoroughness and order that doctors apply to 
their diagnostic decision-based actions.  To examine this, an experimental approach was 
therefore taken to try and identify where and what kind of affect impacted the trajectory and 
timeliness of progression through further diagnostic decision stages.     
 
 
5.2  Study 3 
5.2.1  Aims 
Study 3 drew upon all the elements of the distinct diagnostic stage of information gathering 
(e.g. activation, observation and identification), in order to assess how affect influenced the 
diagnostic decision making process in a sample of doctors.  It also explored doctors’ general 
affect and discrete emotions in response to positive or negative affect framed clinical case 
presentations.  Where feasible, the results obtained from doctors here were compared with 
96 
 
those from study 2 with medical students to identify similarities and differences in affective 
response and processes of information gathering that might be related to experience. 
The main objectives in this study were: 1). to examine whether affective cues presented in a 
clinical scenario influenced the thoroughness and order in which doctors gathered 
information for diagnostic decision making and case management; 2). to assess whether, and 
to what extent, different affective cues and specific sources of affect induced general affect 
and discrete positive and negative emotions in doctors.    
 
5.2.2  Hypotheses 
As positive affect has been associated with heuristic based thinking and negative affect with 
systematic thought processes, it was hypothesized that: 
1. Doctors in the positive affect conditions would demonstrate faster, less methodical 
decision making and be less thorough when gathering information for diagnosis 
than doctors in the negative affect conditions. 
2. Doctors in the negative affect conditions would demonstrate slower, more 
considered decision making and be more thorough when gathering information for 
diagnosis than doctors in the positive affect conditions.   
 
To further explore the role of affect in the process of information gathering for diagnosis, an 
additional measure of order was included in this study. As positive affect has been 
associated with faster, less systematic thinking and negative affect with slower, systematic 
thought processes, it was therefore hypothesized that: 
3. Doctors in the positive affect conditions would be less precise and follow a quicker, 
less systematic order when they gathered information for diagnosis than doctors in 
the negative affect conditions. 
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4. Doctors in the negative affect conditions would be more precise and follow a 
slower, more systematic order when they gathered information for diagnosis than 
doctors in the positive affect conditions.   
 
As it is reasonable to assume that positive affect leads to greater confidence, it was also 
hypothesized that: 
5. Doctors in the positive affect conditions would have higher ratings for measures of 
confidence than doctors in the negative affect conditions.   
The current dearth of research on the role of positive and negative anticipatory and 
anticipated affect, discrete emotions, and specific sources of affect (e.g. patient factors, team 
factors) meant that an exploratory approach was taken for these measures, and therefore 
hypotheses were not generated.  
 
 
5.3  Method 
5.3.1  Participants 
The sample
4
 consisted of 77 doctors across all grades and specialties from two acute hospital 
trusts.  There were 33 (42.9%) females and 44 (57.1%) males. Age ranged from 24 to 60 
years with a mean of 38.52 (9.68 SD) years. 
 
Participants were recruited through four main methods. After gaining relevant directorate 
and clinical lead permissions, the first method involved the study advert and questionnaire 
hypertext link (see appendix D) being distributed via email directly to all doctors in each 
clinical department.  This was undertaken by a gatekeeper within the Trust in each clinical 
department. Clicking on the hypertext link took the doctor to the participant information 
                                                 
4
 With an alpha level of 0.05, effect size = 0.4, a sample size of 19 in each group gave 80% power to 
find a significant effect in an ANOVA test (G*Power). 
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sheet.  The second method involved the researcher announcing brief details about the 
opportunity to participate in the study at the beginning or end of departmental meetings and 
distributing a paper copy of the study advert and link to any interested doctor.  The third 
method involved the study advert and questionnaire hypertext link being displayed on the 
Trust intranet.  Again, clicking on the hypertext link took the doctor to the participant 
information sheet (see appendix E).  The final method involved displaying a paper copy of 
the study advert and study link on staff noticeboards in clinical departments.      
5.3.2  Ethics 
The ethical approvals obtained for this study have been described in Chapter 4, section 4.3.2. 
 
5.3.3  Design 
The design was a 2 (positive affect condition or negative affect condition) by 2 (patient 
source of affect scenario or team source of affect scenario) experimental design.  The 
dependent variables were thoroughness of information gathering for diagnosis (e.g. number 
of choices listed, number of words used to describe choices, time taken to make choices), 
and order of information gathering for diagnosis (e.g. further patient history, performing a 
further physical examination, ordering investigations/tests).   
 
Block randomisation was used to randomly allocate participants to one of the four 
conditions.  This was used to balance potential extraneous variables across conditions and 
controlled for researcher bias in the recruitment process.  Other than the final section 
assessing immediate feelings, the case presentation was provided in each section in case the 
doctor needed to refer to it to answer the questions.  This controlled for any omissions that 
may have occurred due to memory lapses concerning the case presentation.  In order to 
avoid response bias, the measure of anticipatory affect was at the end of the questionnaire. 
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5.3.4  Materials 
5.3.4.1  Case presentations 
As the recruitment of doctors from one Acute NHS Hospital Trust had been very low, 
further feedback was gathered from doctors who suggested that as it was likely that the 
questionnaire would be completed during breaks or lunch-time during the busy working day, 
they would find a questionnaire which took 20 minutes and required them to respond to 3 
separate case presentations too time-consuming and onerous to complete.  In general it was 
agreed that an online study which involved responding to one case study and took 
approximately 10 minutes to complete would be more likely to attain a higher number of 
participants.  It was therefore decided that to reduce the burden of participation the present 
study would require doctors to respond to just one case presentation and the 10 item 
International Positive and Negative Affect Schedule (I-PANAS-SF: Thompson, 2007) would 
be used to measure doctors’ anticipatory affect in response to reading the case presentation. 
 
The case presentations for the positive and negative affect versions of the patient and team 
source of affect scenarios were the same as those used in the previous study.  The only 
difference was that due to feedback from clinicians, some minor changes to the wording, or 
order of the wording in the presentations were made to reflect more precise clinical 
language.  It was also decided that the previous experience source of affect scenario was the 
least successful manipulation of source and would be omitted.  While the scenario did 
contain a reference to either the favourable or unfavourable outcome of the patient, it was 
questionable whether this could really tap a doctor’s previous experience unless they had 
actually experienced a similar case themselves.  The neutral affect condition was also 
omitted as Study 1 and Study 2 had found that the positive and neutral affect conditions had 
elicited similar affective responses and that there were no differences between the two 
conditions (see discussion in Chapter 4). 
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5.3.4.2  Online questionnaire 
An online questionnaire was developed to allow for the measurement of thoroughness and 
order of information gathering for diagnosis.  A consultant and junior doctor working in an 
Acute NHS Hospital Trust provided feedback concerning content and structure.   
 
5.3.5  Measures 
5.3.5.1  Affect 
5.3.5.1.1  Mood  
The mood measure was identical to that detailed in Study 1and 2 and is described in section 
4.3.6.2.1. 
 
5.3.5.1.2  Anticipatory affect 
The 10 item International Positive and Negative Affect Schedule (I-PANAS-SF: Thompson, 
2007) was used to measure doctors’ anticipatory affect in response to reading the case 
presentation (e.g. “For each word below, click on the answer which best describes how you 
felt after you had first read the case presentation at the beginning of this questionnaire”).  
The two sub-scales of General Positive Affect (α = .83; e.g. alert, inspired, determined, 
attentive, active) and General Negative Affect (α = 49; e.g. upset, hostile, ashamed, nervous, 
afraid) each had 5 items.  All items had a score range of 1 = very slightly or not at all, to 5 = 
extremely.  Although this was a shorter version of the PANAS, this scale still included the 
emotions that were identified as important in Study 2 (see section 4.9.2 in Chapter 4).  
 
5.3.5.1.3  Anticipated affect  
The measure of anticipated affect was identical to that detailed in Study 2 described in 
Chapter 4.  Cronbach’s Alpha for positive anticipated affect was α = .81 and for negative 
anticipated affect was α = .82.     
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5.3.5.1.4  Confidence in most likely diagnosis 
This measure contained 1 item (e.g. “Please indicate how confident you are that your most 
likely diagnosis for this patient is correct, by clicking on the most appropriate answer 
below”).  This had a score range of 1 = not at all confident to 7 = extremely confident. 
Higher scores signified higher confidence in the facts chosen for making a diagnosis. 
 
5.3.5.2  Thoroughness and order of information gathering 
Thoroughness of information gathering in this study included a new measure of the number 
of choices doctors listed in 3 separate categories of diagnostic decision making and included 
measures of number of words and time for each of the 3 categories of decision making. 
Order of information gathering was a new measure in this study and focused on the sequence 
of choices that doctors made to gather information to make a diagnosis.  The measures are 
described below.    
 
5.3.5.2.1  Thoroughness of information gathering  
5.3.5.2.1.1  Number of choices listed 
This measured the number of choices that doctors listed for most important facts for making 
a diagnosis, differential diagnoses, and immediate actions.  After reading the case 
presentation, doctors were asked questions concerning most important facts for making a 
diagnosis (e.g. “What do you consider to be the most important facts in this case for making 
a diagnosis?”), differential diagnoses (e.g. “Now list what you think might be the differential 
diagnoses in this case”), immediate actions (e.g. “What would be your immediate actions for 
the patient at this stage?”).  Doctors were advised that they could list as many or as few 
items in the text space provided for each category (e.g. “You may list as many or as few 
important facts/differential diagnoses/immediate actions as you want, but please ensure that 
you only write one single immediate action in each space”).  The score range in each 
category was 0 to 12, and higher scores indicated higher number of items listed.   
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5.3.5.2.1.2  Number of words used to describe choices 
The number of words assessed how many words doctors used in the choices they provided in 
the three categories, most important facts for making a diagnosis, differential diagnoses, and 
immediate actions described in the measure above.  Higher score indicated a higher number 
of words used.  To ensure consistency across participants, a set of criteria for determining a 
word unit was followed and is included in appendix C. 
 
5.3.5.2.1.3  Time taken to make choices 
This measure was the number of seconds taken to complete the choices in each of the 
categories, most important facts for making a diagnosis, differential diagnoses and 
diagnostic confidence, and immediate actions.  Higher score indicated a longer duration in 
seconds. While differential diagnosis also included a 1 item question for confidence in 
diagnosis, this was identical across all conditions.  The time each participant took to 
complete the choices for most important facts for making a diagnosis, differential diagnoses 
and diagnostic confidence, and immediate actions were logged automatically by the online 
questionnaire once the section had been completed.  
    
5.3.5.2.2  Order of information gathering 
This measure drew upon the theoretically taught order to guide the diagnostic process and 
management plan described in figure 3.1, section 3.3.3 and supported through discussion 
with clinical colleagues. This measured the order in which the doctor chose to gather 
information for diagnosis and case management when doctors were asked to choose what 
further information they would want to gather for diagnosis after reading the case 
presentation.  Doctors were presented with a choice of: “investigations/tests”, “further 
history”, “no further information needed at this stage”, and “further examination”.  Doctors 
could select as few or as many choices as they wanted in any order, but each choice could 
only be selected once. The choices and the order in which they were made were collected for 
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each doctor by the online computer programme.  Five separate choices of order were 
assessed: 1) whether a taught order was chosen (e.g. further history then further examination 
then investigations/tests); 2) whether all options irrespective of order were chosen (e.g. 
further history, further examination, investigations/tests); 3) whether first option was 
“further history”; 4) whether first option was “further examination” and; 5) whether first 
option was “investigations/tests”. For each of the 5 separate choices, each doctor was either 
scored 1 = No or 2 = Yes.  A score of 1 indicated that the doctor did not choose to gather 
information in the order assessed, while a score of 2 indicated that the doctor did choose to 
gather information in the order assessed.  
 
5.3.5.3  Other 
5.3.5.3.1  Demographics 
Each participant indicated their age, sex, clinical grade, number of years in present grade, 
total number of year’s postgraduate clinical experience and specialty.  
 
5.3.6  Procedure 
On attaining the directorate and clinical lead permissions, recruitment of participants began 
as described in section 4.3.1.  After reading the on-line participant information sheet and 
completing the online consent form, doctors were randomly allocated to one of four 
conditions (positive patient, negative patient, positive team, negative team).  Participants 
then provided an anonymous participant code and demographic information.  Participants in 
all conditions were provided with identical instructions and were firstly asked to respond to 
two questions assessing their current mood before being asked to read one clinical scenario. 
After the clinical scenario, participants were then asked to provide a list of most important 
facts in the clinical scenario for making a diagnosis and to provide a list of differential 
diagnoses and rate their confidence in the most likely diagnosis they had listed.  
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Following this, they were asked to list the immediate treatments or actions they would carry 
out.  All doctors were then asked to choose what further information they would want to 
gather for diagnosis, and were provided with a choice of categories which were, “further 
history”, “further physical examination”, “tests/investigations”, or “no further information 
needed at this stage”.  Dependent on the category of further information chosen, participants 
were then asked to list the most important aspects for making a diagnosis.  Participants were 
able to continue to select all further information categories, or could decide that the case 
presentation had provided them with enough of the required information for some, or all of 
the categories by choosing the option, “no further information needed at this stage”. 
Participants were then asked questions assessing consideration of future feelings and then 
finally asked to provide a rating of their immediate feelings when they first read the case 
presentation.  Other than the final section assessing immediate feelings, the case presentation 
was provided in each section in case the doctor needed to refer to it to answer the questions. 
On completion of the questionnaire, participants were invited to provide an email address so 
that they could be informed when the summary of results was available.  
 
5.3.7  Analysis 
The SPSS statistical software package (Version 19.0) was used for statistical analysis. 
Cronbach’s Alpha was used to assess the reliability of each measurement.  Differences for 
general affective response (positive and negative anticipatory affect, positive and negative 
anticipated affect, and confidence in most likely diagnosis), discrete emotions (positive and 
negative anticipatory emotions, positive and negative anticipated emotions), and 
thoroughness of information gathering for diagnosis (number of items, number of words, 
duration) were assessed by examination of mean scores.  Two-way between-subjects 
MANCOVAs assessed whether differences were significant across conditions.  Cohen’s 
(1988) guidelines for eta squared were used to interpret the strength of partial eta squared.  
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Participants’ baseline mood scores were used as the covariate in the analysis to control for 
mood.  All additional tests of between-subjects effects and post-hoc comparisons controlled 
for Type 1 error by applying a Bonferroni correction for multiple analyses.  In order to 
control for unexpected distractions which may have prolonged the time taken to complete 
the answers, extreme scores for duration were removed from the analysis for the measure of 
time. 
 
Chi-square tests for independence were conducted to explore the relationship between order 
of information gathering (taught order, choosing all information gathering options, taking 
further history first, performing a further physical examination first, order of investigations 
first) and condition (positive and negative affect) for the patient and team source of affect 
scenarios.  The expected frequency in cells was checked to be a minimum of 5 in all Chi-
square tests to ensure assumption of minimum expected cell frequency was not violated.  
Where Chi-squares were found to violate this assumption, Fisher’s Exact Probability Test 
was used. Yates’ Continuity Correction values were used to assess significance of 
association in the remaining Chi-square tests.  
 
 
5.4  Results 
5.4.1  Affect 
5.4.1.1  Mood 
A one-way between-groups ANOVA demonstrated that there was a significant difference in 
baseline mood between doctors in the positive patient source of affect (M = 4.24, SD = 
0.65), negative patient source of affect (M = 4.26, SD = 0.75), positive team source of affect 
(M = 4.82, SD = 1.17) and negative team source of affect (M = 5.30, SD = 0.96) conditions, 
F (3, 66) = 5.36, p = < 0.01.  Post-hoc comparisons with a Bonferroni adjustment indicated 
that the baseline mood score for doctors in the negative team source of affect condition was 
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significantly higher than doctors in both the positive and negative patient source of affect 
condition.   
 
5.4.1.2  General affective response to clinical scenarios   
The mean and standard error for ratings of positive and negative anticipatory affect across 
conditions are presented in Table 5.1.  The mean scores for positive and negative 
anticipatory affect in response to the scenarios were all below the mid-point score of 3 
suggesting that arousal of anticipatory affect for the scenarios was low across all conditions.  
Positive anticipatory affect scores were at least 1 scale point higher than negative 
anticipatory affect scores across all conditions.  While the pattern of negative anticipatory 
affect supported that manipulation of emotion had been successful (e.g. higher negative 
anticipatory affect scores in negative conditions), scores for positive anticipatory affect show 
that while the patient positive source of affect scenario had higher positive anticipatory 
affect ratings than the patient negative source of affect scenario, this pattern was not 
replicated for the team source of affect scenario.   
 
Table 5.1  Mean (Std. Error) general affective response across conditions 
 Pos. Patient   Neg. Patient 
    N = 18           N = 18            
Pos. Team    Neg. Team   
   N = 16          N = 17                                                                                                                                                                                                            
Positive  
Negative 
Pos. Anticipated  
Neg. Anticipated 
Confidence  
 2.76 (0.18)    2.58 (0.18)      
 1.26 (0.09)    1.37 (0.09) 
 4.66 (0.24)    4.36 (0.25) 
 3.19 (0.30)    4.15 (0.31) 
 4.29 (0.22)    3.94 (0.23) 
2.54 (0.19)    2.69 (0.19)         
1.25 (0.09)    1.47 (0.10)      
4.86 (0.25)    4.54 (0.26)         
3.73 (0.31)    4.60 (0.32)        
4.90 (0.23)    4.50 (0.23)   
Pos. Patient: Positive patient; Neg. Patient: Negative patient; Pos. Team: Positive  
team; Neg. Team: Negative team; Pos. Anticipated: Positive anticipated affect;  
Neg. Anticipated: Negative anticipated affect 
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The mean scores for positive and negative anticipated affect showed that while mean score 
differences were small, doctors felt higher positive anticipated affect levels in both the 
positive patient and positive team conditions when compared to the negative patient and  
negative team conditions.  In contrast, doctors in the negative patient and negative team 
condition felt higher levels of negative anticipated affect in comparison to doctors in the 
positive patient and positive team conditions.  In both cases mean score differences were 
almost 1 scale point.  Doctors were moderately confident in the likely diagnosis they had 
made.  Doctors in the positive patient and team conditions were more confident that their 
most likely diagnosis for the patient was correct than doctors in the negative patient and 
team conditions.   
 
A two-way between-groups MANCOVA was conducted to examine the impact of condition 
(positive vs. negative) and scenario (patient vs. team) on general affective response (positive 
affect, negative affect, positive anticipated affect, negative anticipated affect and confidence 
in most likely diagnosis).  After adjusting for mood scores, there was no significant two-way 
interaction, F (5, 60) = 0.22, p = .953.  There was a significant main effect for condition, F 
(5, 60) = 3.76, p = .005, with a large effect size (partial eta squared = .24), but no significant 
main effect for scenario, F (5, 60) = 1.54, p = .192.  Mood was a significant covariate, F (5, 
60) = 2.51, p = .040, with a large effect size (partial eta squared = .17).  
 
With a Bonferroni adjusted alpha level of 0.01, the univariate effects for condition showed 
only negative anticipated affect to be significant,  F (1, 64) = 9.32, p = .003, with a medium 
effect size (partial eta squared = .13).  Doctors in the negative patient and team conditions 
had significantly higher negative anticipated affect than doctors in the positive patient and 
teams conditions.  Mood was not a significant covariate at the adjusted alpha level of 0.01. 
At the 0.05 alpha level, mood was a significant covariate for general positive anticipatory 
affect, F (1, 64) = 5.46, p = .02, partial eta squared = .08. While doctors in the positive 
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patient and team conditions had higher mean scores for confidence that their most likely 
diagnosis for the patient was correct than doctors in the negative patient and team 
conditions, the difference was not significant and did not support the hypothesis that doctors 
in the positive affect conditions would have higher ratings for measures of confidence than 
doctors in the negative affect conditions.     
     
5.4.1.3  Discrete anticipatory emotions in response to clinical scenarios 
The mean and standard error for ratings of discrete positive and negative emotions across 
conditions are presented in Table 5.2.  Other than the emotion, inspired, the discrete positive 
emotions were generally 1 scale point higher than the discrete negative emotions across all 
conditions.  In general, all positive emotions other than ‘inspired’ were aroused across all 
conditions.  The emotion alert was most highly aroused and scored above the mid-point of 3 
across all conditions.  The emotion inspired was the least aroused and scored within the 
scale point of 1 across all conditions.  When compared to the negative affect versions of the 
scenarios, only the positive emotion inspired was highest in both the positive patient and 
team conditions, while determined and attentive were higher in the positive patient, but not 
the positive team condition. While the discrete negative emotions were lower in intensity 
than the discrete positive emotions, doctors in the negative team condition reported higher 
levels of all the negative emotions compared to doctors in the positive team condition.  
However, the emotions upset and ashamed had only marginal mean score differences.  In 
contrast, while doctors in the negative patient condition scored more highly than doctors in 
the positive patient condition for the negative emotions, upset and hostile, doctors in the 
positive condition had marginally higher mean scores for the other negative emotions of 
ashamed, nervous and afraid.  The largest differences between negative and positive 
conditions of the same scenario occurred in both the patient and team source of affect 
scenarios for the emotion hostile.  Similarly to Study 2, the emotion, nervous was the only 
negative anticipatory emotion that showed consistency in arousal across all conditions.  
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Table 5.2  Mean (Std. Error) discrete positive and negative anticipatory  
emotions across conditions 
 Pos. Patient   Neg. Patient 
    N = 18          N = 18            
 Pos. Team   Neg. Team           
 N = 16          N = 16                   
Gen. Pos.  
Alert. 
Inspired  
Determined 
Attentive 
Active  
Gen. Neg. 
Upset 
Hostile 
Ashamed 
Nervous 
Afraid 
       
 3.23 (0.23)    3.44 (0.23) 
 1.68 (0.21)    1.55 (0.22) 
 2.85 (0.27)    2.29 (0.27) 
 3.34 (0.21)    2.86 (0.22) 
 2.67 (0.24)    2.77 (0.25) 
 
0.96 (0.11)    1.21 (0.11) 
1.13 (0.17)    1.66 (0.17) 
1.06 (0.08)    1.01 (0.08) 
1.76 (0.21)    1.63 (0.22) 
1.40 (0.18)    1.35 (0.19) 
          
3.08 (0.24)    3.03 (0.26)              
1.65 (0.22)    1.42 (0.24)              
2.51 (0.28)    2.64 (0.30)              
2.92 (0.22)    3.22 (0.24)     
2.52 (0.25)    2.99 (0.27)              
 
1.21 (0.11)    1.22 (0.12)             
1.15 (0.18)    1.78 (0.19)             
1.12 (0.08)    1.17 (0.09)            
1.45 (0.22)    1.87 (0.24)             
1.31 (0.19)    1.48 (0.20)                     
Pos. Patient: Positive patient; Neg. Patient: Negative patient; Pos. Team: 
Positive team; Neg. Team: Negative team; Gen. Pos.: General positive 
affect; Gen. Neg.: General negative affect 
A two-way between-groups MANCOVA was conducted to examine the impact of condition 
(positive vs. negative) and scenario (patient vs. team) on discrete anticipatory emotions 
(alert, inspired, determined, attentive, active, upset, hostile, ashamed, nervous, afraid).  After 
adjusting for mood scores, there was no significant two-way interaction, F (10 54) = 0.91, p 
= .529.  There was no significant main effect for condition, F (10, 54) = 1.72, p = .100, and 
no significant main effect for scenario, F (10, 54) = 0.35, p = .963.  Mood was not a 
significant covariate, F (10, 54) = 1.80, p = .083. 
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5.4.1.4  Discrete anticipated emotions in response to clinical scenarios 
The mean and standard error for ratings of discrete anticipated positive and negative 
emotions across conditions are presented in Table 5.3.  In general, there were higher mean 
scores for discrete positive anticipated emotions than for discrete negative anticipated 
emotions.  Positive emotions were above the mid-point of 4 indicating that doctors had 
moderate arousal of positive anticipated emotions.  All anticipated positive emotions were 
higher in the positive affect than the negative affect conditions for both the patient and team 
source of affect scenarios.  The highest positive emotion was confidence (M = 5.52, SE = 
0.23) in the positive team condition.  The emotion, proud tended to score the lowest across 
all conditions.  The largest differences between negative and positive conditions of the same 
scenario occurred in the team source of affect scenario for the emotion confidence.  
 
Table 5.3  Mean (Std. Error) discrete positive and negative anticipated emotions  
across conditions 
 Pos. Patient   Neg. Patient 
    N = 18           N = 18            
 Pos. Team   Neg. Team           
   N = 17          N = 17                    
Pos. Antic.  
Proud. 
Confidence  
Self-respect 
Neg. Antic. 
Regret 
Shame 
Guilt 
       
 4.45 (0.35)    4.08 (0.36) 
 4.73 (0.23)    4.68 (0.23) 
 4.82 (0.24)    4.34 (0.25) 
  
 3.55 (0.36)    4.79 (0.37) 
 3.30 (0.39)    3.76 (0.40) 
 2.84 (0.35)    4.09 (0.36) 
          
4.28 (0.35)    4.10 (0.37)              
5.52 (0.23)    4.80 (0.25)              
4.85 (0.25)    4.69 (0.26)              
 
4.41 (0.36)    5.41 (0.38)              
3.72 (0.39)    3.75 (0.41)              
3.57 (0.36)    4.33 (0.38)                  
Pos. Patient: Positive patient; Neg. Patient: Negative patient; Pos. Team: 
Positive team; Neg. Team: Negative team; Pos. Antic.: Positive anticipated 
emotions; Neg. Antic.: Negative anticipated emotions 
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The discrete anticipated negative emotions had more variation in mean scores across 
conditions than anticipated positive emotions.  All emotions were felt with more intensity in 
the negative conditions for both the patient and team scenarios, however, mean score 
differences were smaller for the emotion, shame while both regret and guilt had larger mean 
score differences between the positive and negative conditions.  The highest anticipated 
negative emotion was regret (M = 5.41, SE = 0.38) by doctors in the negative team 
condition.  The lowest anticipated negative emotion was guilt (M = 2.84, SE = 0.35) in the 
positive patient condition.  The largest differences between negative and positive conditions 
occurred in the patient source of affect scenario for the emotions regret and guilt.  
 
A two-way between-groups MANCOVA was conducted to examine the impact of condition 
(positive vs. negative) and scenario (patient vs. team) on discrete positive and negative 
anticipated emotions (proud, confidence, self-respect, regret, shame, guilt).  After adjusting 
for mood scores, there was no significant two-way interaction, F (6, 60) = 1.29, p = .275. 
There was a significant main effect for condition, F (6, 60) = 3.54, p = .005, with a large 
effect size (partial eta squared = .26), but no significant main effect for scenario, F (6, 60) = 
1.66, p = .148.  Mood was not a significant covariate, F (6, 60) = 0.79, p = .583. 
 
With a Bonferroni adjusted alpha level of .008, the univariate effects for condition showed 
regret F (1, 65) = 10.14, p = .002, with a large effect size (partial eta squared = .14), and 
guilt, F (1, 65) = 8.13, p = .006, with a medium effect size (partial eta squared = .11), to be 
significant.  Doctors in the negative patient and team conditions had significantly higher 
feelings of anticipated regret and guilt than doctors in the positive patient and teams 
conditions.  
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5.4.2  Thoroughness and order of information gathering for diagnosis 
5.4.2.1  Number of choices listed  
The mean and standard error scores for the number of choices that doctors listed are 
presented in Table 5.4.  While doctors in the negative team condition listed more choices 
than doctors in the positive team condition for all 3 categories (e.g. important facts for 
diagnosis, differential diagnoses and immediate actions), doctors in the negative patient 
condition listed more choices than doctors in the positive patient condition for differential 
diagnoses and immediate actions but not important facts for diagnoses.  While ‘important 
facts for diagnoses’ was the category with the largest mean difference between positive and 
negative conditions of each scenario, mean score differences were generally under 1 scale 
point and small.  
 
A two-way between-groups MANCOVA was conducted to examine the impact of condition 
(positive vs. negative) and scenario (patient vs. team) on the number of items listed  
(important facts for diagnosis, diagnosis, differential diagnoses, and immediate actions). 
After adjusting for mood scores, there was no significant two-way interaction, F (3, 64) = 
1.42, p = .244.  There was not a significant main effect for condition, F (3, 64) = 0.08, p = 
.972, but there was a significant main effect for scenario, F (3, 64) = 6.16, p = .001, with a 
large effect size (partial eta squared = .22).  Mood was not a significant covariate, F (3, 64) 
= 0.24, p = .871.  
 
With a Bonferroni adjusted alpha level of .017, the univariate effects for scenario showed 
that none of the dependent variables were significant.  However, at the 0.05 alpha level, 
differential diagnoses was significant, F (1, 66) = 4.79, p = .032, with a medium effect size  
(partial eta squared = .07) indicating that doctors in the positive or negative patient source of 
affect scenarios gave more differential diagnoses than doctors in the positive or negative 
team source of affect scenarios.    
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Table 5.4  Mean (Std. Error) scores for thoroughness of information gathering across 
conditions 
  Pos. Patient        Neg. Patient 
     N = 19                N = 18            
    Pos. Team        Neg. Team            
      N = 17              N = 17                    
Choices  
Facts 
Diagnosis  
Actions 
Words  
Facts 
Diagnosis 
Actions 
Time† 
Facts 
Diagnosis  
Actions 
       
  5.88 (0.55)         4.91 (0.57) 
  5.14 (0.44)         5.29 (0.42) 
  5.55 (0.52)         5.92 (0.54) 
 
 16.89 (2.89)       16.65 (3.03) 
 10.37 (1.03)       10.23 (1.08) 
 18.55 (4.55)       26.24 (4.77) 
 
228.04 (30.70)  253.59 (28.34) 
134.44 (21.00)  171.81 (19.39) 
114.94 (24.55)  144.35 (22.66) 
          
   5.64 (0.57)      6.83 (0.60)             
   3.92 (0.44)      4.37 (0.47)   
   6.63 (0.54)      6.73 (0.57)   
                                          
  18.85 (3.02)    22.82 (3.19)            
    8.16 (1.08)      9.77 (1.14)   
  21.35 (4.77)    25.54 (5.02)    
                                          
244.73 (29.08)  295.12 (30.80)      
119.32 (19.89)  162.57 (21.07)  
159.19 (23.25)  183.48 (24.62)            
Note that † = N = 14 (positive patient), N = 17 (negative patient), N = 16  
(positive team), N = 14 (negative team). Pos. Patient: Positive patient; Neg. Patient:  
Negative patient; Pos. Team: Positive team; Neg. Team: Negative team 
 
 
Although the mean score difference was in the hypothesized direction for the number of 
choices listed, the difference was not significant at the alpha level of .017 and therefore the 
hypotheses that when gathering information for diagnosis, doctors in the positive affect 
conditions would use faster, less methodical decision making processes, while doctors in the 
negative affect conditions would use slower, more considered decision making processes 
was not supported.   
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5.4.2.2  Number of words used to describe choices 
The mean scores for the number of words used to describe choices showed that doctors in 
the positive team condition used fewer words than doctors in the negative team condition for 
all of the three categories.  In the patient source of affect scenarios, doctors in the positive 
condition used marginally more words than doctors in the negative condition for facts 
important for diagnosis and differential diagnoses.  As the number of words used is likely to 
be a reflection of the number of choices made in each of these categories, it is likely that 
differences in mean scores for facts important for diagnoses and differential diagnoses may 
be due to the number of choices made.  However, for the immediate actions category, the 
number of choices made were similar for the positive and negative affect condition of each 
scenario.  Here, the mean difference between the positive and negative conditions for the 
number of words used for the patient scenario was approximately 8 words and for the team 
scenario was approximately 4 words.  
 
A two-way between-groups MANCOVA was conducted to examine the impact of condition 
(positive vs. negative) and scenario (patient vs. team) on the number of words used 
(important facts for diagnosis, differential diagnoses, and immediate actions).  After 
adjusting for mood scores, there was no significant two-way interaction, F (3 64) = 0.60, p = 
.615.  There was not a significant main effect for condition, F (3, 64) = 0.59, p = .624, or for 
scenario, F (3, 64) = 1.89, p = .140.  Mood was not a significant covariate, F (3, 64) = 1.10, 
p = .358. 
 
Although the mean scores between groups for the number of words used to describe choices 
for immediate actions were in the hypothesized direction, they were not statistically 
significant, and therefore the hypotheses that when gathering information for diagnosis, 
doctors in the positive affect conditions would use faster, less methodical decision making 
115 
 
processes, while doctors in the negative affect conditions would use slower, more considered 
decision making processes was not supported.  
 
5.4.2.3  Time taken to make choices 
The mean scores and standard error for time taken to make choices, illustrates that doctors in 
the positive conditions across both scenarios took less time than doctors in the negative 
conditions to list choices for information gathering and management of the patient.  The 
greatest time difference occurred in the team source of affect scenario for important facts for 
diagnosis, with doctors in the negative affect condition taking over 50 seconds longer to 
make choices than doctors in the positive affect condition.  Conversely, the shortest time 
difference occurred in the patient source of affect scenario for the same category, with 
doctors in the negative affect condition taking just under 26 seconds longer to make choices 
than doctors in the positive affect condition.  Doctors in both conditions of the patient source 
of affect scenario took longer than doctors in the corresponding conditions of the team 
source of affect scenario to make choices for differential diagnoses, whilst the opposite 
occurred for important facts for diagnosis and immediate actions. 
 
A two-way between-groups MANCOVA was conducted to examine the impact of condition 
(positive vs. negative) and scenario (patient vs. team) on the time taken to list choices 
(important facts for diagnosis, differential diagnoses, and immediate actions).  After 
adjusting for mood scores, there was no significant two-way interaction, F (3 54) = 0.60, p = 
.980.  There was not a significant main effect for condition, F (3, 54) = 1.60, p = .200, or for 
scenario, F (3, 54) = 1.95, p = .133.  Mood was not a significant covariate, F (3, 54) = 1.80, 
p = .157.  
 
Although the mean scores between groups for time taken to make choices were in the 
hypothesized direction, they were not statistically significant, and therefore the hypotheses 
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that when gathering information for diagnosis, doctors in the positive affect conditions 
would use faster, less methodical decision making processes, while doctors in the negative 
affect conditions would use slower, more considered decision making processes was not 
supported. 
 
5.4.3  Order of information gathering for diagnosis 
As illustrated in Table 5.5, Chi-square tests for independence were conducted to explore the 
association between order of information gathering (taught order, choosing all information 
gathering options, taking a further history first, performing a further physical examination 
first, ordering investigations first) and condition (positive and negative affect) for both the 
patient and team source affect scenarios.  The expected frequency in cells was checked to be 
a minimum of 5 in all Chi-square tests to ensure assumption of minimum expected cell 
frequency was not violated.  Chi-squares that violated this assumption were the test of 
association between performing information gathering in a taught order and affect and 
selecting further history first and affect in both the patient and team source of affect 
scenarios.  The assumption was also violated in the team source of affect for the test of 
association between selecting a further examination first and affect.  In these cases, Fisher’s 
Exact Probability Test was used. Yates’ Continuity Correction values were used to assess 
significance of association in the remaining Chi-square tests.  
 
An examination of whether doctors selected a taught order (e.g. taking a further patient 
history, performing a further physical examination, then ordering tests) when gathering 
information for diagnosis, showed that the proportion of doctors in the patient source of 
affect scenario who selected a taught order for information gathering consisted of 60.0% of 
doctors in the negative affect condition and 40.0% of doctors in the positive affect condition.  
A Chi-square test for independence (with Yates Continuity Correction) indicated that there 
was no significant association between performing information gathering in a taught order  
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Table 5.5  Relationship between positive and negative affect and order of information gathering 
 PATIENT SOURCE 
Negative affect     Positive affect   
   (N = 18)                  (N = 19) 
TEAM SOURCE 
Negative affect    Positive affect 
      (N = 17)               (N = 17) 
 
Taught order 
No 
Yes 
   
All options selected 
No† 
Yes 
  
Further History first 
No 
Yes 
  
Further Exam first 
No 
Yes 
  
Investigations first 
No 
Yes 
 
    
15  (46.9%)            17  (53.1%)   
  3  (60.0%)              2  (40.0%) 
Χ 2 = 0.00, p = .66 
    
  6  (37.5%)            10  (62.5%)   
12  (60.0%)              8  (40.0%) 
Χ 2 = 1.01, p = .31 
    
14  (48.3%)             15  (51.7%)   
  4  (50.0%)               4  (50.0%) 
Χ 2 = 0.00, p = 1.00  
 
 8   (34.8%)              15  (65.2%)   
10  (71.4%)                4  (28.6%) 
Χ 2 = 3.33, p = .07 
 
 14  (63.6%)                8  (36.4%)   
   4  (26.7%)              11  (73.3%) 
Χ 2 = 3.51, p = .06      
 
         
15  (50.0%)            15  (50.0%)   
  2  (50.0%)              2  (50.0%) 
 Χ 2 = 0.00, p = 1.00  
 
  9  (56.3%)              7  (43.8%)   
  8  (44.4%)            10  (55.6%) 
 Χ 2 = 0.12, p = .73  
 
 14  (48.3%)            15  (51.7%)   
   3  (60.0%)              2  (40.0%) 
 Χ 2 = 0.00, p = 1.00  
  
  13  (44.8%)            16  (55.2%)   
    4  (80.0%)              1  (20.0%) 
 Χ 2 = 0.94, p = .34  
 
     7  (63.6%)             4  (36.4%)   
   10  (43.5%)           13  (56.5%) 
 Χ 2 = 0.54, p = .46     
 
 
Note that discrepancies in N are due to missing data. † = N = 18 for positive affect in patient 
source  
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and affect, Χ 2(1, N = 37) = 0.00, p = .66, phi = -.09.  The proportion of doctors in the team 
source of affect scenario who selected a taught order for information gathering consisted of 
50.0% of doctors in the negative affect condition and 50.0% of doctors in the positive affect 
condition.  A Chi-square test for independence (with Yates Continuity Correction) indicated that 
there was no significant association between performing information gathering in a taught order 
and affect, Χ 2(1, N = 34) = 0.00, p = 1.00, phi = .00. 
 
An examination of how many doctors selected all available options for gathering information 
for diagnosis (e.g. taking a further patient history, performing a further physical examination 
and ordering tests), showed that in the patient source of affect scenario the proportion of doctors 
who selected all available options for information gathering consisted of 60.0% of doctors in the 
negative affect condition and 40.0% of doctors in the positive affect condition.  A Chi-square 
test for independence (with Yates Continuity Correction) indicated that there was no significant 
association between selecting all options for information gathering and affect, Χ 2(1, N = 36) = 
1.01, p = .31, phi = -.22.  The proportion of doctors who selected all available options for 
information gathering in the team source of affect scenario consisted of 44.4% of doctors in the 
negative affect condition and 55.6% of doctors in the positive affect condition.  A Chi-square 
test for independence (with Yates Continuity Correction) indicated that there was no significant 
association between selecting all options for information gathering and affect, Χ 2(1, N = 34) = 
0.12, p = .73, phi = .12.   
 
An examination of how many doctors selected to take a further patient history first, showed that 
in the patient source of affect scenario the proportion of doctors who selected to take a further 
patient history first consisted of 50.0% of doctors in the negative affect condition and 50.0% of 
doctors in the positive affect condition.  A Chi-square test for independence (with Yates 
Continuity Correction) indicated that there was no significant association between selecting to 
take a further patient history first and affect, Χ 2(1, N = 37) = 0.00, p = 1.00, phi = -.01.  The 
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proportion of doctors who selected to take a further patient history first in the team source of 
affect scenario consisted of 60.0% of doctors in the negative affect condition and 40.0% of 
doctors in the positive affect condition.  A Chi-square test for independence (with Yates 
Continuity Correction) indicated that there was no significant association between selecting to 
take a further patient history first and affect, Χ 2(1, N = 34) = 0.00, p = 1.00, phi = -.08.   
 
An examination of how many doctors selected to perform a further examination first, showed 
that in the patient source of affect scenario the proportion of doctors who selected to perform a 
further examination first consisted of 71.4% of doctors in the negative affect condition and 
28.6% of doctors in the positive affect condition.  A Chi-square test for independence (with 
Yates Continuity Correction) indicated that there was no significant association between 
selecting to perform a further examination first and affect, Χ 2(1, N = 37) = 3.33, p = .07, phi = -
.36.  The proportion of doctors who selected to perform a further examination first in the team 
source of affect scenario consisted of 80.0% of doctors in the negative affect condition and 
20.0% of doctors in the positive affect condition.  A Chi-square test for independence (with 
Yates Continuity Correction) indicated that there was no significant association between 
selecting to perform a further examination first and affect, Χ 2(1, N = 34) = 0.94, p = .34, phi = -
.25.   
 
An examination of how many doctors chose to order investigations first, showed that in the 
patient source of affect scenario the proportion of doctors who chose to order investigations first 
consisted of 26.7% of doctors in the negative affect condition and 73.3% of doctors in the 
positive affect condition.  A Chi-square test for independence (with Yates Continuity 
Correction) indicated that there was no significant association between selecting to perform a 
further examination first and affect, Χ 2(1, N = 37) = 3.51, p = .06, phi = .36.  The proportion of 
doctors who chose to order investigations first in the team source of affect scenario consisted of 
43.5% of doctors in the negative affect condition and 56.5% of doctors in the positive affect 
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condition.  A Chi-square test for independence (with Yates Continuity Correction) indicated that 
there was no significant association between selecting to perform a further examination first and 
affect, Χ 2(1, N = 34) = 0.54, p = .46, phi = .19. 
   
 
5.5  Discussion 
The aim of Study 3 was to explore doctors’ general affective and discrete emotions in response 
to positive or negative affect framed clinical case presentations.  It drew upon all processes in 
the diagnostic stage of information gathering in order to identify whether types (mood, 
anticipatory affect, anticipated affect)  and sources (patient factors and team factors) of affect 
influenced the thoroughness and order in which doctors gathered information for diagnostic 
decision making and case management.  Findings were also considered in light of results 
obtained with medical students.  
 
5.5.1  General affective response to clinical scenarios 
Doctors’ mean score ratings for positive general anticipatory affect were similar across all 
conditions and were higher in the positive patient condition but not the positive team condition.  
In contrast, general negative affect was higher in all negative affect conditions, although the 
differences in mean scores were low and statistically non-significant.  The fact that there were 
not greater mean score differences between conditions, and the fact that mean scores for 
anticipatory affect was generally low, may be because the 10 item I-PANAS-SF (Thompson, 
2007) lacked the sensitivity to capture arousal of general anticipatory affect, or it may be that 
doctors did not have a strong enough anticipatory reaction to the case presentations.  While the 
general positive feelings experienced by doctors in the positive patient condition were slightly 
higher than those experienced by medical students for the same scenario, doctors in the negative 
team condition had almost a 1 scale point lower score for negative feelings than medical 
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students in the same scenario.  This would seem to suggest that clinical experience involving 
patients and colleagues played a role in determining the level of affective response.       
Doctors in the positive affect conditions gave statistically non-significant higher scores for 
general positive anticipated affect, while doctors in the negative affect conditions felt 
significantly more general negative anticipated affect.  This finding would seem to support 
evidence that there is congruence between an individual’s present affective state and their 
judgement of the valence of likely future occurrences (Waters, 2008).  In this case it may be that 
the doctor’s present feelings make congruent future feelings more salient.  Therefore, while 
doctors in a more positive affective state focus on their positive future feelings, doctors in a 
more negative affective state may be more likely to focus on their negative future feelings.  An 
alternative explanation may be strengthened by the contrasting finding that medical students in 
the positive condition had higher feelings of negative anticipated affect.   
 
While medical students’ inexperience in clinical situations may cause them to base any 
consideration of future feelings on their immediate response to the patient, colleague or 
situation, doctors’ experience of managing difficult patients or working with rude and hostile 
clinical colleagues, may make them more likely to base any consideration of future feelings on a 
more reflective feedback of previous feelings from similar outcomes (Baumeister, et al., 2007b).  
It is feasible to suggest that negative clinical situations may result in stronger negative feelings 
and worse outcomes. Therefore, the higher ratings of anticipated negative emotions in negative 
conditions may be indicative of the doctors’ own reflection of the feelings they have 
experienced following the decisions they have made for diagnosis and case management in 
similar real-life clinical situations. 
 
In comparing doctors’ confidence in the most likely diagnosis in the positive and negative 
conditions the trends in the means may imply that higher confidence was a result of being in a 
more positive affective state, although this difference was not statistically significant.  However, 
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as it is proposed that the higher confidence in facts chosen by medical students in a negative 
affective state was due to the retrieval of knowledge rather than experience, this suggestion 
supports the notion that both positive affect and confidence make heuristic-based processes 
more likely in diagnosis and supports research that links faster heuristic or intuitive-based 
decision processes with higher levels of clinical experience (Croskerry, 2009a, Woolley & 
Kostopoulou, 2013). 
 
5.5.2  Discrete positive and negative emotions in response to clinical scenarios 
With the exception of the emotions, alert, active and ashamed, non-significant mean score 
differences may suggest that doctors in the positive affect conditions had higher discrete 
positive anticipatory emotions, while doctors in the negative affect conditions had higher 
negative anticipatory emotions.  The suggestion in the study with medical students that certain 
emotions appear to span affective valance and source in a clinical context was further supported 
in this study. In particular, the positive emotions, alert and attentive were again near or over the 
mid-scale point of 3, while determined and active showed lower but consistent arousal across 
conditions.  Furthermore, the negative emotion, nervous, was again the most consistently 
highest scoring negative feeling across all conditions.  This again emphasises the importance of 
gaining knowledge about the role of discrete emotions in decision making (Lerner & Keltner, 
2000; Van Kleef, 2009; Van Kleef, De Dreu, & Manstead, 2010) and in understanding to what 
extent the specific emotions identified in these experimental studies may direct and regulate 
individual clinical performance.  
 
On the whole, doctors’ anticipatory and anticipated responses were lower than those found in 
the medical student study.  As there is evidence that empathy declines throughout medical 
training (Bellini, Baime, & Shea, 2002; Neumann et al., 2011) it is possible that anticipatory 
and anticipated affective responses to situations in clinical settings also declines.   
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5.5.3  The influence of affect on thoroughness and order of facts for diagnosis 
Although not significant, the mean score differences for measures of thoroughness of 
information gathering for diagnosis may imply that when gathering information for diagnosis, 
doctors in the positive affect conditions used faster, less methodical decision making processes, 
while doctors in the negative affect conditions used slower, more considered decision making 
processes.  However, whilst this was a consistent pattern in the team source of affect scenario, 
data did not always support the hypothesized difference in the patient source of affect scenario.  
This finding suggests that the source of affect may play a role in the processes used when 
gathering information to make diagnostic decisions. 
   
There may have been some support that affect was influencing whether heuristic-based or 
analytic-based decisions were being made.  Although non-significant, the finding that doctors in 
the positive affect conditions had higher confidence in their most likely diagnosis and higher 
anticipated confidence, while doctors in the negative affect conditions had significantly higher 
anticipated regret and guilt, may imply that doctors in the positive affect conditions may have 
been less thorough and taken less time in information gathering, due to faster if-then judgements 
based on higher feelings of confidence.  In contrast, doctors in the negative affect conditions 
may have been more thorough and taken more time in information gathering due to making 
more considered choices to avoid negative anticipated emotions.     
 
The hypothesis that doctors in a negative affective state would be more precise and follow a 
slower, more systematic order when they gathered information for diagnosis than doctors in a 
positive affective state may have been supported in some of the measures of order of 
information gathering.  A statistically non-significant higher percentage of doctors in the patient 
source of affect negative affect condition gathered information in a taught order and selected all 
options, however, the number of doctors that the percentage difference represented was very 
small and accounted for a difference of only 1 to 4 doctors between conditions.  The 
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relationship between affect and whether doctors chose to perform a further physical examination 
or to order investigations and tests first was also non-significant. However, the fact that doctors 
in the patient source of negative affect scenario and to a lesser extent, in the team source of 
negative affect scenario had a higher percentage who chose to perform a further physical exam 
first, suggests that doctors in the negative affect conditions may have been motivated to base 
diagnostic and case management decisions on information that was derived from more focused 
and precise further physical assessment of the patient, in order to avoid negative anticipated 
emotions. 
  
It is also noteworthy that doctors in the negative conditions felt more hostility than doctors in 
the positive conditions.  As hostility and anger have been associated with approach, rather than 
avoidance behaviours (Lerner & Keltner, 2000, 2001), it is interesting to note that doctors who 
were feeling more hostile in the negative affect conditions, elected to approach and examine the 
patient first.  In contrast, doctors in the positive affect conditions who had a higher percentage 
who chose to order investigations and tests first may have been motivated by the higher 
confidence that they had in their initial diagnosis.  Lerner and Keltner (2000, 2001) also 
associate hostility with risk-taking, rather than risk-averse behaviour.  Whilst further 
examination of a patient before ordering investigations would appear to reflect risk-aversion, it 
could be argued that doctors may have perceived risk examining the patient. For example, in the 
negative patient condition doctors may have regarded examining an abusive and angry patient 
as a risk to their own safety, and doctors in the negative team condition may have regarded the 
examination of the patient as part of a risky strategy of having to manage the patient’s uncertain 
symptoms for up to an hour on their own before a clinical colleague is able to assist.     
  
5.5.4  The role of specific sources of affect  
There was some evidence that team source of affect evoked stronger affective responses than 
patient source of affect, and further supports the need to gain a better understanding of how 
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team affective factors impact judgement and behaviour (Annett et al., 2000; Annett & Stanton, 
2000).  The highest scores for confidence in most likely diagnosis and anticipated confidence 
were from doctors in the positive team condition.  Doctors in the negative team condition had 
the highest ratings for anticipated future regret and discrete negative anticipatory emotions, 
although some of the mean score differences were small.  The finding that anticipated regret and 
guilt were higher in the negative team condition, may again be due to more reflective feedback 
of previous feelings from similar outcomes (Baumeister, et al., 2007b) and has been discussed 
in more detail in section 5.5.1. As it has been found that differential diagnoses that are too 
narrow in scope lead to cases of missed diagnosis (Ely et al., 2012), the finding that doctors in 
both the positive and negative patient source of affect scenarios provided more differential 
diagnoses than doctors in both the positive and negative team source of affect scenario merits 
further investigation. 
 
5.5.5  Mood 
Finally, there was no evidence that mood influenced affective responses or thoroughness or 
order of information gathering for diagnosis.  As discussed in section 4.9.5 of Chapter 4, this 
may be due to the fact that the 2-item measure of mood was not sensitive enough to capture 
subtle deviations in the way doctors were feeling before they began reading and responding to 
the clinical presentation.    
 
5.5.6  Limitations 
There are limitations to the experimental studies presented in Chapters 4 and 5.  Although the 
scenarios attempted to replicate realistic clinical presentations and contexts in which diagnostic 
judgements are made, the fact that affect and diagnostic decision making were measured in 
response to written case presentations may mean that this did not capture the context in which 
clinical decisions are made.  Although the ability to choose the information gathering sequence 
in Study 3 attempted to replicate the key choices of this diagnostic stage, the fact that the 
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questionnaire did not allow for progression or feedback from the information integration or 
information implementation stage, meant that it did not fully capture the dynamic nature of 
diagnostic decision making (Schiff et al, 2009; Wear, 2009).  It may also be possible that cues 
contained within the different scenario conditions influenced the order that information was 
gathered. 
 
While the generally low arousal of anticipatory affect may reflect the lack of real-life clinical 
settings, the moderate to moderately high elicitation of anticipated affect suggests that both 
medical students and doctors did engage with how the case presentations made them feel.  The 
use of the 10 item International Positive and Negative Affect Schedule (I-PANAS-SF: 
Thompson, 2007) due to issues with recruitment meant that the exploration of discrete emotions 
was restricted in study 3.  It is also possible that the completion of the I-PANAS-SF at the end 
of the questionnaire may not have captured the intensity of feeling upon first reading the case 
presentation.  The scale resulted in a low level of reliability for the measure of anticipatory 
negative affect, therefore a similar future study would be strengthened by a using a longer 
version of the PANAS (Watson, Clark, & Tellegen, 1988) and asking the question about 
participants’ feelings immediately after reading the case presentation. While some findings were 
in the hypothesized direction, they were often not statistically significant. As the experiments 
were only powered to detect medium to large effect sizes it is important that future studies 
should be powered to detect smaller effect sizes.    
 
The fact that the study was conducted online meant that the experimental environment could not 
be controlled, and therefore factors which may have caused distractions could not be removed. 
Furthermore, online studies cannot guarantee the identity of participants.  To mitigate this, care 
was taken to target doctors as directly as possible and to ensure that all study adverts clearly 
stated who the study was aimed at.  However, the fact that the questionnaire was completed 
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anonymously at a time and location that suited each medical student and doctor may have 
removed any social desirability pressures which may have been reflected in their responses.     
 
Finally, it is also possible that findings for the number of words used to describe important facts 
for diagnosis or to describe choices and the time taken to make choices were influenced by other 
factors.  For example, medical students and doctors may have naturally differed in their level of 
verbosity, the time they took to read the case presentations or in the speed in which they typed 
their answers on a computer keyboard. Furthermore, the difference in times between the patient 
and team scenario may have been a reflection of case complexity and clinical knowledge 
(Croskerry & Tait, 2013) rather than the influence of source of affect.   
   
 
5.6  Summary 
In summary, while findings were non-significant, the direction of results in study 3 may suggest 
that affect influenced the thoroughness of the information gathered for diagnosis, and the order 
in which doctors chose to gather diagnostic information.  Findings also further supported the 
importance of team factors in affective responses, and reinforced an earlier finding that clinical 
interactions and performance may evoke consistent emotions which may be used as a feedback 
for clinical decision making.  The implication of these findings will be addressed in the 
discussion of the studies presented in this thesis in Chapter 8.     
   
While this and the previous chapter focused on decision making made by individual doctors in 
isolation, it is important to recognise that in many clinical contexts, diagnostic judgements and 
management of the patient are often made when working within multi-professional teams.  The 
study presented in the next chapter attempts to explore and understand the role that affect plays 
in doctors’ and nurses or allied health professionals’ perceptions of individual and team 
communication performance. 
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CHAPTER 6 
DOES AFFECT PLAY A ROLE IN PERCEPTIONS OF COMMUNICATION 
BEHAVIOUR AND TEAM EFFECTIVENESS DURING CRITICAL 
INCIDENTS? 
 
6.1  Introduction 
Clear and effective communication of clinical information and patient symptoms within clinical 
teams is pivotal to efficient diagnosis and appropriate case management in healthcare settings 
(Christensen et al., 2000; Greenberg, et al., 2007).  When breakdowns in communication occur, 
patient safety is compromised and can result in negative patient outcomes (Greenberg et al, 
2007; Sutcliffe, Lewton, & Rosenthal, 2004).  
 
In recognition of the pivotal role that optimal inter-professional interaction plays in providing 
safe patient care, programmes focusing on teamwork have been developed and introduced into 
healthcare settings and organisations (Flin et al., 2008).  These include simulation-based 
training using crew resource management (CRM) and behavioural rating tools to assess ‘non-
technical’ skills (NTS) such as communication, decision making and situation awareness (Yule 
et al, 2006), and surgical team checklists (Haynes et al., 2009).  These approaches have 
highlighted the importance of cognitive processes in communication and decision making in 
multi-professional clinical teams.  However, very little is known about the specific role of affect 
in teams involving doctors and nurses or allied health professions, despite research suggesting 
that affective factors such as emotional climate (Nurok et al., 2011) and interpersonal 
interactions (Edmondson, 1999) may impact individual and team communication behaviour.   
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Affective factors such as aggression and disagreement (Coe & Gould, 2007), rudeness (Flin, 
2010), intergroup competition (Hewett et al., 2009) and tension (Lingard, Reznick, Espin, 
Regehr, & DeVito, 2002) between health professional groups have been shown to foster a tone 
of conflict and to negatively impact communication and collaboration.  Furthermore, inter-
professional boundaries and conflict have been found to contribute to breakdowns in 
collaborative working and the verbalisation of clinical information (Dewitt, Baldwin, & 
Daugherty, 2008; Finn, 2008; Greenberg et al., 2007; Powell & Davies, 2012).  Work which has 
examined multi-professional clinical teams has found that strain between team members may be 
due to differences between professions in their perceptions of roles, responsibilities, hierarchy 
and goals (Allen, 1997; Greenberg et al., 2007; Salhani & Coulter, 2009).  It is therefore 
possible those professional boundaries elicit different affective responses in doctors and nurses 
and allied health professions during teamwork tasks and that these feelings are related to their 
perception of team communication and effectiveness.  As affect can influence the level of 
communication between team members (Edmondson, 1999; Kish-Gephart, Detert, Trevino & 
Edmondson, 2009; Lingard et al., 2002), and information sharing is pivotal in diagnostic and 
treatment decisions, it is important to understand the role that differences in affective response 
may play in the perception of teamwork.     
  
While dual process theories emphasise the impact of individual feelings on decision making and 
behaviour, clinical teams involve judgements and actions which stem from a collaborative 
reaction to, and assessment of, a clinical presentation or situation.  The emerging Emotions as 
Social Information Model (EASI: Van Kleef, 2009; Van Kleef, et al., 2010), posits that as well 
as individual responses to stimuli, group-based social interaction involves the observation of 
emotion in others.  The emotional display of one or a group of individuals may subsequently 
influence the judgements and actions of another individual. Van Kleef (2009) argues that this 
may occur through two different processes; inferential mechanisms (e.g. a registrar’s 
anxiousness alerts you to the fact that they regard the case as urgent which causes you to collect 
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the blood test results yourself) or affective responses (e.g. a registrar’s nervousness about the 
case makes you anxious and urges you to seek the advice of another senior colleague).  
 
As clinical teams involve individuals working together and making diagnostic and treatment 
decisions, it is likely that both individual and team affective factors play a role in how health 
professionals respond to, and function within, clinical teams which they perceive to be hostile 
and intimidating or cooperative and supportive.  As inter-professional factors have been 
associated with failures in clinical team communication, it is important to understand how and 
what type of affect influences specific health professional groups when they work in clinical 
teams, and what role these affective factors have on their perception of how the team performs.    
 
6.2  Study 4 
6.2.1  Aims 
The aim of study 4 was to replicate the real-life contexts and settings in which clinical 
communication and decisions are made and explore the role of affect in the perceptions that 
healthcare professionals have about individual and team communication behaviour, and team 
effectiveness during a simulation of a critical incident.   
 
6.2.2  Objectives 
The main objectives of this study were: 1) to examine differences in individual and team 
emotions in doctors and nurses or allied health professions during simulation; 2) to examine 
differences in perceptions of communication behaviour and team effectiveness in doctors and 
nurses or allied health professions, and assess the role that affect plays in these perceptions; 3) 
to assess whether health professionals’ ratings of affect predict their ratings of communication 
behaviour and team effectiveness. 
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6.3  Method 
6.3.1  Participants 
Seventy-two junior healthcare professionals, who were registered to attend a patient safety 
simulation course in groups of 12, were invited to participate in the study.  Sixteen healthcare 
professionals declined.  Two healthcare professionals who did consent to participate were 
unable to take part due to the programme schedule.  The two healthcare professionals did not 
complete the post-simulation questionnaire and took no further part in the study.  The final 
sample consisted of 54 participants 50% (n = 27) F1 doctors and 50% (n = 27) nurses or allied 
health professions (19 Grade 5 nurses, 6 student nurses and 2 physiotherapists) across all 
departments from one NHS Hospital Trust.  All participants were recruited while attending one 
of 6 identical NHS Hospital Trust simulation courses.  There were 40 (74%) females and 14 
(26%) males.  Age ranged from 19 to 53 years with a mean of 28.83 (SD = 7.51).   
 
The study information sheet and consent form was included with the pre-course material which 
was sent out to all registered participants approximately 1 week prior to attending the simulation 
course.  This ensured that all registered participants were aware of the opportunity to participate 
in the study alongside participating in the Simulation Course and would have time to provide 
informed consent.  No incentive for participation was offered.   
 
6.3.2  Ethics 
Approval to undertake research with NHS health professionals was granted by the University of 
Leeds’ Institute of Psychological Sciences’ Research Ethics Committee (Ref: 11-0192) and the 
Trust Research and Development Department.  Care was taken to address all potential ethical 
issues in the Participant Information Sheet and to remind participants of their right to withdraw 
at any time.  Both participants and course staff were assured that the study would run alongside 
the course in order to minimise disruption to the timing and delivery of the simulation course. 
To protect anonymity, codes made up of letters and numbers were used on all completed 
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questionnaires.  All participants were asked to consent to video recordings of the simulation 
they took part in to be used for the purpose of analysis as part of the research, and were assured 
that the video recordings would only be viewed in a private room within the trust and would 
remain on Trust premises.  They were also informed that any observer viewing the video 
footage had agreed to the NHS Confidentiality Code of Practice.  
 
6.3.3  Design 
The study employed a cross-sectional design. Steps were taken to control for confounding 
variables.  The inclusion of the study information and consent form with pre-course material 
and the allocation of participants to pairs and scenario by course staff controlled for researcher 
and selection bias.  The questionnaire was completed individually by health professionals in an 
identical setting and all items were administered in the same order.  
 
6.3.4  Materials 
6.3.4.1  Critical care scenarios 
Three 15 minute simulations of critical care scenarios were developed by simulation course staff 
and health professionals as part of a simulation course aimed at improving patient safety in 
junior doctors, nurses and allied professions.  Scenarios were conducted by participants in pairs 
(doctor and nurse/physiotherapist) and were based on real critical care incidents which 
comprised of either post-operative bleeding, head injury or respiratory failure.  All scenarios 
involved a manikin and simulation course staff role-playing additional members of the 
healthcare team.  To facilitate learning and aid reflection, the simulated scenarios were video-
recorded as part of the simulation course.  This provided the opportunity for retrospective 
observer rating, which is not reported here.  While role-playing additional members of the 
clinical team, course staff provided information and assistance in response to requests from 
participants, but they did not lead health care decisions or actions.  There was no pre-determined 
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manipulation of affect in any of the scenarios and the type of clinical incident varied between 
participant pairs.   
     
6.3.5  Measures 
6.3.5.1  Post Simulation Questionnaire 
A post simulation questionnaire was developed for this study (see appendix F) and consisted of 
the following measures: 
 
6.3.5.1.1  Team affect  
6.3.5.1.1.1  Team Functional Emotions Climate 
Team Functional Emotions Climate during the clinical scenario was measured using a scale 
with 2 items utilised in previous research (Nurok., et al., 2011).  Both items had a score range of 
1-5.  The first item measured level of team engagement (e.g. “Did team members seem engaged 
(e.g. interested, attentive, alert) or disengaged (e.g. bored, inattentive, distracted) throughout the 
simulation?”).  This was rated 1 = disengaged, to 5 = engaged.  The second item measured the 
appropriateness of the level of feeling tense within the team (e.g. “For what was happening in 
the case during the simulation, were the team…”).  This was rated 1 = inappropriately tense, to 
5 = appropriately tense.  A lower score indicated that climate was less emotionally functional 
(e.g. members of the team were not attentive, disinterested and inappropriately anxious), while a 
higher score indicated a more emotionally functional climate (e.g. members of the team 
appeared attentive, alert and appropriately anxious).   
 
6.3.5.1.1.2  Team Cooperative Climate 
The perception of Team Cooperative Climate was assessed with one item (e.g. “Was there a 
cooperative climate in the team during the simulation?”).  The item was scored on a five point 
scale of 1 = not at all, to 5 = very much so.  A higher score indicated the perception that was a 
higher cooperative climate within the team during the simulation.   
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6.3.5.1.1.3  Team Competitive Climate 
The perception of Team Competitive Climate was assessed with one item (e.g. “Was there a 
competitive climate in the team during the simulation?”).  The item was scored on a five point 
scale of 1 = not at all, to 5 = very much so.  A higher score indicated the perception that was a 
higher competitive climate within the team during the simulation.  
 
6.3.5.1.2  Individual affect 
6.3.5.1.2.1  Individual affective response 
The 10 item International Positive and Negative Affect Schedule (I-PANAS-SF: Thompson, 
2007) has been shown to be a reliable and valid brief measure of positive and negative affect 
and was used to measure participants’ feelings during the clinical simulation.  The two sub-
scales of General Positive Affect (α = .71; e.g. alert, inspired, determined, attentive, active) and 
General Negative Affect (α = .62; e.g. upset, hostile, ashamed, nervous, afraid) each had 5 
items.  All items had a score range of 1 = very slightly or not at all, to 5 = extremely.  A higher 
score indicated a higher feeling of that emotion during the scenario.   
  
6.3.5.1.2.2  Individual Functional Emotions Climate 
Individual Functional Emotions Climate during the clinical scenario was measured using the 
same 2 item scale to measure Team Functional Emotions Climate.  The only difference was that 
the two items were adapted to measure the level of individual engagement (“Were you engaged 
(e.g. interested, attentive, alert) or disengaged (e.g. bored, inattentive, distracted) throughout the 
simulation?”) and the appropriateness of the level of feeling tense for the individual (e.g. “For 
what was happening in the case during the simulation, were you…”).  A lower score indicated 
that climate was less emotionally functional (e.g. individuals were not attentive, disinterested 
and inappropriately anxious), while a higher score indicated a more emotionally functional 
climate (e.g. individuals appeared attentive, alert and appropriately anxious).  
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6.3.5.1.3  Communication and effectiveness 
6.3.5.1.3.1  Team Communication Behaviour 
A 5 item Team Communication Behaviour scale (α = .82) was developed using the behavioural 
elements of observed clinical team communication skills from previous research (Nurok et al., 
2011).  All items were scored on a five point scale of 1 = not at all, to 5 = very much so. 
Participants could also indicate an answer of “Not applicable” if they felt that the behaviour or 
action was not appropriate or necessary to the simulation they had participated in.  The items 
assessed perceptions of team collaboration and information sharing (e.g. “Was there a tone of 
collaboration and information sharing in the team which created an atmosphere of safety to 
speak up?”); the sharing of clinical information and shared understanding (e.g. “Did the team 
talk openly about ideas, plans and concerns and discuss important clinical information so that 
they had a shared understanding of how to manage the case and were clear about what each 
team member needed to do?’); the use of verbal responses (e.g. “Did the team use verbal 
responses to requests so that team members were confident that requests had been heard 
correctly and were being acted upon?”); and the assertion of ideas and escalating concerns (e.g. 
“Did all team members assert their ideas and escalate concerns?”).  The fifth item, which asked 
participants to assess the negotiation and resolution of conflicts within the team (e.g. “Were 
conflicts within the team appropriately negotiated and resolved?”), was omitted from the final 
analysis due to the majority of participants indicating that this item was not applicable to their 
scenario.  This resulted in the final analysis being conducted using a 4 item communication 
behaviour scale.  A higher score indicated a perception of higher engagement in team 
communication behaviour.    
 
6.3.5.1.3.2  Individual Communication Behaviour 
The Individual Communication Behaviour scale (α = .86) included the same 4 items used in the 
team communication behaviour scale but was adapted to assess health professionals’ 
perceptions of their own individual communication behaviour.  For example, the item, “Did all 
136 
 
team members assert their ideas and escalate concerns?” was changed to, “Did you contribute to 
all team members being able to assert their ideas and escalate concerns?”  A higher score 
indicated a perception of higher engagement in individual communication behaviour.    
 
6.3.5.1.3.3  Team Effectiveness 
A 4 item measure of Team Effectiveness (α = .70; Lemieux-Charles et al, 2002) was used to 
assess how effective health professionals perceived the team was.  All items were scored on a 
five point scale of 1 to 5.  The first item assessed whether expectations were met (e.g. “Did your 
team’s overall performance meet your expectations?”). The scale for this item was 1 = not at all 
met, to 5 = completely met.  The second item measured satisfaction (e.g. “Were you satisfied 
with your experience as a team member?”).  The scale for this item was 1 = not at all satisfied, 
to 5 = extremely satisfied.  The third item assessed feelings (e.g. “How do you feel about your 
experience?”).  The scale for this item was 1 = negative, to 5 = positive.  The final item assessed 
willingness to work with team again (e.g. “Would you be willing to work on a similar team in 
the future?”).  The scale for this item was 1 = not at all willing, to 5 = extremely willing.  A 
higher score indicated a perception of higher team effectiveness.    
 
6.3.5.1.3.4  Familiarity with team members 
Two separate items assessing familiarity with team members were included in the questionnaire. 
The first item assessed how well health professionals knew members of the team (e.g. “How 
well do you know any members of the team?”).  The scale for this item was, 1 = not at all, to 5 
= extremely well.  The second item assessed how often they had worked with any member of 
the team (e.g. “How often do you work with any members of the team?”).  The scale for this 
item was, 1 = never, to 5 = all the time.  Higher scores indicated that the health professional was 
more familiar with a member of the team.    
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6.3.5.1.4  Other 
6.3.5.1.4.1  Demographics 
Each participant indicated their age, sex, clinical grade, length of time in present grade, total 
number of year’s postgraduate clinical experience and specialty by either ticking the appropriate 
answer from a choice of responses, or writing the relevant answer in the text space provided.  
 
6.3.6  Procedure 
All activities took place during 6 separate days over a period of 6 months in the simulation 
centre where the patient safety simulation course was taking place.  Before the course 
commenced, written consent was obtained and collected from each course participant and 
course staff.  Following consent each participant completed the demographics questionnaire and 
was allocated a unique participant code.   
 
On each of the 6 separate days, as part of the simulation course, participants were divided into 
pairs by the simulation course staff for the short 15 minute critical incident simulations. Where 
possible, pairs consisted of a junior doctor and nurse or allied health profession. This replicated 
the multi-professional nature of clinical teams and ensured that the doctor, nurse or allied health 
professional would assume the role and responsibilities they would usually take in real-life 
critical incidents.  Half of the course participants completed the critical incident simulations 
during the first half of the course day and half completed the critical incident simulations during 
the second half of the course day.   
 
After completing the simulation, participants immediately completed the questionnaire while 
sitting at separate tables in a corridor within the simulation centre and directly outside the 
simulation room.  At the end of the course day, participants were debriefed and provided with 
the opportunity to ask further questions.   
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6.3.7  Analysis 
The SPSS statistical software package (Version 19.0) was used for statistical analysis. 
Cronbach’s Alpha was used to assess the reliability of each measurement.  Differences between 
doctors and nurses or allied health professions for individual (positive affect, negative affect, 
individual functional emotions climate) and team (cooperative climate, competitive climate, 
team functional emotions climate) affective response, discrete positive and negative anticipatory 
emotions (alert, inspired, determined, attentive, active, upset, hostile, ashamed, nervous, and 
afraid), communication behaviour and team effectiveness were assessed by examination of 
mean scores.  Between-subjects MANCOVAs assessed whether differences between health 
professional groups were significant. All additional tests of between-subjects effects and post-
hoc comparisons controlled for Type 1 error by applying a Bonferroni correction for multiple 
analyses.  Cohen’s (1988) guidelines for eta squared were used to interpret the strength of 
partial eta squared. 
 
To assess whether health professionals’ ratings of affect predicted their ratings of 
communication behaviour and team effectiveness, relationships between affect dimensions and 
communication behaviour were examined using Pearson’s Correlation Coefficients.  A series of 
hierarchical multiple regressions were used to examine the predictive value of perceptions of 
individual and team affect on perceptions of individual and team communication behaviour and 
team effectiveness.  They were also used to investigate whether profession moderated the 
relationship between affect and communication behaviour, and team effectiveness.  At Step 1, 
the affective dimensions that demonstrated a significant relationship with Pearson’s Correlation 
Coefficient with individual or team communication behaviour, and team effectiveness were 
entered into the regression.  To determine the unique contribution of health profession group, 
profession was entered at step 2.  At step 3, interaction terms were included for each of the 
affective dimensions and profession, and a stepwise regression was used to assess whether 
profession moderated the predictive value of any of the affective dimensions. 
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6.4  Results 
6.4.1  Differences in individual and team affect, Communication Behaviour and Team 
Effectiveness 
The mean scores and standard deviations for perceptions of affect, communication behaviour 
and team effectiveness are presented in Table 6.1.  Both groups of health professionals had 
mean scores above the mid-point of 3 for Individual Positive Affect, Individual and Team 
Functional Emotions Climate, and Cooperative Climate, which suggested that they perceived 
that these affective dimensions to be high. Conversely, Individual Negative Affect and 
Competitive Climate were both below the mid-point of 3, indicating that both health 
professional groups perceived their own negative feelings and competition within the team to be 
low. 
 
The mean scores did demonstrate some differences between the two groups for perceptions of 
individual and team affect. Nurses or allied professions had higher mean scores for both 
Individual Positive and Negative Affect, and Team Cooperative Climate than doctors.  
However, this was reversed for both Individual and Team Functional Emotions Climate and the 
team affect scale of Competitive Climate, for which doctors had higher mean scores than nurses 
or allied health professions.   
 
Ratings for Individual and Team Communication Behaviour, and Team Effectiveness were 
above the mid-point of 3 for both groups.  This suggests that both doctors and nurses or allied 
health professions perceived engagement in communication, and the effectiveness of the team to 
be high.  Mean scores show that nurses or allied health professions gave slightly higher scores 
than doctors for Individual Communication Behaviour and Team Effectiveness.  However, there 
was a larger difference between the two groups for Team Communication Behaviour with 
nurses or allied health professions perceiving that there was a higher level of communication 
behaviour in the team than doctors did.   
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A between groups MANOVA revealed that there was a statistically significant multivariate 
difference between doctors and nurses or allied health professions, F (9, 43) = 2.88, p = .009, 
with a large effect size (partial eta squared = .38).  With a Bonferroni adjusted alpha level of 
0.006, the univariate analysis revealed that the only significant difference between doctors and 
nurses or allied professions was for Team Cooperative Climate, F (1, 51) = 13.86, p = <.001, 
with a large effect size (partial eta squared = .21).  Nurses or allied health professions provided 
higher ratings for cooperation in the team than doctors did. At the 0.05 alpha level, negative 
anticipatory affect was marginally non-significant, F (1, 51) = 3.74, p = .059, partial eta squared 
= .07.  Nurses or allied health professions reported feeling marginally higher ratings for 
individual negative affect than doctors did during the simulation.      
 
Table 6.1  Mean (SD) for affect, Communication Behaviour and Team Effectiveness for health 
professionals  
                                                                 Doctor                                Nurse 
 (N = 26)                            (N = 27) 
 
Individual     
Positive Affect               
Negative Affect 
Individual Climate 
Individual Communication 
  3.49 (0.57) 
2.13 (0.53) 
4.37 (0.58) 
3.75 (0.83) 
                    3.61 (0.71) 
                    2.45 (0.67) 
                    4.22 (0.90) 
                    3.88 (0.90) 
 
 
 
 
 
Team 
Cooperative Climate 
Competitive Climate 
Team Climate   
Team Communication   
Team Effectiveness               
   
 
4.19 (0.69) 
2.23 (1.39) 
4.42 (0.50) 
3.95 (0.84) 
3.88 (0.55)    
                     
                     
                    4.78 (0.42) 
                    2.15 (1.68) 
                    4.41 (0.71) 
                    4.32 (0.69) 
                    3.96 (0.78) 
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6.4.2  Differences in discrete positive and negative anticipatory emotions 
Within the health professional group, Table 6.2 demonstrates that doctors’ highest positive 
emotion rating was alert, while nurses or allied health professions’ was determined.  The lowest 
positive emotion score for both professions was inspired.  This, alongside the finding that the 
negative emotions of nervous and afraid were the two highest scores, and hostile was the lowest 
for both professions, suggests that there was some correspondence between the professions for 
the type of emotions they experienced during the simulation.   
 
Table 6.2  Mean (SD) for discrete individual emotions for health professionals  
Emotions    Doctor                         Nurse       
 (N = 26)                      (N = 27)       
                 
 
Positive     
Alert               
Inspired 
Determined 
Attentive 
  4.00 (0.94) 
2.42 (1.14) 
3.46 (1.03) 
3.63 (0.66) 
       3.81 (1.04) 
       3.19 (1.18) 
       3.93 (0.92) 
       3.67 (0.96) 
 
 
 
 
Active 
 
Negative 
Upset 
Hostile 
Ashamed   
Nervous   
Afraid               
  3.62 (0.75)     
 
 
1.35 (0.56) 
1.31 (0.68) 
1.69 (0.93) 
3.73 (0.96) 
2.62 (0.94)    
       3.44 (1.05) 
 
        
       1.67 (1.04) 
       1.26 (0.66) 
       1.85 (1.26) 
       4.26 (0.94) 
       3.22 (1.37) 
 
 
 
 
 
   
 
 
 
However, mean scores for positive emotions show that nurses or allied health professionals 
gave higher ratings than doctors for inspired, determined and attentive, but lower ratings than 
doctors for alert and active.  A comparison of mean scores for negative emotions also showed 
that while doctors had a slightly higher rating than nurses for the emotion hostile, nurses gave 
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higher ratings than doctors for upset, ashamed, nervous and afraid.  This indicates that in 
general, nurses or allied health professionals appear to have felt emotions more intensely than 
doctors did during the simulation.  A between groups MANOVA revealed that there was no 
multivariate difference between doctors and nurses or allied health professions across the 
discrete emotions F (10, 42) = 1.81, p = .088.  
 
6.4.3  Relationships between dimensions of affect  
The relationship between the dimensions of affect for health professionals were examined using 
Pearson’s Correlation Coefficients (see Table 6.3).  Of particular note, higher ratings of 
Individual Positive Affect and lower ratings of Individual Negative Affect were associated with 
higher Individual Functional Emotions Climate.  A higher rating of Team Cooperation was 
associated with increased scores for Team Functional Emotions Climate. Team Competitive 
Climate did not have a significant relationship with any of the affect dimensions, but was 
related to familiarity with team members.  The better that health professionals knew, or the 
more that they had worked with members of the team, the more that they felt there was a 
competitive climate in the team during the simulation. 
 
6.4.4  Relationship between affect and Communication Behaviour   
The relationship between the dimensions of affect and Communication Behaviour for health 
professionals were also examined using Pearson’s Correlation Coefficients (see Table 6.3).  
Higher Individual Positive Affect, lower Individual Negative Affect, increased Individual and 
Team Functional Emotions Climate, and higher ratings of a Cooperative Climate in the team 
were associated with higher ratings of Individual Communication Behaviour.  Higher ratings of 
Team Communication Behaviour in health professionals were related to higher ratings of 
Individual Positive Affect, higher Functional Emotions Climate in the team and higher ratings 
of a Cooperative Climate in the team.  Familiarity with team members was not associated with  
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Table 6.3  Mean (SD) and Pearson’s correlations between affect dimensions and Communication Behaviour and Team Effectiveness for health professionals 
Note. N = 54 unless ‡ N = 53.  * p = < .05   ** p = < .01   ***p = ≤  .001. Ind. Communication: Individual Communication Behaviour                          
Scales                                      1                    2        3   4                    5                 6 7 8          9        10        11    
  1. Positive Affect                    3.52  (0.67)      
 
  2. Negative Affect                   2.29  (0.62)       
  
  3. Individual Climate               4.30  (0.75)      
 
  4. Team Climate                      4.42  (0.60)       
 
  5. Cooperative Climate            4.50  (0.64)     
 
  6. Competitive Climate            2.17  (1.53)                
 
  7. Ind. Communication            3.82  (0.84)       
 
  8. Team Communication‡       4.14  (0.78)         
 
  9. Team Effectiveness              3.94 (0.68)    
 
10. Know members                    1.93  (1.37) 
 
11. Work with members             2.13 (1.54) 
     - 
 
-.26                                
    
   .37**  
                       
 .23 
    
  .19 
    
-.16 
   
   .47*** 
    
   .29* 
    
   .31* 
  
   .08  
 
   .16                       
 
      
-
 
    -.29* 
    -.05                      
     
    -.11 
     
      .09 
       
     -.41** 
     
     -.06 
      
     -.39** 
 
       .09 
 
.03
        
 
 
         
 
         - 
 
.17 
        
       .14 
        
      -.09 
       
       .54*** 
        
       .22 
        
       .26 
 
      -.12 
 
        .02 
         
      
 
 
 
     
 
 
     - 
 
   .28* 
       
   .07 
      
   .32* 
       
   .48*** 
       
   .33*  
 
   .15 
 
   .16 
 
 
 
 
       
 
 
 
   - 
 
-.15 
     
  .51*** 
       
  .46*** 
       
  .49** 
 
   .04 
 
   .14 
 
 
 
 
 
   
 
 
 
 
      - 
 
     .07 
     
     .15 
     
     .05  
 
     .57*** 
 
     .38**      
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  - 
 
.65***                   
 
.66**  
 
.22 
 
.22        
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
   
 
 
 
 
 
 
  -
 
.45**       - 
 
.22         .18       - 
 
.18         .13    .74***   - 
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perceptions of Individual or Team Communication Behaviour. Individual Communication 
Behaviour was also positively and strongly correlated with Team Communication Behaviour. 
 
6.4.5  Relationship between affect and Team Effectiveness   
The relationship between the dimensions of affect and Team Effectiveness for health 
professionals were also examined using Pearson’s Correlation Coefficients (see Table 6.3).  
Higher Individual Positive Affect, lower Individual Negative Affect, increased Individual and 
Team Functional Emotions Climate, and higher ratings of a Cooperative Climate in the team 
were associated with higher ratings of Team Effectiveness.  Familiarity with team members was 
not associated with perceptions of Team Effectiveness.  Higher Individual and Team 
Communication Behaviours were also positively correlated with Team Effectiveness.  
 
6.4.6  Predicting perceptions of Individual Communication Behaviour 
Hierarchical multiple regression was used to examine whether affect predicted health 
professionals’ perceptions of their own individual communication behaviour. Individual 
Positive and Negative Affect, Individual Functional Emotions Climate, Team Cooperative 
Climate and Team Functional Emotions Climate were entered into the Model at the first step.   
As demonstrated in Table 6.4, Model 1 was significant in predicting Individual Communication 
Behaviour explaining 58% (adj. R² = 54%) of the variance, F (5, 48) = 13.47 p < .001.  In this 
model, Team Cooperative Climate (β = .38, p = < .001), Individual Functional Emotions 
Climate (β = .33, p = .002) and Individual Negative Affect (β = -.22, p = .033) were significant 
predictors of Individual Communication Behaviour.  The higher the perception that there was a 
cooperative climate in the team and increased individual functional emotions, and the lower the 
feeling of experiencing negative feelings, the more health professionals believed that they 
engaged in individual communication behaviour during the simulation. 
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Table 6.4  Hierarchical regression of affect and Individual Communication  
Behaviour for health professionals 
 
Predictor 
Individual Communication Behaviour 
  B                     SE of B                    β 
Step 1 
Constant 
Positive Affect                          
Negative Affect                         
Individual Climate                        
Cooperative Climate                     
Team Climate                                
Step 2 
Constant 
Positive Affect 
Negative Affect 
Individual Climate 
Cooperative Climate 
Team Climate 
Profession 
 
-  0.81   
   0.24  
-  0.30  
   0.37  
   0.50  
0.14
   
-  0.84   
   0.25   
-  0.28 
   0.36 
   0.52 
   0.13 
-  0.06 
 
0.93 
0.13  
0.14  
0.12  
0.13  
0.14  
 
0.94 
0.14 
0.15 
0.12 
0.15 
0.14 
0.19 
 
    - 
  .19  
- .22*  
  .33**  
  .38***  
  .10  
    
    -  
  .20 
- .21 
  .33** 
  .40*** 
  .10 
- .03 
 
Note. N = 54.  For Individual Communication Behaviour: Step 1 ∆R² = 
 .58, F change (5, 48) = 13.47, p = < .001; Step 2 ∆R² = .00, F change  
(1, 47) = 0.08, p = .776 
* p = < .05   ** p = < .01   ***p = ≤ .001 
 
The addition of profession at the second step did not explain any significant incremental 
variance (p = .776).  However, Team Cooperative Climate (β = .40, p = .001) and Individual 
Functional Emotions Climate (β = .33, p = .003) remained significant predictors in Model 2.  
Stepwise regression with the inclusion of interaction terms did not compute a third model, 
indicating that profession did not moderate the predictive value of any affective dimensions.  
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6.4.7  Predicting perceptions of Team Communication Behaviour 
A second hierarchical multiple regression was used to examine whether affect predicted health 
professionals’ perceptions of Team Communication Behaviour. Individual Positive Affect, 
Individual Functional Emotions Climate, Team Cooperative Climate and Team Functional 
Emotions Climate were entered into the Model at the first step.  As demonstrated in Table 6.5,  
 
Table 6.5  Hierarchical regression of affect and Team Communication  
Behaviour for health professionals 
 
Predictor 
Team Communication Behaviour† 
  B                     SE of B                    β 
Step 1 
Constant 
Positive Affect                          
Cooperative Climate                     
Team Climate                                
Step 2 
Constant 
Positive Affect 
Cooperative Climate 
Team Climate 
Profession 
 
- 0.27   
  0.17  
  0.41  
0.45
    
- 0.33 
  0.16  
  0.57 
  0.47 
  0.17 
 
0.85 
0.14  
0.15  
0.16  
  
0.85 
0.14  
0.06 
0.16 
0.20 
 
      - 
    .14  
    .33**  
    .35**  
      
      -     
    .14 
    .28* 
    .37**   
    .11 
Note. N = 54 unless † N = 53.  For Team Communication Behaviour:  
Step 1 ∆R² = .36, F change (3, 49) = 9.20, p = < .001; Step 2 ∆R² = .01,  
F change (1, 48) = 0.70, p = .406 
* p = < .05   ** p = < .01   ***p = < .001 
 
Model 1 was significant in predicting Team Communication Behaviour explaining 36% (adj. R² 
= 32%) of the variance, F (3, 49) = 9.20 p < .001. In this model, the affective dimensions of 
Team Functional Emotions Climate (β = .35, p = .006) and Team Cooperative Climate (β = .33, 
p = .008) were significant predictors of Team Communication Behaviour.  The higher the 
perception of team functional emotions and the increased belief that there was a cooperative 
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climate in the team, the more health professionals believed that the members of the team 
engaged in team communication behaviour during the simulation.   
 
The addition of profession at the second step did not explain any additional significant variance 
(p = .406).  However, Team Functional Emotions Climate (β = 37, p = .005) and Team 
Cooperative Climate (β = .28, p = .043) remained significant predictors in Model 2.  The 
inclusion of interaction terms in the stepwise regression at step 3, did not compute a third 
model, indicating that profession did not moderate the predictive value of any of the affective 
dimensions. 
 
6.4.8  Predicting perceptions of Team Effectiveness 
A third hierarchical multiple regression was used to examine whether affect predicted health 
professionals’ perceptions of Team Effectiveness.  Individual Positive Affect, Individual 
Negative Affect, Team Functional Emotions Climate and Team Cooperative Climate were 
entered into the Model at the first step.  As demonstrated in Table 6.6, Model 1 was significant 
in predicting Team Effectiveness explaining 40% (adj. R² = 35%) of the variance, F (4, 49) = 
8.23 p < .001. In this model, the affective dimensions of Individual Negative Affect (β = - .31, p 
= .008) and Team Cooperative Climate (β = .38, p = .002) were significant predictors of Team 
Effectiveness.  The less the health professional was feeling negative affect and the more that 
they felt that there was a cooperative climate in the team, the more health professionals believed 
that the team was effective during the simulation.   
 
The addition of profession at the second step did not explain any additional significant variance 
(p = .449).  However, Individual Negative Affect (β = - .28, p = .031) and Team Cooperative 
Climate (β = .44, p = .002) remained significant predictors in Model 2.  The stepwise regression 
with the inclusion of interaction terms at step 3 did not compute a third model, indicating that 
profession did not moderate the predictive value of any of the affective dimensions. 
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Table 6.6  Hierarchical regression of affect and Team Effectiveness 
for health professionals 
 
Predictor 
Team Effectiveness 
  B                     SE of B                    β 
Step 1 
Constant 
Positive Affect     
Negative Affect                 
Cooperative Climate  
Team Climate                               
Step 2 
Constant 
Positive Affect 
Negative Affect 
Cooperative Climate 
Team Climate 
Profession 
 
   1.62   
   0.11  
 - 0.35  
   0.41 
0. 20
    
   1.51  
   0.13 
 - 0.31 
   0.47 
   0.18 
 - 0.14  
 
0.83 
0.12 
0.13  
0.13 
0.13 
 
0.84  
0.12 
0.14 
0.15 
0.14 
0.18 
 
      - 
    .11  
  - .31**  
    .38** 
    .18      
                            
      -    
    .13 
  - .28*   
    .44** 
    .16 
  - .10 
Note. N = 54. For Team Effectiveness: Step 1 ∆R² = .40, F change  
(4, 49) = 8.23, p = < .001; Step 2 ∆R² = .01, F change (1, 48) = 0.58,  
p = .449 
* p = < .05   ** p = < .01   ***p = < .001 
 
6.5  Discussion 
The aim of study 4 was to explore whether doctors and nurses or allied health professions 
experienced different individual and team affect during simulation of a critical incident and 
whether they had different perceptions of Communication Behaviour and Team Effectiveness. It 
also assessed whether individual and team affect predicted perceptions of Communication 
Behaviour and Team Effectiveness.  
 
6.5.1  Differences in perceptions of individual and team affect during simulation 
Doctors and nurses or allied health professionals demonstrated identical patterns in their ratings 
of affect giving higher and lower scores to the same affect dimensions.  While Individual 
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Negative Affect and Team Competitive Climate were perceived to be low, both groups of health 
professionals perceived that Individual Positive Affect, Individual and Team Functional 
Emotions Climate, and Cooperative Climate were high.  These high ratings of affect may have 
been a reflection of health professionals being in a simulation of a critical incident which 
increased visceral arousal through active involvement (Martinez et al., 2009) or heightened 
affective arousal through being in a hot state (Ariely & Loewenstein, 2006; Nordgren et al., 
2009).  This suggests that during team-based tasks, both doctors and nurses or allied health 
professions experience a high intensity of both individual and team affect. 
 
Doctors’ higher rating of individual engagement and tenseness, and team competitiveness, and 
lower individual anticipatory response suggested that they focused on affective indicators of 
clinical performance.  Nurses or allied health professionals had a more intense individual 
anticipatory response during the simulation, and suggested that they focused on individual 
feelings.   While some of the differences between the two groups in their perceptions of 
individual and team affect were small, it is crucial that more work is undertaken to examine why 
and whether different health professionals focus on different affective cues when they are 
working together on the same clinical task.  In particular, it is important to establish whether 
different aspects of affect during team communication provide role-specific feedback. It is also 
important to understand whether a focus on different affective cues enhances situational 
awareness and broadens the clinically relevant information that is gathered and shared in a 
clinical team, or whether divergences in the salience of affective cues hinders team cohesiveness 
and a sense of shared goals. 
 
6.5.2  Differences in perceptions of discrete positive and negative emotions 
Health professionals showed general correspondence in the pattern of their ratings of discrete 
emotions.  All positive emotions other than inspired for doctors were perceived to be moderate 
to high, while all negative emotions, other than nervous for both groups and afraid for nurses 
                                                                                                                 
150 
 
were perceived to be low.  As found in study 2 and study 3, in Chapters 4 and 5 respectively, the 
positive emotions, alert, determined, attentive and the negative emotion of nervous appear to be 
important emotions in clinical judgement and performance. In this study, these emotions 
showed consistent arousal across both doctors and nurses or allied health professions. However, 
there were differences in discrete emotional responses. Although not statistically significant, 
nurses or allied health professions felt more inspired and determined and less alert and active 
than doctors. They also felt most negative emotions more intensely than doctors during the 
simulation. The only exception was that doctors did report feeling higher ratings of hostility, but 
the mean score difference was very small.  
 
These findings appear to further support the notion that different emotional responses may be 
due to perceptions of professional roles and responsibilities.  The facts that doctors had a higher 
feeling for the emotions alert and active imply a more immediate, transient response state that is 
required for instantaneous decision-based actions and performance, while the feelings of 
inspired, determined, upset, ashamed, experienced more intensely by nurses or allied health 
professions, indicate a more considered, and emotionally burdensome response during the 
simulation.  This finding supports research on emotional labour (James, 1989; Smith, 1992) and 
the hostess role (Timmons & Tanner, 2005) in the work of nurses.  In a study involving 
observations and interviews with operating theatre nurses, Timmons and Tanner (2005) found 
that nurses engaged in behaviour and displays that were juxtaposed to actual feelings in order to 
maintain equanimity in the mood of the surgeons they worked with.  Therefore, it is possible 
that the nurses observed were carrying out the hostess role and that during team scenarios, they 
were acting as a team emotion gauge and were therefore more likely to be more acutely aware 
of, and report, the emotions they were feeling.  
 
Future research should examine whether, and to what extent, emotional labour and the “hostess 
role” in nurses compete with the awareness of other affective cues that are important for 
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diagnosis and treatment during a team-based task. It should also try to establish whether 
emotional labour assists or hinders nurses’ verbalisation of information they feel is clinically 
relevant to the rest of the team. 
 
While the negative emotions of nervous and afraid were increased in both professional groups, 
they were again more aroused in nurses or allied health professions.  As both anxiety and fear 
have been associated with low personal control and aversive behaviour (Lerner & Keltner, 
2000, 2001), increased nervousness and fear in health professionals may reduce the level of 
communication within a team context (Kish-Gephart et al, 2009).  In a clinical team context, 
this could hinder or delay the sharing of important diagnostic and treatment information. Further 
research should examine differences in the expression of anxiety and fear in multi-professional 
clinical teams, and assess how quickly and accurately these emotions are gauged by other 
members of the team.  This would aid the development of team strategies to mitigate omissions 
or errors caused by emotion-based avoidance behaviour.  These findings further support the 
need to develop a better understanding of the role that specific emotions play in decisions and 
behaviour in applied settings (Van Kleef et al., 2012).  
 
6.5.3  Differences in perceptions of Communication Behaviour and Team Effectiveness 
The fact that Communication Behaviour at both an individual and team level, and Team 
Effectiveness were perceived to be high may be due to the fact that the high level of positive 
affect that health professionals were feeling led to the perception that more positive behaviour 
(e.g. more use and engagement in communication behaviour) occurred.  It is possible that this 
reflected congruence between present affective state and outcomes which require judgement 
(Waters, 2008).  This is further supported by the fact that nurses or allied health professions 
who reported higher positive feelings and a higher perception of cooperation within the team 
also gave higher ratings for Communication Behaviour and Team Effectiveness than doctors.  
This implies that perceptions of Communication Behaviour and Team Effectiveness are 
                                                                                                                 
152 
 
influenced by the intensity of positive affect experienced during simulation.  An alternative 
explanation is that the high levels of positive affect may have been due to emotional contagion 
(Barsade, 2002).  As the perception of positive emotions has been linked to cooperation 
(Barsade, 2002; Van Doorn, Heerdink, & Van Kleef, 2012) and cooperation is a key component 
of effective teamwork (Flin et al., 2008), it is important to now examine the role that 
cooperation plays in the quantity and quality of verbalisation and exchange of information for 
diagnosis and case management in clinical team contexts.    
          
6.5.4  The relationship between individual and team affect  
Health professionals did not associate individual and team affect with each other.  While they 
related their own high individual positive and low individual negative feelings with how 
engaged and appropriately tense they themselves felt during the simulation, they did not 
associate any individual affective response with team affect.  Likewise, they associated a 
perception that the team was engaged and appropriately tense with a sense of cooperation in the 
team, but not with any feelings concerning their own affective response.  This may suggest that 
during clinical tasks that require teamwork, affect-based information may be derived from 2 
distinct affective phenomena.  This may involve individual affect which is gauged through 
visceral feelings, and team affect which is assessed through team members’ social displays and 
expressions of emotions (Van Kleef, 2009).  
 
The finding that health professionals related more familiarity with members of the team with a 
perception that competitiveness in the team was higher, may have reflected the junior level of 
the participants’ and a focus on establishing themselves as competent professionals.  It may also 
have been due to the knowledge that their performance was being viewed by their peers.  
Further studies exploring the role of competitiveness in junior health professionals and 
established clinical teams would help to clarify whether this finding was context and sample-
specific and whether it hinders or facilitates communication behaviour and team effectiveness. 
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6.5.5  The relationship between affect and Communication Behaviour and Team Effectiveness 
Although health professionals related both levels of Communication Behaviour with both 
individual and team affect, individual affect was more strongly associated with Individual 
Communication Behaviour, and team affect was more strongly associated with Team 
Communication Behaviour.  While this may partly support the notion that individual and social 
affect exert their influence in distinct ways (Van Kleef, 2009), it also indicates that perceptions 
of team performance are influenced by both individual and team affect.  This is further 
supported by the finding that Team Effectiveness was related to both types of affect.  It is now 
important to gain further knowledge about how individual and team emotions interrelate and 
how this influences the feedback of relevant diagnostic and treatment information during team-
based clinical tasks.   
 
6.5.6  Affective predictors of ratings of Communication Behaviour and Team Effectiveness 
While the pattern described in section 6.5.5 above was generally supported in the affective 
predictors of Communication Behaviour and Team Effectiveness, it emerged that low individual 
negative affect was an important factor in the perception of Individual Communication 
Behaviour and Team Effectiveness.  Moreover, the finding that a higher perception of 
cooperation in the team predicted all 3 outcomes further supports the growing literature which 
suggests that cooperation is an important social affective factor in fostering effective team 
communication and behaviour (Van Doorn et al., 2012; Van Kleef, 2009).    
   
6.5.7  Limitations 
There are limitations to this study.  Although the study attempted to replicate realistic contexts 
and settings in which clinical communication and decisions are made, the fact that affect was 
measured within a simulated environment, raises issues concerning generalizability of the 
findings into real clinical practice.  Furthermore, as the study was run alongside a simulation 
training course, it is unclear whether health professionals’ ratings of affect were a true reflection 
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of their perceptions of the simulated scenario or whether they were influenced by high arousal 
states due to the stress of participating in a training programme.  
 
While on one hand health professionals had a high rating for feeling nervous and an elevated 
score for feeling afraid, they also indicated that they felt highly positive for four of the five 
discrete positive emotions, and for all of the main affect dimensions other than individual 
negative affect and team competitive climate.  One explanation for the pattern of high ratings 
across all positive affect dimensions may be that the act of completing a questionnaire about 
feelings, made health professionals’ current mood due to participating in the simulation, more 
salient.  Previous research suggests that in order to regulate mood, an individual will make 
appropriate choices (Caruso & Shafir, 2006).  Therefore, in this situation it is possible that those 
that felt positive after the simulation continued to indicate positive affect to correspond with 
their mood, while those who felt negative after the scenario indicated more positive feelings in 
an attempt to regulate their mood.  As the questionnaire was completed during a training course 
which included colleagues and senior health professionals, health professionals may have felt 
social desirability pressures which may have been reflected in their responses.      
 
The context and time limits within which the study was carried out also restricted the measures 
which could be collected. The low Cronbach Alpha level of the general negative affect sub-
scale of the 10 item International Positive and Negative Affect Schedule (I-PANAS-SF: 
Thompson, 2007) meant that the measure of negative affect may not be reliable.  Furthermore 
the use of the I-PANAS-SF also meant that the exploration of discrete emotions was restricted, 
and the measure of communication behaviour focused on perceptions, and did not include an 
objective assessment of the quantity or quality of individual or team communication from a 
clinical or technical skills perspective.     
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While this study indicates that information from both individual and social affect played a role 
in the perception of individual and team communication behaviour, being cross-sectional it is 
not able to disentangle the nature of the relationship between these different types of affect.  
Therefore, it is not possible to comment on whether individual affect influenced the nature and 
degree of team affect or whether team affect had an impact on the direction and intensity of 
individual affect.  
 
This study, and the studies in Chapters 4 and 5 have provided evidence that both individual and 
social affect play a role in the process of diagnostic and case management decisions. The study 
presented in the next chapter presents the findings from in-depth interviews with 16 junior and 
senior Accident and Emergency and Anaesthetics doctors in which the features and interplay 
between the types and sources of affect involved in diagnostic and case management decisions 
were explored and identified.  
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CHAPTER 7 
DO AFFECTIVE INFLUENCES FEATURE IN DIAGNOSTIC AND CASE 
MANAGEMENT DECISION MAKING IN EMERGENCY CARE?  
A QUALITATIVE APPROACH 
 
7.1  Introduction 
The previous 3 chapters described the quantitative approaches used to examine the role of affect 
in diagnostic decision making and case management in emergency care.  As discussed in 
Chapter 3, research examining the role of affect in diagnostic and case management decision 
making should acknowledge that doctors make clinical judgements and perform clinical tasks 
individually and within teams amidst a plethora of concrete and abstract clinical and non-
clinical factors.  Due to this, a programme of work which uses only quantitative methods 
deduced from existing theory was unlikely to attain a comprehensive knowledge of a complex 
feature of clinical practice without eliciting and understanding the role of the social and 
contextual settings in which it occurs (Armitage & Hodgson, 2004).  
 
The Naturalistic Decision Making research approach (NDM: Klein et al., 1993) asserts that to 
understand thought processes, research should be conducted with those who have experience of 
the phenomena of interest and reflect their real life situations and settings.  A number of studies 
have followed a NDM research approach in semi-structured interviews with doctors in order to 
understand the cognitive components and processes that are important in clinical decision 
making (Fackler et al., 2009; Woolley & Kostopoulou, 2013).  It was therefore decided that a 
NDM approach would be utilised in this study and semi-interviews were used to draw on 
doctors’ real-life accounts of the decisions they made during emergency care incidents.  This 
would elicit meaningful data which would provide knowledge of the sources and types of affect 
that feature in diagnostic and case management decision making and would allow for the 
assessment of their role.  
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Obtaining narratives from doctors who are making diagnostic and case management judgements 
on a daily basis would provide rich and extensive data that may assist in providing explanations 
for the findings from the quantitative studies in this thesis.  It was also hoped that this method 
would provide data that might indicate whether current theoretical perspectives are supported, 
or require further development to aid the understanding of the role of affect in diagnostic and 
case management decision making (Barbour, 2000).  
 
7.2  Study 5 
7.2.1  Aims 
The aim of this study was to elicit doctors’ own accounts of decision making strategies used in 
real-life clinical incidents to identify the emotional processes which influence diagnostic and 
case management judgements in emergency care. The study also assessed whether doctors felt 
that affect influenced the decisions they made and explored the role it played. The research 
questions were: 
1). What are the sources of affect that feature in emergency care decision making?  
2). What are the types of affect that feature in emergency care decision making?  
3). What discrete emotions feature in emergency care decision making?  
4). To what extent are affective factors perceived to influence decision making in emergency          
      care and what is their role?   
7.3  Method 
7.3.1  Participants 
The sample consisted of 16 junior and senior doctors working in Accident and Emergency (N = 
9) or Anaesthetics Departments (N = 7) in 2 NHS Trusts.  The mean number of years practice 
was 14.47 years (SD = 9.08).  There were 6 females and 10 males with a mean age of 38.44 
(8.54 SD) years.  
 
                                                                                                                 
158 
 
There were 2 criteria for participation.  Firstly, doctors had to be working in the specialties of 
Accident and Emergency or Anaesthetics in an acute hospital setting.  This was to allow for an 
in-depth exploration of the features of diagnostic and case management decision making with 
doctors who had experience of making decisions in emergency care in an acute care setting. 
Secondly, doctors must have completed 3 months of working in the department. This formed 
part of the ethical requirements and is discussed in more detail in section 7.3.2.   
 
All participants were recruited using the same method.  After gaining relevant directorate and 
clinical lead permissions, eligible doctors in each department were sent a study invitation letter 
(see appendix G) along with a study information sheet.  This was undertaken by a gatekeeper 
within the Trust in each clinical department.  A study invitation reminder letter was sent 2 
weeks later after which no further contact was made.  Doctors were informed that interviews 
must take place in their own free time.  No incentive for participation was offered.  Doctors who 
were interested in participating were invited to contact the researcher by email or telephone to 
arrange a convenient time and place to conduct the interview.   
 
7.3.2  Ethics 
Approval to undertake research with NHS health professionals was granted by the NHS 
Research Ethics Committee (Ref: 11/YH/0082) and the Trust Research and Development 
Department.  Care was taken to address all potential ethical issues in the Participant Information 
Sheet and to remind participants of their right to withdraw at any time.  To reduce the risk of 
psychological harm, ethical approval was granted on condition that doctors recruited to the 
study must have completed 3 months of working in the department. These conditions were put 
in place to minimise any distress that the most junior staff may experience due to participating 
in the study and to ensure that the interview schedule was appropriate for their level of practice 
and clinical experience.  A protocol for the occurrence of any distress either during or after the 
interview was developed and following the interview each participant was provided with a 
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debrief sheet which provided details of sources of psychological support if required.  To further 
avoid the possibility of distress, the information sheet included advice that if the potential 
participant was likely to be particularly distressed by the discussion of a critical incident they 
should avoid participation. 
 
A further condition of ethical approval was that a clear disclosure procedure was in place should 
doctors disclose any information of a criminal or violent nature, or instances of professional 
negligence, or if individuals had suffered harm.  Participants were made fully aware of the 
disclosure procedure as this was included in the Participant Information Sheet.  
  
Issues of confidentiality and anonymity are paramount in qualitative research in which 
participants trust the researcher with the divulgence of personal and sensitive information 
(Murphy, Dingwall, Greatbatch, Parker, & Watson, 1998).  All participants were asked to 
consent to audio recordings of the interview to be used for the purpose of analysis as part of the 
research.  They were informed that transcription would be carried out solely by the researcher.  
Participants were also assured that the interview data would be stored securely in a locked 
cabinet at the researcher’s university office, and that any electronic versions of the audio 
recordings would be stored on the university’s password protected computer system.  To protect 
anonymity, codes made up of letters and numbers were used on all study materials and 
participants were assured that any identifying name or place would be removed from research 
reports, journal articles or conference papers.  As the interview extracts across sources, themes, 
and specific answers to questions would involve segments of accounts from the same 
respondent, it was also decided that no identifying respondent specialty or code would be 
included with the data extracts to help maintain confidentiality and anonymity.  Participants 
were also informed that care would also be taken to ensure that any identifying clustering of 
features from incidents would be avoided in any published material.   
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7.3.3  Design 
The study was a two-centred exploratory design and used the semi-structured interview 
technique of Critical Decision Method (CDM: Klein, Calderwood & MacGregor, 1989). This 
interview technique uses a methodical strategy to elicit accounts of non-routine, domain-based 
incidents and establishes the contextual and environmental determinants and thought processes 
that informed key decisions through a set of cognitive probes.  CDM includes 5 distinct stages 
to the interview.  As recommended by Klein et al. (1989), the stages were adapted to meet the 
aims of the research and are presented below:  
 
 
Figure 7.1  Procedure used in Critical Decision Method (adapted from Klein et al., 1989)  
 
CDM can be used to specifically compare the decision making strategies of those with more or 
less field experience, but is also a valuable method for gaining knowledge about the cognitive 
processes that underlie judgements.  As the focus of this study was to identify the sources and 
Participant selected challenging emergency care incident that involved diagnostic 
and case management decisions  
Participant described the incident from start of their involvement to the time the 
incident was under control, care was transferred or ended  
An incident timeline was drawn while the incident was repeated back to the 
participant to confirm accuracy of content and sequence of events     
The timeline was used for the identification of 2 key diagnostic and case 
management decisions 
Each decision was probed in order to elicit the cues, strategies and processes 
involved in each judgement    
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types of affect that typically featured in diagnostic and case management decision making, it 
was important to include accounts from both junior and senior doctors, but equal numbers were 
not essential.  
 
Due to time constraints, doctors were asked to select only 1 emergency care incident but were 
asked to identify 2 key diagnostic and case management decision points (e.g. a choice was made 
from a number of possible courses of action) within that incident.  As discussed in Chapter 3 
(see section 3.3.4) case management is included as a distinct sub-category of diagnostic decision 
making in this thesis and therefore, case management decisions (e.g. What were the treatment 
options? Where should the patient be treated?) were included in this study.  Each decision was 
then probed in the sequence in which they occurred during the incident described. 
 
7.3.4  Materials 
7.3.4.1  Interview schedule 
The interview schedule (see appendix H) included the 5 stages described in Figure 7.1.  The 
fifth stage included probes commonly used in CDM (Klein et al., 1993), which focus on the 
cognitive interpretation of information used in the decision making.  However, in order to 
extract information about affective features that informed decision making during the incidents, 
additional probes which explicitly explored the emotions that were experienced during the point 
of decision making were developed and included in the decision probing stage.  This would 
allow for the experience of emotion to be matched with specific cognitive processing of 
information, and would also assist in identifying the conscious and less conscious impact of 
affect.  It also explored the extent to which doctors were able to reflect on the role that affect 
may have had on the decisions they made.        
  
The interview schedule was piloted on one occasion with a consultant who represented the 
sample criteria.  The consultant advised that an acceptable duration of the interview would be 
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approximately 1 hour, therefore the time taken for completion was noted.  Feedback was also 
attained regarding structure and comprehensibility of the questions.  The interview schedule was 
also assessed to ensure that the questions facilitated the collection of broad and meaningful data 
in terms of the research questions.     
 
7.3.5  Measures 
7.3.5.1  Demographics 
Each doctor indicated their age, sex, clinical grade, year in present grade, clinical experience in 
years and specialty. 
 
7.3.6  Procedure 
All interviews took place in a private room either in the clinical department or on the hospital 
site that was convenient to the participant. Interviews took between 29 minutes and 1 hour, 18 
minutes.  Before the interview commenced, any questions were addressed by the researcher 
before obtaining consent and completion of the demographics questionnaire.  All participants 
were informed in the study invitation letters and study information sheet that the interview 
would require them to talk about an incident that was challenging and involved diagnostic and 
case management decisions.  Enquiring whether participants had been able to select an incident 
that they could describe was used as an ice-breaker question.  If participants had not been able 
to select an incident, they were reminded of the criteria and given time to consider and make a 
choice.  Once the participant was happy with the incident they had selected, the interview was 
audio-taped and the remaining stages of CDM described in Figure 7.1 commenced.  Decision 
point probing was carried out separately for the selected decision points.  
 
On completion of the interview and questionnaires, participants were debriefed and asked 
whether they wanted to discuss any issues raised through taking part in the study.  A list of 
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possible sources of support was provided to all participants and they were offered the 
opportunity to be sent a summary of the study findings.  
 
7.3.7  Analysis 
Klein et al. (1989) suggest that when using CDM the aims of the research should direct the 
coding strategy used.  Therefore, the Framework Approach (Ritchie & Lewis, 2003) informed 
the stages of analysis of the interview data.  This approach was chosen due to its ability to 
incorporate both inductive and deductive interrogation of the interview data.  This allowed for 
the support of a priori theoretical and literature-based assumptions for sources and types of 
affect, while also providing the flexibility to extend knowledge and move beyond the confines 
of the theoretical framework that informs this thesis.  The 5 stages of the Framework Approach 
are illustrated in Table 7.1.  
 
Table 7.1  Stages of the Framework Approach to analysis (adapted from Ritchie & Lewis, 2003) 
Stage Procedure 
1. 
2. 
3. 
4. 
5. 
Familiarisation with data   
Establishment of key thematic concepts 
Labelling of codes  
Arrangement of data into thematic charts 
Conceptual interpretation 
 
Interviews were transcribed verbatim by the researcher and due to the arrangement and 
synthesis of data into charts all of the stages of analysis were done by hand.  The audio-
recordings and typed transcripts were listened to and read several times to allow for 
familiarisation with the data and the initial identification of key ideas and themes that emerged.  
Fourteen doctors selected 2 decision points, 1 doctor selected 1 decision point, and 1 doctor 
selected 3 decision points.  During analysis, it was determined that 1 decision point was not 
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concerned with diagnostic or case management decisions, and was therefore omitted from the 
analysis.  Time restrictions meant that one decision point was not interrogated using all the 
probes.  However, due to relevance this decision point was retained in the analysis.  This 
resulted in 31 decision points.   
 
Interview text was then coded into labels using words and phrases.  Not all conversation was 
coded.  To avoid subjective inferences and bias, only segments of conversation that included 
explicit references to emotions or feelings were coded for sources and types of affect.  The 
codes were then assigned to the key thematic concepts.  
 
While an inductive approach was applied to the analysis, a number of themes were derived from 
the theoretical framework that informed the research in this thesis.  Therefore, for sources of 
affect; Patient, Team, and Previous clinical experience, and for types of affect; Mood, 
Anticipatory affect, and Anticipated affect were identified as potential themes.  Due to the 
difference in these concepts, thematic analysis for source of affect took a predominantly 
inductive approach, while a deductive strategy generally informed type of affect.   
 
The nature of the participant-researcher interaction during qualitative research may mean that it 
moves from being a professional encounter to a personal dialogue (Murphy et al., 1998).  The 
non-clinical background of the researcher may go some way to ensuring that some distance was 
maintained between the researcher and participant.  While reflexivity is one approach to guard 
against the possibility of bias and subjectivity, transparency in how codes and categories were 
derived from qualitative data and the level of agreement of interpretation obtained between 
researchers is another (Murphy et al., 1998; Pope & Mays, 2006).  However, there is some 
debate concerning how inter-rater agreement should be determined in qualitative research 
(Barbour, 2001; Pope and Mays, 2006).  While applying techniques such as the Kappa measure 
of agreement is one such method, it is acknowledged that quantitative approaches used to 
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address issues concerning inter-rater reliability have limitations.  While the Kappa statistic 
measures researchers’ level of concordance, Barbour (2001) argues that, “the degree of 
concordance between researchers is not really important; what is ultimately of value is the 
content of disagreements and the insights that discussion can provide for refining coding 
frames” p. 1116.  Furthermore, it is suggested that the Kappa measure of agreement may not be 
conducive to qualitative data that is or “dependent on detailed interpretation” p. 19 (Thompson, 
McCaughan, Cullum, Sheldon and Raynor, 2004).  It was therefore decided that in order to 
ensure rigour of the analytical process, and to assist in the refinement of the coding labels and 
key thematic concepts, multiple coding by 2 further researchers (one researcher with a 
background in health psychology and another with a background in clinical practice) would be 
undertaken.  This allowed for the data to be interrogated by two appropriate researchers who 
shared different, yet complementary perspectives and involved the cross-checking of coding 
labels by each researcher, separately coding the same 2 transcripts (one transcript from a doctor 
in Accident and Emergency and another from a doctor working in Anaesthetics).   
 
The final themes and sub-themes were decided through a process of all three researchers 
discussing and describing themes and achieving conceptual clarity through consensus (Barbour, 
2001).  An example of how codes were transformed into themes and sub-themes is presented in 
Table 7.2 (see appendix I for tables of transformation of codes into themes and sub-themes).  To      
assist interpretation, frequencies of themes, emotions and answers to particular questions are 
also illustrated.  In an attempt to explain emotional states, it emerged that doctors often used 
different words to describe an overall feeling state (e.g. anxiety/nervous/uneasy).  Therefore, in 
order to control for any over-representation of emotions, the analysis of discrete emotions has 
combined different words where appropriate.  
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Table 7.2  Transformation of codes to themes for Knowing yourself and Professional ethos  
Codes Codes Sub-themes Theme 
Own likes and dislikes 
Treatment Preferences 
Clinical experience 
Clinical Knowledge 
Own response 
Own interests 
Own personality 
Training 
Own busyness 
Own behaviour 
Effect on self 
Appropriate response 
Previous life experience 
Belief system 
Own thought processes 
Clinical ability 
Clinical experience 
Clinical knowledge 
Training 
Own busyness 
Clinical ability 
 
Professional 
competence 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Knowing 
yourself 
Own likes and dislikes 
Treatment Preferences 
Own response 
Own interests 
Own personality 
Own behaviour 
Effect on self 
Appropriate response 
Previous life experience 
Belief system 
Own thought processes 
 
 
 
Intrapersonal 
Self-awareness 
Professional role 
Sense of ownership 
Responsibility 
Sense of control 
Approach to management 
Clinical performance 
Ethics 
Professional role 
Sense of ownership 
Responsibility 
Sense of control 
Approach to management 
Clinical performance 
Ethics 
                     
 
 
Professional 
ethos 
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7.4  Results 
A total of 8 sources of affect and 5 types of affect emerged using the inductive and deductive 
approaches described in section 7.3.7.  The frequency of themes and concepts, along with 
illustrative extracts from the interviews, are presented below.  
 
7.4.1  Sources of affect 
7.4.1.1  Frequency of themes for source of affect 
The frequency of the source of affect that featured in the 31 decisions is shown in Table 7.3. 
As illustrated the sources, Knowing yourself and Interpersonal factors featured in nearly all of 
the 31 decisions.  The sources, Getting an answer and Organizational or statutory drivers had 
fewer endorsements, and featured in less than a third of all decisions.  
 
Table 7.3  Frequency of source of affect across all decision points 
 
 
Source 
 
Total 
 
Knowing yourself 
 
                          
                         30 
 
Interpersonal factors 
 
                          
                         29 
 
Professional ethos 
 
                          
                         25 
 
Clinical environment 
 
                          
                         18 
 
Risk and uncertainty 
 
                          
                         18 
 
Narrowing of focus 
 
                          
                         10 
 
Getting an answer 
 
                           
                           8 
 
Organizational or statutory drivers 
 
                           
                           6 
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7.4.1.2  Themes – Sources of affect 
7.4.1.2.1  Theme 1: Knowing yourself: An awareness of one’s own abilities, thought patterns 
and influences 
7.4.1.2.1.1  Sub-theme 1: Professional competence: Knowledge of one’s own clinical ability and 
experience 
Table 7.4  Interview extracts reflective of the source Professional competence   
 
“…I guess, I guess, what was sort of underlying it was just that I felt out of my… I felt out of 
my depth in… in erm, being able to advise this, this man appropriately…”  
 
“Erm, and you’re always, you know, “Will I be able to cope with this if it does go wrong?” 
and hoping that you will be able to. Yeah, I think you’re always aware that you may be about 
to be tested in some way.”  
 
“Contentment in the fact that I’d been in that situation before and I knew what the answer was, 
where the trainees didn’t know the answer, and so I felt in a way, as I said, contentment in the 
fact that I could offer them the advice that was appropriate.” 
 
“…knowing that I’d had lots of experience in transfers and pre-hospital work and actually I 
was quite comfortable with it…”   
 
 
In the majority of the decisions described, doctors associated their own awareness of their 
clinical knowledge and ability with both positive and negative feelings.  In general, negative 
feelings of “nervousness” and “anxiety” were experienced when doctors doubted their level of 
expertise and skill-base, while positive emotions of feeling, “calm”, “comfortable”, and “in 
control” were experienced when doctors were confident that their previous clinical experience, 
training or a knowledge base enabled them to make clear judgements, perform clinical tasks, or 
advise junior colleagues.  
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7.4.1.2.1.2  Sub-theme 2: Intrapersonal self-awareness: Knowledge of one’s own thought 
processes and behavioural tendencies 
Table 7.5  Interview extracts reflective of the source Intrapersonal self-awareness   
 
“Erm, you, you hear it in your own voice when you talk to your colleagues.”  
 
“I am aware of a, almost a slow time behaviour that I have when things are difficult. When 
there’s a, when there’s a complex trauma usually, or something difficult to deal with, I do 
realise I don’t, I don’t decide to do it, but I’ll catch myself having slowed down my thought 
processes… become quite pedantic in how I… it’s quite hard to describe really.”   
 
“…I’m quite a conflict averse kind of person, so I still have that sort of, erm, slight reticence 
to, to phone people.”  
 
“…just from previous discussions, previous, err… just from knowing myself, I know that I can 
sometimes not be so bothered about, err, taking a risk, and, as some people would be. Err, and 
so what might…what I might be comfortable accepting, erm, somebody else might not be.” 
 
“…because I’m a medical professional, you have to make the right decisions, but then as a 
human being, I don’t like upsetting people, it’s just my nature.”  
 
“…the anger, just because it’s, err, it goes against sort of human, well my human nature to, to, 
you know, do what you want as long it doesn’t adversely affect anybody else, and [patient] 
clearly, err, didn’t live by that rule, so err, that annoyed me somewhat.” 
 
“…I was aware that I would…I might slightly err to the side of thinking, ‘Oh, well I would not 
wanna be on the [drug]” and “Oh, well, you know, I’d take my chances if it was me,’ whereas, 
you know, I, I…and so I had to, kind of, keep that in check.” 
 
 
Many diagnostic and treatment decisions involved emotions which stemmed from doctors’ own 
preferences and beliefs, or an awareness of their own trait-based behaviour.  In a number of 
decisions this manifested itself in conscious and familiar vocal or cognitive reactive patterns 
                                                                                                                 
170 
 
that reflected the emotions they felt, while for other decisions, some doctors described how their 
traits elicited emotions which influenced their behaviour.  Most doctors were conscious of how 
their thought processes and behavioural tendencies influenced their decision making and 
actions.  However, some were comfortable with this notion and felt it assisted their judgement, 
others spoke about how particular traits and tendencies might result in decisions and behaviour 
which deviated from a more rational approach. 
 
7.4.1.2.2  Theme 2: Interpersonal factors: How one relates to and responds to others 
7.4.1.2.2.1  Sub-theme 1: Reaction to others: Decisional or behavioural response to others 
Table 7.6  Interview extracts reflective of the source Reaction to others   
 
“I was obviously fed up with, err, err, you know, the sort of blasé attitude of the surgeon…”  
 
“Erm, I guess I knew because I looked at [patient] and thought, “Huh, I don’t really like you 
very much,” yeah”   
 
“…Err, partly I… this is been something that I, erm, have an opinion on and have thought 
about, is because my [parent]…has a [condition]… and I’ve looked into the evidence about, 
erm, how to treat this…”   
 
 
Affective responses to others featured in nearly every decision.  Interactions with other clinical 
colleagues or team sometimes generated negative emotions such as, “anger”, “irritation”, and 
“frustration”.  This was often due to unhelpful behaviour or a difference in management 
strategies.  Conversely, the support and help of colleagues often led to doctors’ feeling more 
“calm” and “confident” in their judgements and actions.  Patients also evoked positive and 
negative emotions and these tended to be based on the patient as an individual, or the patient’s 
personal circumstances reminding the doctor of a member of their own family or own family 
situation.   
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7.4.1.2.2.2  Sub-theme 2: Reaction of others: Decisional or behavioural response of others 
Table 7.7  Interview extracts reflective of the source Reaction of others   
 
“…maybe the key feature was who I discussed it with. He said, ‘Let’s go and get this checked 
by someone else,’ who gave me the confidence to get a second opinion…”  
 
“…and just being able to bounce the ideas and the what ifs and that with the surgical 
registrar. That was really helpful…”  
 
“…well also you kind of realised as well that no one seemed to be taking this on and you know, 
potentially he could die, you know, people do die from these symptoms.”  
 
“I’m not sure other people really realised that this could kill her in the next, you know, hour 
you know…”  
 
“… feedback from the [parent] who also said, ‘Thank you for making that decision’”  
 
“I was like, oh you know the [parent’s] not happy with the action, maybe I shouldn’t be doing 
it, and I had to go with what I felt was best for the patient.”  
 
 
The reaction of others also elicited feelings in doctors.  Decisions often involved interactions 
with colleagues concerning the synthesis of diagnostic information.  These interactions and the 
response of other colleagues appeared to evoke two distinct affective responses in doctors. 
When colleagues engaged in discussions about the case or shared concerns about diagnostic 
uncertainty, the sense of collaboration encouraged doctors to pursue a chosen course of 
gathering more information or to action treatment strategies.  In contrast, when this did not 
occur, doctors often felt a sense of isolation in their decision making which was driven by a 
heightened awareness of the potential serious consequences for the patient.  Doctors also spoke 
of decisions when the response of the patient’s family members also caused divergent affective 
responses.  While feedback from family members could be cooperative and served to reaffirm 
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confidence in the decisions they made, when there was disagreement in proposed management, 
the sense of conflict resulted in doubt of judgement.       
         
7.4.1.2.3  Theme 3: Professional ethos: Decisions and behaviour which reflect the standards and 
values associated with being a doctor. This incorporates expectations of self and others. 
Table 7.8  Interview extracts reflective of the source Professional ethos 
 
“But I felt like I was in control and doing things right and doing anything that should be done. 
And I think… I didn’t think I was not doing the right thing at any point, I always thought, not 
to be like big-headed, but I was, I was pleased with how I was going and I thought well, it 
doesn’t matter who else is going to come in because it can’t be done any better than what 
we’re doing at the moment.”  
 
“…but the rest of the team I think give me their respect. They would look to me to…erm, and I 
think they would respect my decision as well.”  
 
“ ‘Oh that one’s mine.’ ((laughs)). Yeah that’s mine. Cos that’s what I’m trained to do. I’m an 
emergency medicine doctor.”  
 
“…there’s a mixture of sort of emotions with these sort of things. I’m always one for taking 
charge. I like to lead the team and obviously, you know, from the point of view of getting the 
team, discussing with the team, ‘What should we do? Let’s… but I think we should…’”  
 
“… I suppose, consciously or subconsciously, I’m not sure but I think I accept that part of the 
role of being a doctor is, is handling other people’s… is kind of shouldering the anxiety for 
other people to a certain extent.”  
 
“And you think you’ve got a dying patient in front of you, and you’ve been doing this for 
twenty years at least, can you not have a bit of a think?”   
 
“Erm, so we spoke to the [specialty] unit, and they, erm, unfortunately had no beds, and they 
didn’t seem seem particularly keen to offer much in the way of advice, of they weren’t taking 
the patient, which we found really unhelpful. Erm, and caused a lot of furrowing of brows…”   
  
                                                                                                                 
173 
 
Table 7.8: Continued 
 
 “…as far as actually making the decision goes…it, it, it would, it would in these situations be 
nice if other specialties didn’t wash their hands of the situation.”  
 
“Erm, I did feel a bit uneasy about, err, was I copping out by, erm, getting him to see his GP?” 
 
 
Decisions and behaviour that reflected or challenged the standards and values that the doctors 
associated with their profession evoked affective reactions in over two thirds of the decision 
points.  Many doctors described how they felt as being “in control” when making decisions or 
performing clinical tasks, and a similar feeling was extended to their approach to managing 
clinical teams.  The sense of ownership and responsibility that they saw as integral to their 
professional role exposed them to harrowing and emotionally burdensome situations.  There 
was also a strong sense that unhelpful attitudes or actions which conveyed a reluctance to share 
responsibility for patient care made decision making more difficult and elicited negative 
feelings both at an individual and team level.      
 
7.4.1.2.4  Theme 4: Clinical environment: Physical and sensory components in the clinical 
setting 
Table 7.9  Interview extracts reflective of the source Clinical environment   
 
“I can see the room. I can see the monitors telling me what I didn’t know. What I didn’t want 
to know.”  
 
“…and quite different to…we went from the stretcher room, when everything was relatively 
sort of low key, because I was worried, but nobody else was. We went to CT, got the CT and 
we came back into resus and then it was like the cat was out of the bag…”   
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Table 7.9: continued 
 
“But the process I found really frustrating and difficult, err, because I had to make decisions 
that, erm on a hunch really. And erm, and I felt I was forced into making those decisions 
because we don’t have [type] service here.”     
 
“And I remember thinking, ‘Is there any reason why we shouldn’t do that?’ You know, we’re 
not taking him for an operation, that it makes sense, it’s, you know, it’s ending up at the places 
of safety, you know, that place where you’ve got adequate equipment and adequate levels of 
monitoring and trained staff.”  
 
Affective reactions to aspects of the clinical environment featured in many of the decisions. The 
sight and sounds of monitors and ventilators were prominent in incidents with negative 
outcomes or when the outcome was uncertain. Specific clinical areas were linked with the 
feelings experienced during the diagnostic process and treatment decisions. Limitations to 
services and resources available also produced feelings of frustration. 
 
7.4.1.2.5  Theme 5: Risk and uncertainty: A situation or action with a possible bad or unknown 
outcome 
Table 7.10  Interview extracts reflective of the source Risk and uncertainty 
 
“The worse the situation gets, the calmer and slower I am.”  
 
“…when he first came in, he looked grey, he looked sweaty, he looked shocking. What’s going 
on? And there’s that kind of stress of that, of that diagnostic conundrum…”  
 
“…I think you always feel a bit nervous, erm, cos I’m sure I was nervous. Erm, I think just 
knowing that, he could deteriorate at any second, and that naturally produces in you, kind of, a 
bit of anxiety and a sense that you need to be on your guard…”  
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Table 7.10: Continued 
 
Over half of the decisions elicited an affective reaction when judgements had to be made about 
how to manage the patient in the face of diagnostic uncertainty or risky procedures. Doctors 
either felt “anxiety” or “nervous”, or felt “calm”.   
 
7.4.1.2.6  Theme 6: Narrowing of focus: A task or feature that causes one to channel attention 
and effort 
Table 7.11  Interview extracts reflective of the source Narrowing of focus   
 
“…just looking at her and thinking, ‘Gosh, she’s pale,’ and then asking somebody, you know, 
‘What’s the matter with the lady in [room]?’ I presume I spoke to the nurse and then and then 
thinking, ‘Right, I’d better…’ You know, ‘I’d better go and see her and just see what’s 
happening.’ And then sort of fairly rapidly realising that I was right, that my gut feeling having 
glanced through the door, was right.”  
 
“… and I’m thinking, err, cos of the commotion, moving the bed trolley out to go and pick up 
the patient. Yeah, and then everybody else rushing in for the other emergencies, yeah. I kind of 
sat there and I thought, and I looked round and I thought, ‘Who’s gonna take this guy?’ He’s 
just bleeding everywhere. No one’s picking up on this information, cos it’s being delivered in a 
different fashion. Yeah, this information is being delivered in a different fashion from the 
information that’s usually being delivered.” 
 
"Very focused as well and you’re sort or very, erm, focused about what it is that, that we need 
to do. Err, very, you know, heart rate’s going up. I was very conscious at the time, the fact that 
we need to get this done quickly.”  
 
 
 
“It’s just because I had the knowledge of what could go wrong, so you know, I wanted to be… 
not that that in itself is anxiety creating, except to a certain extent, or if it’s not, maybe 
anxiety’s not quite the right word, but I felt alert to potential risks.”  
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Table 7.11: Continued 
 
“When you’ve got something to do, or at work then it’s, it’s pretty. Erm… I don’t really feel that 
much, I don’t think, because you’ve got something to do and you’ve got a task and you’re 
concentrating on what you wanna do. It’s when, when you’ve stopped….”   
 
“Err, because in the midst of these things on a busy day you don’t really have time to sit and 
think about all these things. You just are going, based on your clinical decision making, err, like 
what is right? What is the best way to deal with a patient? Patient care, it’s like more 
mechanical, you know…”   
 
Some decisions involved a specific feature which directed the doctor’s focus.  Here, doctors 
spoke of a physical aspect of the patient’s presentation, an unusual sequence of events in the 
clinical environment, or an awareness of a time critical situation which elicited an affective 
reaction, which caused them to channel their attention and effort into a particular case.  In 
contrast, some doctors described how during periods when they were immersed and engaged in 
clinical tasks, the cognitive and automated state they were in meant that they did not experience 
feelings.  
 
7.4.1.2.7  Theme 7: Getting an answer : The pursuit of a diagnosis or clear treatment strategy 
Table 7.12  Interview extracts reflective of the source Getting an answer   
 
“It’s not I’m not someone who can just walk away and think, ‘Well I’ve done this and this, 
which is what I have to do and it’s not sorted, but I’ve done what I should do. So job done. I 
can leave that till tomorrow.’ I knew that I hadn’t got the answer. Erm, so it irked me, for erm, 
well until I’d got the answer basically.”  
 
“… I had a good idea of what was going on, erm, so I think I felt fairly relaxed and, and fairly, 
err, and you know, I felt, I felt in control of the situation, I guess.”  
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Table 7.12: Continued 
 
For a smaller number of decisions, doctors spoke of the feelings that were evoked during the 
pursuit of a diagnosis or treatment plan.  When the diagnosis or treatment plan was unclear, 
emotions were aroused and they felt uneasy and restless.  In contrast, once the diagnosis or 
treatment plan was known, emotions seemed less intense and they spoke of feeling, “in control”. 
 
7.4.1.2.8  Theme 8: Organizational or statutory drivers: Organizational guidelines and 
consequences that control clinical decisions and behaviour 
Table 7.13  Interview extracts reflective of the source Organizational or statutory drivers    
 
“So there was a degree of frustration there that we were losing a nurse really because of a, of 
a policy, erm, rather than for a particular clinical reason…”  
 
“…but it’s, it’s difficult. I mean there’s only the staff and there’s lots of patients to see and 
you’re looking at your watch and you’re thinking, ‘I’ve over ran here,’ but then you know, this 
is not… these are not figures, these are not numbers, these are real people with real issues….” 
 
“Erm, well unfortunately some… err, in every decision that we make, there’s always that kind 
of thought about, erm, could you defend this decision in court, I suppose there’s… well in 
court’s a bit, but could you defend it if someone… if he was to go home and erm, unfortunately 
was to die…”  
  
 
 
 
“Erm, I think you always feel satisfied and in control if you feel you know what’s happened to 
the patient. So I felt that, erm, the diagnosis that I’d come to was probably the right diagnosis 
and that I’d considered alternative diagnoses as well. So I didn’t feel that I’d be letting him 
down by just following that route.” 
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Table 7.13: Continued 
 
“Erm, I felt like I’d not missed anything out from the normal, erm, procedures that you’re 
meant to follow, so I didn’t feel that if anything went wrong… so defensively I felt comfortable if 
anything went wrong.” 
 
Organisational guidelines and policies infringed on decision making and behaviour in some 
decision points. Those factors that were external to the clinical case resulted in doctors feeling 
frustrated and contributed to the feeling of being stressed.  The threat of litigation also featured 
in their decisions.  Here, the feeling of being “comfortable” was achieved through meticulous 
consideration of the clinical information and choices that were available to them.  
 
7.4.2  Types of affect 
7.4.2.1  Frequency of themes for types of affect 
The frequency of the type of affect that featured in the 31 decisions is shown in Table 7.14.  As 
illustrated, Anticipatory affect featured in all 31 decisions and Affective climate and Affective 
 
Table 7.14  Frequency of type of affect across all decision points 
 
 
 
 
Type 
 
 
Total 
Anticipatory affect 
 
                         31 
Affective climate 
 
                         23         
Affective empathy 
 
                         21 
Anticipated affect 
 
                         16 
Reflective mood 
 
                         13 
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empathy were endorsed in over two thirds of the decisions. Anticipated affect and Reflective 
mood had lower frequencies but still featured in more than a third of all decisions. 
7.4.2.2  Themes – Types of affect 
7.4.2.2.1  Theme 1: Anticipatory affect: Immediate emotional reaction to stimuli  
Table 7.15  Interview extracts reflective of Anticipatory affect 
 
“…I felt pretty calm, I felt in control…”  
 
“Erm, quite, erm, well quite, quite comfortable with it really.” 
 
“Assertive.”  
 
“ …but then also a little bit of anger, erm, to the [patient] that was lying in the bed next door 
to us.”  
 
“…but just a sort of a sense of almost anxiety, like butterflies in your tummy, yeah, yeah.”  
 
“Err, stressed, and worried. Which is slightly different from stressed in a way. Erm, no I was 
very worried about him.”  
 
“…I think when you first, when this gentleman first came in, he, err, looked, err, he looked like 
he was about to die. Erm, so that was fairly, it’s that’s, that’s probably one of the most 
stressful situations…”   
 
All decisions elicited an immediate affective response.  In most cases there were affective 
reactions to an aspect of the patient presentation (e.g. physical appearance or symptoms), and in 
general this tended to initially arouse negative emotions such as “anxiety” and “stress”. 
However, doctors also described instantaneous feelings towards a number of sources in each 
decision, and these evoked both positive and negative anticipatory affect.    
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7.4.2.2.2  Theme 2: Affective climate: An assessment and processing of tone in the social 
environment   
Table 7.16  Interview extracts reflective of Affective climate 
 
 
“…because it’s obviously a shocking experience for anybody to come into, err, A&E resus, 
isn’t it? So suddenly you’ll be exposed to so many things which you don’t even think of in your 
normal day, right? So suddenly all these monitorings and ventilators and all this kind of stuff.”  
 
“A visual auditory information comes in to say, this is not a situation where it would be, you 
want to walk away from it, they’re, they’re struggling here. And you can just tell. There’s just 
an auditory difference to the department when it’s…there’s too much going on and you’re not 
quite in control to when it’s in control. You just know. More of an intuition that I’m not gonna 
walk away from this…”  
 
“And I suppose we spend a lot of our time as A&E [doctors] with our ears flapping, trying to, 
cos you can’t see every patient, but you’re desperately trying to work out ((laughs)) who you 
should be seeing, what’s going on in all these different rooms, and trying to just pick up…”   
  
“...usually if you have a colleague there, you would usually tend to be in agreement, so then it 
becomes just another pair of hands to help, but it was in some ways harder to have someone 
else there when their opinion didn’t necessarily chime with mine.”  
 
“…these kind of decisions are, are collaborative decisions, and, and I think that’s a, erm, an 
important concept in emergency medicine, and it’s one of the things that very often bails us out 
is that, erm, I wasn’t the only person in the room. There was, you know, a couple of other 
nurses, there’s other doctors around as well. And, erm, whilst it’s another field, it’s a, it’s a 
single person job, it’s… that’s not the atmosphere here “  
 
“So I guess I must have known that things were going the right route because everyone was… 
well there was no conflict between us so that’s probably an important thing. So, all of us there, 
all the doctors and the nurses were all in agreement, so none of us were disagreeing as to what 
should happen next, so that makes you relaxed and feel in control.”  
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In over two thirds of the decisions, doctors appeared to assess the affective tone in the social 
environment in which they carried out their clinical decisions and tasks. The way the patient’s 
family were responding to the clinical situation and setting, noise, movement and interaction 
within departments, and the interpersonal communication that took place between colleagues, 
all provided doctors with information relating to whether the climate felt harmonious or 
discordant, cooperative or antagonistic.  
 
7.4.2.2.3  Theme 3: Affective empathy: The consideration of someone else’s feelings 
7.4.2.2.3.1  Sub-theme 1: Empathy for others: A concern for and desire to reduce another’s 
distress 
Table 7.17  Interview extracts reflective of Empathy for others 
 
“The initial decision was, erm, err, you can’t see somebody rocking backwards and forwards, 
clearly in agony from something that you know is incredibly painful.”  
 
“So it’s sort of you’re, erm, basically, erm, I mean when you stop treatment of something you 
are actually taking the support of this [child] away, isn’t it?”  
 
“…it was the similarities in age with the patient, cos it was only a few years ago I was in that 
state, and you know things were so different for me.”  
 
“I felt so sorry for the family.”  
 
“…I hope that I gave my registrar more support than my consultant gave me.”  
 
“…but a big part of it was not wishing to expose a a newly qualified doctor to what could be a 
horrendous, potentially horrendous experience.”  
 
In a number of decisions, doctors’ concern for how others were feeling or might feel featured in 
their choices.  This prompted action with regard to how they managed patients and interacted 
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with the patient’s family.  It also impacted decisions regarding roles and responsibilities of 
members of the clinical team in treatment plans.       
 
7.4.2.2.3.2  Sub-theme 2: Self-empathy: A consideration of one’s own feelings of distress  
 Table 7.18  Interview extracts reflective of Self-empathy 
 
“Erm, if I if I’d got the call wrong, there was a significant chance she could die in the 
ambulance and there was no way, I thought, that should be on the conscience of a…of a baby 
doctor, so in the end I took her myself.”  
 
“…I suppose when I’m making these decisions I am thinking, if I don’t get this right this 
person could die, and then there would be, you know the burden of, of guilt and, erm, and the 
consequences to that person and their loved ones, and my own bereavement, you know, having 
met them and them, them dying…”  
 
 
There were examples when decisions which considered someone else’s distress also reduced the 
doctors own negative feelings. This seemed to occur when the doctor felt solely responsible for 
making a decision in which the outcome could mean that the patient lived or died.    
  
7.4.2.2.4  Theme 4: Anticipated affect: Judgements and behaviours driven by an individual’s 
consideration of how their current decisions or actions may make them feel in the future. 
Table 7.19  Interview extracts reflective of Anticipated affect 
 
“…I was apprehensive that the patient would wake up and say, ‘It was absolutely dreadful 
when my hands went numb and I couldn’t breathe…”   
 
“…he could have died here, and it would have been delayed. Erm, and I would, because I care 
about my patients, I would have felt dreadful.”  
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Table 7.19: continued   
 
 In approximately half of the decisions, doctors considered how their choices would make them 
feel in the future.  All anticipated affect was negative and tended to be in relation to how they 
would feel if their decision led to a negative outcome for the patient.  At least two doctors 
experienced negative anticipated affect when considering speaking to a clinical colleague about 
a patient.  When asked directly about whether they had considered their own future feelings 
when making the decision, in only 4 decisions did doctors describe anticipated affect.  In the 
majority of the other decisions, doctors stated they had not and in a few cases they explained 
that this was due to the uncertainty of the outcome. 
 
7.4.2.2.5  Theme 5: Reflective mood : Emotional states that occur when considering decisions 
that have been made  
 
 
 
“Yeah, I mean I keep, I keep thinking of what if, I think a lot of doctors do. I mean I was saying 
to myself, ‘What if I let him go home?’”  
 
“…I think we’re, we’re always, or at least I’m always, a little bit reticent about making 
contact because, you know, you want to ask a valid question and you don’t want to ask a stupid 
question. Erm, and so I guess whenever, before I phone… make a phone call like that I’m, I’m 
always thinking, ‘Is this something that’s valid, you know? Is this a reasonable thing to, to 
ask?’”  
 
“No I didn’t. No, no, cos there’s no point. You don’t know what’s gonna happen.”  
 
“No, I don’t think so. There were too many unknowns at that stage, you know. I didn’t know 
what was going to happen to him. I didn’t know how the next few hours were going to go, so I 
wasn’t, I wasn’t really thinking about how I was gonna feel. I was thinking about what I was 
going to do, but I didn’t think about how I was gonna feel.”  
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Table 7.20  Interview extracts reflective of Reflective mood   
 
“Err, but, err, when you have some time to yourself, like my time for myself is when I’m 
driving home… like I have a good half an hour, forty minutes, or maybe an hour, so things you 
did during the day will be coming back to you. Err, if you did something good, extremely good, 
you’ll be very happy that day. If you’re going home full of joy, err, and contentment, err, you’d 
think that, err, ‘Oh you’ve done all the right things and you’ve saved lives,’ that sort of feeling. 
But, err, sometimes you could as well, like on a bad day, you could think, ‘What else could I 
have probably done to get a better outcome?’”  
 
“…But I found, I found that very, I found him a very, err, memorable patient, you know and, 
yes, sort of you do a lot of soul searching afterwards and talk to colleagues…”  
 
“You always reflect upon these situations. Erm, and, erm, you think, what, what might we have 
done differently? So I think everybody reflects upon them, err, when you are in a critical 
situation. I mean you know them, so you, err… I think that’s why in a way quite often, erm, the 
emergency cases, you, you, you get more experience because you remember them and you 
remember how things went and how you were feeling. You think about how you reflect on it 
and what you might have done differently, and erm, and then you put that into practice, in 
another, in another event.”  
 
A number of doctors described how the decision remained in their thoughts after their role in 
the patient’s care had ceased.  This most often involved the use of decisional “what ifs?” which 
resulted in negative mood and tended to occur when there had been a bad outcome or when 
there had been some conflict with a colleague or team.  
 
7.4.3  Discrete emotions 
7.4.3.1  Frequency of discrete emotions 
The frequency of the type of discrete emotions that doctors recalled they had felt in the 31 
decision points is shown in Table 7.21.  As illustrated, the positive feelings of 
“calm/relaxed/comfortable” and the negative feelings of “anxiety/nervous/uneasy” had the most 
endorsements and both featured in 7 of the decisions.  The negative feeling of being 
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“stressed/pressured” featured in 5 decisions. While there were a number of other discrete 
emotions, these were only endorsed in 1 decision. The list of all discrete emotions is provided in 
appendix J.  In general, doctors tended to experience more negative emotions than positive 
emotions when making diagnostic and case management decisions in emergency care. 
 
Table 7.21  Frequency of discrete emotions across decisions in response to the  
question: Can you recall exactly how you were feeling at this point? 
Emotion Total 
calm/relaxed/comfortable 7 
anxiety/nervous/uneasy 7 
stressed/pressured 5 
in control 3 
satisfied/contentment 3 
anger/cross/irritation 3 
worried/concern 2 
fatigued/exhausted 2 
sad 2 
letting down 2 
 
7.4.4  Did affect play a role in decision making?  
The frequency of response from doctors across 31 decisions when asked the question, “Did 
these emotions affect the decisions you made?” is displayed in Table 7.22.  As illustrated, while 
affect was not felt to have influenced decisions in 17 of the 31 decisions, in 13 decisions, 
doctors felt that affect had or may have had an influence on their judgements.  
Table 7.22  Response across 31 decisions to the question: Did these emotions affect  
the decision you made? 
Response Total 
Yes 8 
May have 5 
No 17 
Note: Due to time constraints one decision was not interrogated using this question  
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Table 7.23  Interview extracts where it was considered affect did influence decision 
 making when asked: Did these emotions affect the decision you made? 
 
“Erm, err, yes I expect it did, because I suspect that five years ago I probably wouldn’t have 
felt that calm and I might have run around looking for someone else to do that patient, 
knowing that they were a critical patient.” (calm) 
 
“I think they helped me make a better decision, because when I think of bad decisions I’ve 
made, they’ve usually been when I’ve been distracted, busy…” (calm and slow) 
 
“Yeah, I mean I think, erm, I think I was able to erm, discharge my duties properly because, 
erm, I felt in a safe environment with the support of, erm, the nursing colleague who I had 
with me…” (comfortable) 
 
“Yes, I think, I think I’m not that much assertive and I needed to be assertive at that point…” 
(assertive) 
 
“…there probably were emotions involved, because if I had done it completely, err, like a 
machine then I would have just said right, ‘Well the policy is this, you should be admitted…’ 
Erm, and, and I think maybe because I had a bit of rapport with him, because I felt empathy 
for his viewpoint, erm, and because I thought the risks were, were low, erm, I didn’t really, 
kind of, press that. Erm, and I think I certainly felt some part of that decision was to do with, 
the, the kind of how I was feeling, in terms of how I related to him and how I felt about his 
decision, rather than just about the cold facts.” (rapport with patient) 
 
“I think that only, the only emotion that affected my decision was fear of having, err, a lot of 
conflict with this person in [dept]” (fear, stressed, and worried) 
 
“It kind of prompted me to do something active, to make sure the patient was getting 
helped.” (upset and letting down patient’s family) 
 
“Even the clear cut decision I’m used to making was compromised at every step, taking a lot 
of time, I was feeling worn out, I wasn’t making clean decisions that I would normally make. 
They were here and there. I was just… I wasn’t dedicating myself to the situation or to my 
decisions. So I think emotions were just kind of infringing on my decision making to be 
honest.” (pressured) 
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In the 8 decisions where affect was considered to have influenced decision making, positive 
affect such as feeling “calm”, “comfortable” and “assertive” was generally considered to have 
improved judgement by facilitating a focused approach to the decisions and actions that were 
required.  The only exception to this was that one doctor considered that the empathy they felt 
for the patient and their wishes, which was elicited because of the rapport they had with the 
patient, contributed to them deviating from admission policy.  In contrast, negative affect such 
as feeling “stressed” and “pressured” or “fear” was regarded as being a barrier to clear and 
timely decision making.  However, if the doctor felt that they were “letting down” the patient or 
their family, this often was associated with prompting them to actively seek the information 
they needed to make a diagnosis or decide on the most appropriate treatment plan.    
Table 7.24  Interview extracts where it was considered affect may have influenced  
decision making when asked: Did these emotions affect the decision you made? 
    
Where it was considered that affect may have influenced decision making, “anxiety” and 
“concern” were perceived to have led to more careful judgements.  One doctor felt that “anger”  
 
“No, I don’t think so. I think it just made me think about things very carefully.” (anxious) 
 
“Err, well only in the sense that, you know, I was very anxious about making… well not 
very anxious, but I didn’t, I didn’t want to make the…I wanted to make what I thought was 
the best decision and I was trying to decide what the best decision was.” (concern)  
 
“Erm, maybe. It’s difficult to answer that. Erm, I try not to get too emotional at work. It can 
have a positive effect on what you’re doing. So erm, yeah, especially if they’re strong 
emotions, they might push you into doing something or speaking to people that you 
wouldn’t normally go and talk to.” (irritation and anger) 
 
“You know sometimes, that maybe yes, maybe that held me back, because I was quite calm 
in my mind that I’d thought of all the options and I knew the proc… and we’re gonna do 
this, this, or if not, we’re gonna do that. And maybe if I’d thought there was another thing 
we could do, I wouldn’t have been.” (calm) 
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directed and motivated action, while another discussed how experiencing a sense of being 
“calm” might have prevented them from considering all the possible management options.     
Table 7.25  Interview extracts where it was considered affect did not influence 
 decision making when asked: Did these emotions affect the decision you made? 
 
“Err, I don’t remember them being involved at all in the decision. Erm, but presumably 
when you’re in control of a situation then you’re able to weigh things up and be objective. 
Whereas, possibly if you’re not in control, and feel like you’re floundering, or there’s other 
external pressures on you then, you might start making decisions which, erm, become 
subjective, so they’re just how you feel at the time due to the stuff around you.” (calm and 
in control) 
 
“No, no, no. It’s a…it’s a pretty…it sounds a bit clinical really, but it is a clinical decision. 
It’s just, you know, emotions don’t come in. In fact you don’t really feel those emotions 
until after and you start… because generally, and it’s probably the right thing really, is you 
don’t really hear the full story about why it happened until after it’s all happened…” (anger 
and sadness) 
 
“No. Not at all, no. Erm, no. You know there is… no. It’s kind of decision that I, that I make 
routinely, routinely every day. Erm, and it’s something that I’m not sure we’re taught how 
to do, but it’s certainly it’s a feature I think of ED doctors to make those kind of decisions 
fairly rapidly and to sort of try to sort of balance, balance quite a lot of balls and multi-task 
a bit.” (stressed) 
 
“I don’t think they were strong enough to make me. They’re there and I’m aware that they 
exist, but they’re not overpowering emotions…not to make you cry, make you growl, make 
you shout, sort of emotions…” (anger, cross, and sadness) 
 
“I don’t think so. I mean I wasn’t…I mean I don’t think I was… I wasn’t overly anxious or, 
you know, sometimes nervousness can cause you to ((inaudible)) it quite a lot, and I kind of, 
give you a bit of you know, you get a bit paralyzed in decision making, but I don’t feel I got 
to that stage at least at any point.” (nervous) 
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Table 7.25: Continued.   
 
“Err, so I started to say that but then I decided that because I was aware of the emotions and, I 
therefore decided, actually, no, let’s… you know, this isn’t such a life and death decision that it 
has to be made today, it can, it can wait.” (uneasy) 
 
In general, the decisions where doctors believed that affect had not influenced decision making 
usually involved negative emotions.  When doctors explained why they felt that affect had not 
influenced decision making, they tended to assert that clinical decision making was a rational 
and objective process that involved weighing up clinical facts and choices, or that the emotions 
that were elicited were not powerful enough to impact judgement.  One doctor discussed how an 
awareness of the potential impact of their feelings on their interaction with a patient actually 
caused them to reassess and change the advice they gave.     
 
 
7.5  Discussion 
The aim of study 5 was to identify the emotional features of diagnostic and case management 
decision making in emergency care through doctors’ own accounts of decision making 
strategies used in real-life clinical incidents.  It also attempted to identify the discrete emotions 
which were important in emergency care decision making and assessed to what extent doctors’ 
perceived that emotional factors influenced the decisions they made.  
 
7.5.1  What were the sources of affect that featured in emergency care decision making?  
The 8 sources of affect that featured in diagnostic and case management decision making 
reflected the emotionally-charged nature of emergency care.  Sources ranged from physical and 
circumstantial details of the case presentations to tangible and psycho-social aspects of the 
clinical setting.  The affective values of the sources were generated through the reactions and 
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interactions of doctors while working with others within their immediate clinical environments 
and the broader organisation.  This demonstrates the influence of social factors in clinical 
decision making and further supports the need to understand the role of social-based emotion in 
decision making as well as the role of individual emotion-based responses (Van Kleef et al., 
2012). 
 
7.5.2  What types of affect featured in emergency care decision making?  
The 5 types of affect that emerged from the analysis suggested that the types of affect in 
diagnostic and case management decisions were complex and involved the generation and 
processing of feelings at both an individual and social level.  While individual types of affect 
concerned visceral feedback about one’s own affective reactions and states, social types of 
affect concerned visceral feedback that informed the doctor about the affective tone of the 
clinical situation or someone else’s affective reaction or state.   
 
Affective valence and arousal experienced at an individual level included anticipatory affect, 
and to a lesser extent, anticipated affect.  While incidental mood was not a type of affect that 
featured when the interview data was analysed, a number of doctors did discuss a reflective 
mood which took place after the incident.  This occurred when doctors were considering the 
decisions that had been made.  They described how this affective state was related to positive or 
negative feelings that were generally dependent on the patient outcome or an aspect of team 
work.  The use of counterfactuals, in which the doctors imagined how different decisions may 
have produced different outcomes, was regarded as being a natural part of an experiential 
process and pivotal to learning for future practice.  This supports the view that counterfactual 
thinking plays an important role in the improvement of performance and behaviour (Baumeister 
et al., 2007b; Epstude & Roese, 2008). 
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Affective valence and arousal at a social level included 2 main types of affect.  Affective 
climate reflected doctors’ recollection of a processing of affective information from another 
person, the clinical team, or the environment, that often signified to them whether the clinical 
situation was calm and controlled or tense and uncontrolled.  Doctors used this type of affective 
processing to gather information to determine what action was required or whether judgements 
seemed appropriate or needed re-appraising.  This supports work which suggests that emotional 
climate is an affective phenomenon which influences behaviour in clinical settings (Nurok et 
al., 2011). 
 
Affective empathy reflected doctors’ consideration of patients’ or colleagues’ distress when 
making decisions.  However, while most literature on empathy in doctors has tended to focus on 
its role in doctor-patient relationship interaction and outcomes (Bellini et al, 2002; Neumann, et 
al., 2011), this study demonstrated that empathy for colleagues also influenced judgement. 
Therefore, research should also focus on the role that empathy between members of a clinical 
team has on decision making and case management.  Some accounts of empathy also included 
decisions where the desire to reduce someone else’s distress was linked to the reduction of their 
own negative feelings with regard to their responsibility for the outcome.  This is an interesting 
finding which may be explained by the empathy-altruism hypothesis (Bateson, 1991, 1994). 
This suggests that empathy may be motivated by a desire to reduce someone else’s distress (e.g. 
altruism) or the desire to reduce your own distress (e.g. egoism).  These social types of affect 
provide further support for the Emotions as Social Information Model (EASI: Van Kleef, 2009; 
Van Kleef et al, 2010) and provides evidence that others’ emotions are taken into consideration 
when making judgements.  
 
7.5.3  What discrete emotions featured in emergency care decision making?  
When doctors were directly asked if they could recall how they were feeling at the decision 
point, both positive and negative emotions featured.  The most frequently reported positive and 
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negative emotions represented opposite affective states and often reflected the stage of the 
presentation that the decision was made, the experience and knowledge of the doctor, or their 
interaction with colleagues.  Doctors often discussed feeling “calm”, “relaxed” or “comfortable” 
when they had a diagnosis or clear treatment plan, or conveyed a sense of confidence in their 
own ability or in the ability and support of other clinical colleagues.  In contrast, doctors stated 
that they felt, “anxiety”, “nervous”, or “uneasy” when they were unsure of the diagnosis, had 
not established a clear treatment strategy, were highly aware of the possibility of a bad outcome, 
or were in conflict with a colleague or another clinical specialty.  This corroborates the findings 
from studies 2-4 which suggest that nervous may be an important emotion in a clinical context. 
 
In general, negative emotions were recalled slightly more often than positive emotions. This 
may have been due to the nature of the case presentations in emergency care. However, it is 
arguable that emotions such as anxiety, stressed, anger and worried may produce stronger 
visceral feelings than the positive emotions, calm, in control and satisfied. Therefore, the 
negative emotionality experienced during the incident may have been more readily reactivated 
when recalling the feelings that were experienced during decision making, and may be 
explained by the “vividness effect” (Nisbett & Ross, 1980).  
 
This suggests that emergency care doctors experience high arousal of negative emotions during 
diagnostic and case management decisions. As chronic levels of negative emotions such as 
stress  have been related to burnout in doctors (Shirom, Nirel, & Vinikur, 2006), it is important 
that interventions are developed to lessen the impact of sources of negative affect that are 
neither purposeful or conducive to optimal diagnostic and case management decision making. 
Anxiety or a sense of uneasiness may be an appropriate and natural initial response to not 
knowing the diagnosis, not having a clear treatment plan, or being aware of potential risks and 
therefore may not be readily amenable to change. However, anxiety and uneasiness that stems 
from conflict between colleagues and specialties elicit unnecessary negative affect that may be 
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damaging to doctors and result in hesitant and less assertive decision making. This study 
provides evidence that conflict between colleagues and specialties features in diagnostic and 
treatment decisions. This emphasises the importance of devising strategies to help improve 
relationships by increasing collaboration and the sense of shared responsibility between health 
professionals when caring for patients.       
       
7.5.4  To what extent were emotional factors perceived to influence decision making in 
emergency care and what is their role?  
Emotional factors were perceived to have influenced, or possibly influenced decision making in 
13 of the 31 decisions.  In general, positive emotions (e.g. calm, comfortable and relaxed) and in 
some cases, negative emotions (e.g. nervous, anxiety and uneasy) were believed to have helped 
the doctor to focus on specific details of the patient presentation or on clinical tasks and led to 
more considered decision making.  These emotions came from a variety of sources and often 
involved anticipatory affect or the processing of affective climate.  This suggests that doctors’ 
feelings played a role in the features and actions that were deemed salient, and indicates that 
doctors were using affect as an attentional spotlight (Loewenstein et al., 2001; Peters et al., 
2006).  Interview data also showed how some doctors considered negative anticipated affect or 
affective empathy during case management and treatment decisions.  They also spoke of how 
reflective mood was used as learning to guide and improve future decisions. This suggests that 
doctors use their current feelings, consideration of how they would feel, or the recollection of 
feelings from incidents that remained vivid in their memory, to guide their choices and supports 
the role of affect as information (Schwarz & Clore, 1983).  
 
These findings also reflect contrasting research findings where positive affect (Isen et al., 1991) 
and negative affect (Avramova & Stapel, 2008) have both been found to be conducive to 
optimal decision making.  However, these discrepant findings might be explained by the 
propensity to base findings on valence rather than discrete emotions.  It may be that it is specific 
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emotions rather than valence that produce processes that assist or hinder decision making 
(Lerner & Keltner, 2000).  The importance of disentangling the specific contribution that 
discrete emotions have on decision making is further supported in this study.  While the 
negative emotions of anger and upset were considered to prompt action in seeking help for the 
patient, fear resulted in hesitation or avoidance to seek the help and advice from colleagues.  
This finding supports the idea that affect motivates choice-based behaviour (Lerner & Keltner, 
2000, 2001).     
 
In 17 of the 31 decisions, doctors perceived that emotions had not influenced decision making. 
In a number of cases this seemed to reflect a view that diagnostic and case management decision 
making were purely rational acts in which emotion did not feature.  In others’ decisions it 
seemed to support the notion that the intensity of the affect was not felt to have been sufficiently 
high to exert an influence on choice and behaviour.  Interestingly, in terms of anticipated affect, 
the response by some doctors that the uncertainty of the outcome meant that they did not 
consider their future feelings, provides support for the disjunction effect which suggests that 
uncertainty blunts both the thoughts concerning outcomes and any emotions related to this 
(Tversky & Shafir, 1992).  
 
The accounts of decisions in which doctors answered that they did not think that emotion 
influenced their decisions, were mostly in reference to negative emotions.  This may indicate an 
assumption that negative emotions are associated with bad decisions and outcomes and merits 
further investigation.  The fact that the decisions when doctors did not believe affect influenced 
their judgements when explicitly asked, often did include examples of affect-based judgements 
in their account, may reflect a reluctance to acknowledge a role for affect in clinical decision 
making. It may also be due to the fact that the influence of affect is not always a conscious 
process and therefore doctors were not always able to reflect on the role of affect in the 
decisions they made.  
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7.5.5  Limitations 
There are a number of limitations to this study.  While the decisions that are described in this 
research are based on real-life incidents, the fact that they rely on memory may mean that the 
facts recalled may be inaccurate.  As CDM incorporates a methodical and meticulous scrutiny 
of incidents and decision points, this may have assisted in eliciting reliable and comprehensive 
accounts.  Similarly, it may be that accounts that were recalled were incidents that were 
exceptional because they evoked powerful emotions in the doctors, and therefore their 
emotionality made these incidents salient (Nisbett & Ross, 1980).  This may mean that the 
incidents did not reflect the typical emotions that are experienced on a day-to-day basis. 
Furthermore, the memory of powerful emotions may have caused doctors to forget the more 
subtle feelings they also experienced before, during or after the decision. It is also important to 
acknowledge that when doctors recalled decision points they spoke about both the specific 
decision and also sometimes discussed their general feelings and emotional implications for 
their own overall clinical practice.  As more general statements were part of a longer dialogue 
about specific decision points and were provided when doctors were asked to discuss a 
particular decision, these statements were included in the extracts if they were considered to be 
authentic reflections which added clarity and resonance in understanding the role of emotion in 
diagnostic and case management. Therefore some of the extracts included relate to reflections 
on their more general decision making strategies than the specific decision points discussed in 
the interview.      
 
Other biases may have occurred due to the method and analytic strategy.  The participants may 
have felt social desirability pressures which may have been reflected in their responses to 
questions. Furthermore, the finding that incidental affect did not feature as a type of affect may 
have been due to the fact that doctors were not directly questioned about how they felt before 
becoming involved in the incident.  The aim of this research was to identify sources and types 
of affect in diagnostic and case management decisions.  However, in order to control the 
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possibility of subjective inferences, the strategy of only coding segments of transcripts that 
made explicit reference to emotion and feelings will have omitted the cognitive processes 
involved in the decisions doctors made and may have resulted in a biased representation. It is 
also important to note that due to the fact that a deductive strategy generally informed the 
themes for types of affect, the coding of text indicated two further types of affect (affective 
climate and affective empathy). The analysis is therefore still in the early stages and these two 
types of affect still need to undergo a process of clustering codes and validation with co-authors 
before any further dissemination of the findings.   
 
Finally, the REC condition of the inclusion of a disclosure policy may have had implications for 
the study. Confidentiality and anonymity are important issues for participants in qualitative 
research (Murphy et al., 1998).  It is possible that as the study invitation letters and information 
sheet alerted doctors to the disclosure policy, this may have dissuaded some doctors from 
participating.  Similarly, due to this, doctors who did participate may have felt unable to openly 
discuss any errors or negative outcomes that occurred due to the decisions and this may have led 
to restricted or incomplete accounts.  
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CHAPTER 8 
THESIS SUMMARY 
  
8.1  Introduction 
The key objective of this research was to identify some of the affective influences in the 
diagnostic decision making process and to explore the role that affect played in diagnostic 
judgement.  This chapter presents a summary of the main contributions of the findings to the 
thesis aims and considers the general limitations of the research.  It concludes with a discussion 
of the implications and recommendations for clinical practice and future research.  
 
 
8.2  Summary of findings 
This section discusses how the key findings from the research inform each of the thesis aims. 
 
8.2.1  Aim 1: To bring together two literatures to explain the potential role of affect in 
diagnostic decision making 
The review of literature from both within and outside healthcare provided an overview of the 
current understanding of the role of affect in diagnostic decision making and highlighted the 
gaps in knowledge.  In particular it illustrated how knowledge could be derived from research 
outside healthcare, and that dual process models of decision making would be helpful in 
understanding the role of affect in diagnostic decision making.  It also suggested that the 
identification of the sources and types of affect in diagnostic decision making would assist in 
understanding the processing of affective factors and how affect influences outcomes. It also 
informed the research plan for the thesis.  In particular, it suggested that there was a need to:  
develop and test methods for conducting research to examine the role of emotion in diagnostic 
decision making; to understand and explain the main sources and types of affect that influence 
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diagnostic decision making and the interplay between them; to identify the discrete emotions 
(e.g. anger, happiness etc.) that feature in diagnostic decision making and consider their role; to 
examine the relationships between affect and perceptions of team factors that are critical for 
effective clinical decision making;  to explore to what extent healthcare professionals are able to 
reflect on the role of affect in the decisions they make.  
  
8.2.2  Aim 2: To develop and test methods for conducting research to examine the role of affect 
in diagnostic decision making 
This research has highlighted the difficulties of examining diagnostic decision making.  
Decision making which accomplishes an accurate diagnosis which leads to the most appropriate 
management has been difficult to assess as this would have required complex studies which 
examined all stages of diagnostic decision making, from information gathering, to information 
integration and information implementation.  In particular, the methodological issues that 
emerged during study 2 (see section 5.1) suggested that a focus on accuracy as an outcome (e.g. 
whether the facts or diagnosis are correct) in the study was problematic.  This was due to the 
static nature of the decision making task which did not enable participants to progress beyond 
the information gathering stage and therefore did not reflect that real decision making is 
dependent on feedback from all diagnostic stages.  
 
The design of study 3 was more successful in capturing the dynamic nature of diagnostic 
decision making by focusing on specific processes involved in the initial stage of information 
gathering and identifying where deviations in processes occurred.  Likewise, study 4 used 
simulation to examine what type of affect was perceived to be associated with team 
communication behaviour which is an important skill for the sharing of diagnostic and case 
management information.  These studies demonstrated that in trying to explain how and why 
affect has played a part in clinical processes, and the possible implications for diagnosis (e.g. 
delayed/missed diagnosis), a focus on the specific processes that are critical to a particular 
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diagnostic stage, may be more informative than a more static approach with an emphasis on 
diagnostic accuracy.  
 
The active involvement in, or recollection of clinical scenarios were useful ways to elicit affect 
and identify the affective factors involved in diagnostic decision making.  However, while 
clinical scenarios formed the basis of all the research studies, they were either asking doctors or 
nurses and allied health professions to respond to written or simulated scenarios, or the 
recollection of incidents from memory.  Due to this, it is possible that the emotional responses 
that were elicited or recalled were not an accurate reflection of those experienced during real-
time diagnostic decision making. Incorporating observational or diary methods into diagnostic 
decision making research may help to overcome this in future research. 
 
Findings across all studies suggested that there may be important specific emotions in clinical 
practice.  While there are reliable and validated measures of emotion (Thompson, 2007; Watson 
& Clarke, 1994), these may not be sensitive to the particular emotions that are critical in 
diagnostic decision making.  As the importance of understanding the role of discrete emotions 
in decision making is supported (Lerner & Keltner, 2000; Van Kleef et al., 2012), and this 
research demonstrated the need to use brief measures in research with healthcare professionals, 
there is now a need to develop shorter and more accurate measures of emotions for future 
research examining affective factors which are specific to healthcare professionals in a clinical 
setting.  These are discussed further in section 8.2.4. 
 
Finally, this research demonstrated how a mixed methods approach was vital to understanding 
and explaining the complex affective features involved in diagnostic decision making.  Dual 
process models of decision making (Epstein, 1994; Loewenstein et al., 2001) were fundamental 
to the theoretical framework of this thesis, and have already been applied to diagnostic 
reasoning to help construct theoretical accounts of the role of affect in the diagnostic process 
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(Croskerry, 2009a, 2009b; Elstein, 1999, 2009; Elstein & Schwarz, 2002; Norman, 2009).  The 
review presented in chapter 2, and the research presented in chapters 4 to 7, demonstrate that 
existing dual process models are currently too general and account for the impact of any 
affective state from a range of sources.  Due to this they fail to capture the specific sources and 
types of affect that play a role in diagnostic decision making and the distinct interplay between 
them.  While it may be tempting to test causal models of decision making, it is important to 
acknowledge that most of the current decision making knowledge is from studies outside of 
healthcare.  A more worthwhile, relevant and cost-effective approach may be to draw upon and 
learn from further qualitative studies which have the unique capability of setting and 
understanding diagnostic decision making within the context in which it takes place.  The 
knowledge obtained can then be used to develop more specific and informed models and 
hypotheses which can be tested using quantitative methods (Barbour, 2000, Morse, 2007).    
           
8.2.3  Aim 3: What are the main sources and types of affect that influence diagnostic decision 
making and what is the interplay between them? 
The findings across the studies in this thesis revealed that the sources and types of affect 
involved in diagnostic decision making may be more complex than first thought and involved 
the generation and processing of feelings at both an individual and social level (Van Kleef, 
2009).  While anticipatory and anticipated types of affect appear to be supported, the role of 
incidental mood was not apparent, and may be due to the lack of sensitivity in the measures 
used.  Instead, a role for a more reflective mood that was directly related to decision making 
emerged, as well as the social types of emotion of affective climate and affective empathy. 
While affect emanated from many complex physical and psycho-social sources, team factors 
emerged as an extremely important source of affect and highlighted the need to acknowledge 
and understand the affective reactions to team factors (Annett et al., 2000; Annett and Stanton, 
2000).  However, team sources appeared to be part of the feelings that were generated from 
interpersonal factors, which further highlights the multifarious and complicated nature of affect. 
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To some extent, the findings on the influence of affect on decision making from outside 
healthcare were replicated in an applied, real-life healthcare setting.  Sources of affect elicited 
affective responses which then appeared to exert their influence on diagnostic and case 
management decision making.  For example, in study 3 when choosing actions to obtain a 
diagnosis, more doctors in the negative affect conditions than doctors in the positive affect 
conditions chose to examine the patient first, while more doctors in the positive affect 
conditions than doctors in the negative affect conditions chose to order tests first.  This 
suggested that doctors in a more negative affective state were basing diagnostic decisions on a 
more systematic and detailed gathering of clinical information.  These findings support the need 
to distinguish affect and emotion (Baumeister et al., 2007a) in diagnostic decision making.   
 
Affect also appeared to facilitate a rational assessment of relevant and non-relevant information 
(Peters et al., 2006; Slovic et al., 2005) by acting as a spotlight (Loewenstein et al., 2001; Peters 
et al., 2006), as information (Schwarz & Clore, 1983) and as a motivator (Lerner & Keltner, 
2000, 2001) for diagnostic and case management decision making and behaviour.  For example, 
in study 5, doctors discussed how feeling “calm” or “anxious” led them to focus on a particular 
patient feature or to be particularly attentive to an aspect of the task they were carrying out.  
They described how considering how a clinical situation might make a colleague feel, or how 
they might feel in the future, informed choices about treatment and management decisions.  
Doctors also explained how feeling “angry” or “upset” prompted them to seek further advice in 
order to diagnose or treat the patient.  However, affect also evoked less desirable feelings which 
appeared to be involved in less optimal judgement-based action.  This further supports the idea 
that dependent on other factors such as context, situation, and experience, affect may impact 
clinical decision making in both positive and negative ways (Croskerry et al., 2010; Croskerry 
& Tait, 2013).     
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8.2.4  Aim 4: What are the discrete emotions that feature in diagnostic decision making and 
what is their role? 
The importance of gaining knowledge about the role of discrete emotions in decision making 
(Lerner & Keltner, 2000; Van Kleef, 2009; Van Kleef et al., 2010) was evident in this research. 
Three studies (studies 2 to 4) found that the positive emotions, alert, determined, attentive and 
the negative emotion of nervous were more highly aroused in comparison to other emotions in 
response to written or simulated clinical scenarios.  While the experimental and correlational 
approaches suggested that these emotions may play a central role when health professionals are 
responding to emergency care incidents, they were unable to elucidate what the role of these 
emotions might be.  However, findings from study 5 indicated that feeling nervous was a 
response to uncertainty, risk and conflict and prompted doctors to be more careful and focused 
during decision making and clinical tasks.  Furthermore, feeling, calm, relaxed or comfortable 
was associated with certainty, confidence, and feeling supported, Interestingly, alert, determined 
and attentive were not referred to as feeling states during interviews with doctors, and merits 
further investigation.   
 
In studies 2 and 3, the relationship between confidence and speed of decision making appeared 
to be moderated by clinical experience which supports previous research (Croskerry, 2009a; 
Woolley & Kostopoulou, 2013).  Specific emotions were also found to motivate behaviour 
during the diagnostic process.  In study 3, it was found that doctors who chose to examine an 
angry and abusive patient first when choosing information gathering options, also had higher 
levels of hostility, and in study 5, anger and upset were perceived to encourage behaviours such 
as actively seeking help or advice from colleague.  This suggests that anger and hostility 
prompted approach behaviours (Lerner & Keltner, 2000, 2001).  Conversely, fear prompted 
avoidance behaviour (Lerner & Keltner, 2000, 2001) which manifested itself in hesitation to 
seek help and advice from colleagues.  The feeling of fear in medical students appeared to be 
associated with the notion of interaction with a senior clinical colleague and the feeling of being 
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afraid was higher for nurses in comparison to doctors during simulated scenarios.  This suggests 
that fear is an emotion that may be experienced by junior health care professionals or nurses or 
allied health professions during team tasks.  As this may impact communication (Kish-Gephart., 
et al., 2009) it is important that future research examines the causes and effects of fear in 
clinical teams.   
 
Finally, the intensity of feeling seemed to influence decision making. In study 5, there was 
evidence that for some doctors anticipated affect did not play a role due to the “disjunction 
effect” (Tversky & Shafir, 1992), which causes individuals to have a blunted consideration of 
what might happen and a dulling of any related emotional response, due to the uncertainty of the 
outcome.  In study 4, doctors and nurses or allied health professions were found to experience 
different levels of intensity for specific emotions during simulated scenarios.  As the level of 
arousal of emotions such as anger has been implicated in risk taking (Pezza Leith & Baumeister, 
1996), further studies should examine whether there are consistent differences in the emotional 
arousal of anger in different health professions during teamwork and establish the causes.          
 
8.2.5  Aim 5: What are the relationships between affect and perceptions of team factors that are 
critical for effective clinical decision making?   
A sense that there was cooperation and low individual negative feeling was related to 
perceptions of high engagement in communication behaviour and team effectiveness in 
simulated scenarios.  The pivotal role that perceived cooperation played in team communication 
was corroborated in the accounts of many doctors in study 5.  Many doctors placed great 
importance on working with supportive colleagues and recalled that this was crucial for gaining 
feedback and reassurance for diagnosis and case management decisions, as well as the building 
of trust in the undertaking of clinical roles and responsibilities.  In contrast, when doctors felt 
there was conflict between colleagues, this was perceived to be unhelpful to delivering safe and 
optimal care for the patient and resulted in negative emotions that on some occasions caused 
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hesitant behaviour.  These findings support literature which suggests that cooperation is 
important for the fostering of effective team communication and behaviour and implies that 
social, as well as individual affect influences perceptions of team communication and 
performance (Van Doorn et al., 2012; Van Kleef, 2009). 
 
8.2.6  Aim 6: To what extent are healthcare professionals able to reflect on the role of affect in  
the decisions they make?  
The accounts of reflective mood and the explanations that doctors provided about how affect 
had influenced decision making in study 5, suggest that some doctors do reflect on the role of 
affect in diagnostic decision making after clinical incidents.  However, the level to which they 
associate clinical decisions with affective responses during clinical practice could not be 
established and was much more difficult to gauge.  More decisions were perceived to have not 
been influenced by affect than those that were, and there was some evidence that this was due to 
the traditional perception that clinical decision making is a wholly rational process (Croskerry et 
al., 2008, 2010; Pani & Chariker, 2004; Parker & Lawton, 2003).  Doctors also appeared more 
reluctant to acknowledge that the negative emotions that they felt had an impact on their 
decisions and may have been due to the belief that negative emotions were related to less 
optimal clinical outcomes.  
 
 
8.3  Limitations 
The limitations of each study have already been highlighted in the discussion sections of 
Chapters 5-7.  However, there were also general limitations that applied to this research. 
Recruitment for studies 1 to 3 was lower than anticipated despite utilising a number of 
recruitment methods.  This may have been due to the inconvenience of having to access a laptop 
or computer to complete the questionnaire, or that the completion of the diagnostic tasks and 
measures of affect were perceived to be lengthy and burdensome.  Alternatively, it may be that 
                                                                                                                 
205 
 
the focus on non-rational aspects of clinical decision making may not have been perceived to be 
meaningful patient safety research and led to some difficulty in engaging healthcare 
professionals (Leistikow, 2011).  While many parametric techniques are able to tolerate issues 
such as non-normal distribution, low sample sizes are more likely to produce skewed 
distribution of scores which should be considered when appraising the results.   
 
The research in this thesis was driven by the belief that in order to explore diagnostic decision 
making, studies must be conducted with doctors and health care professionals that recreate the 
real-life clinical scenarios in which they make judgements.  However, the applied nature of this 
research produced several challenges.  The time constraints of health professionals meant that 
measures had to be as brief as possible.  While the need for brevity and minimal burden for 
participants is a pre-requisite in many research studies, this resulted in the use of less extensive 
and possibly less sensitive measures of emotion, such as the I-PANAS-SF (Thompson, 2007). 
Research with healthcare professionals often requires participation to take place on their site of 
work.  This meant that a more complex examination of the level of affective arousal using 
physiological measures of the autonomic nervous system (ANS: e.g. heart rate) or galvanic skin 
response (GSR) was not practical or feasible in this research.  Access to sophisticated research 
resources such as simulation centres are extremely difficult to negotiate within the financial and 
time constraints of postgraduate research.  The use of simulation in study 4 would not have been 
possible without the valuable input and support of health professionals and medical education 
staff.  This took over a year to negotiate and plan and was only possible if it could be conducted 
using pre-developed simulated scenarios and caused minimal disruption to the simulation course 
and its participants. Therefore, the design and measures in the study were subject to these 
constraints.      
 
The ethical considerations of research conducted in healthcare are a crucial component of good 
research practice and ensuring the welfare of participants (Murphy et al., 1998; Pope & Mays, 
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2006).  While Research Ethics Committees and Trust R&D departments recognised the 
importance of this area of research and were supportive of its undertaking, the time required to 
obtain research and study amendment approvals was a serious barrier within the time constraints 
of the research period. This meant that boosting participant recruitment through the inclusion of 
other Acute NHS Trusts was not a feasible option. 
 
 
8.4  Implications and recommendations 
8.4.1  Clinical practice and patient safety 
There are a number of recommendations for clinical practice. System innovations, such as the 
introduction of decision making tools to improve diagnosis (Ramnarayan et al., 2006) suggest 
that a systems approach to reducing any affect-based factors that may be implicated in 
diagnostic error may produce effective strategies (Graber et al., 2002; Newman-Toker & 
Pronovost, 2009).  However, there is also an acknowledgement that while such approaches may 
assist and support the diagnostic process, unique patient presentations and evolving clinical 
contexts mean that health professionals, will to some extent, always have to make decisions 
using their own reasoning strategies.  
 
If the unconscious, fast and effortless nature of system 1 is implicated in error, then 
hypothetically, errors can be overcome through educational and de-biasing strategies 
(Croskerry, 2002, 2003; Graber, 2009). This assumes that in all clinical situations, rapid, affect-
based decision making is inferior to slower, cognitive based reasoning and would involve 
developing strategies which would train system 2 to override system 1.  As it is currently not 
known whether system 2 processing always produces better diagnostic decision making, further 
testing is required before moving forward with this idea. 
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As this research suggests that emergency care doctors work in an emotionally-charged 
environment and that affect can provide information which may both hinder and assist 
diagnostic judgement, it is suggested that doctors should adopt “mindfulness” strategies during 
practice (Croskerry, 2013).  A diagnostic decision making checklist that includes items which 
prompt doctors to consider their feelings when making key judgements about a case 
presentation should be developed.  This would facilitate the consideration and management of 
non-rational information that may be hindering or delaying judgement and action, or may alert 
doctors to the need to pursue a gut instinct and to gather further diagnostic information.  
 
Similarly, affect-based items should also be added to and trialled in the current checklists used 
by clinical teams (Haynes et al., 2009).  The addition of items which foster the open discussion 
of feelings about clinical cases, treatment strategies, and roles and responsibilities, before, 
during and after emergency admissions, surgical procedures, or at handover, may prompt 
individuals to share potentially vital clinical information.  It may also encourage members of the 
team to be more open about how confident they feel in undertaking clinical tasks and 
responsibilities which may lead to improved support, an increased sense of team cooperation, 
and safer patient care.  
 
Clinicians could also engage in reflective practice (Bradley, 2005; Epstein, 1999; Mamede et 
al., 2007) in order to learn how affect influences diagnostic decision making at both an 
individual and team level.  One such strategy would be to use counterfactual thinking 
(Kahneman & Miller, 1986; Kahneman & Tversky, 1982).  Reflective practice could 
incorporate both upwards and downwards counterfactual thinking (Markman, Gavanski, 
Sherman, & McMullen, 1993).  The discussion of upwards counterfactual thinking (e.g. If I/we 
had made that decision, the outcome would have been better) and downwards counterfactual 
thinking (e.g. If I/we had made that decision, the outcome would have been worse) could be 
used to compare instances of negative and positive clinical outcomes and would enable 
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individuals and teams to identify key decisions and any individual or social affect that was 
associated with the decision.  This may help individuals and teams to develop their own tools of 
affective indicators, and would also encourage a positive practice approach to diagnosis and 
case management.   
 
Both of the strategies above should also be utilised in undergraduate and postgraduate medical 
education programmes that use simulated clinical scenarios.  These strategies, combined with 
affective cues and carefully designed decision points, would enable teams of healthcare students 
and multi-professional health care teams to participate in, and then review, whether and how 
affect influenced team communication and discuss the implications for diagnostic and case 
management decision making.  This would encourage inter-professional life-long learning about 
the role of affect in clinical team performance. 
 
8.4.2  Future research  
This research suggests that there is a need for current dual process models of diagnostic decision 
making to incorporate both individual and social types of affect.  These models should be used 
to further understand the interplay between individual and social affective processes and to 
determine their role in individual and team-based diagnostic judgements and behaviour.  There 
is also a need to further examine the roles of experience and confidence as moderators of the 
relationship between affect and diagnostic decision making.  
 
The sources and types of affect that were identified in this research must now be corroborated 
through further interview studies with doctors who make emergency care decisions in other 
acute care settings.  The use of grounded theory (Glaser & Strauss, 1967) in the analysis of 
future interviews may facilitate further assessment and refinement of the themes that have 
emerged from this research. If these findings are transferable, further work should look to 
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mapping sources onto types of affect and determining which combinations hinder or facilitate 
diagnostic reasoning. 
  
There is also a need to further assess whether there are specific emotions which are important in 
diagnostic decision making and to determine their role.  This knowledge should be gained about 
all key health professionals who engage in diagnostic judgement and behaviour in clinical teams 
and should also be extended to other important clinical care processes (e.g. deteriorating 
patients, palliative care etc.).  This would assist in the development of refined measures of 
emotion which could then be utilised in further research examining the role of emotion in 
clinical decision making and performance. 
 
 
8.5  Conclusion 
While many healthcare professionals may intuitively accept the potential for affect to impact 
their diagnostic performance, Crandall and Wears (2008) suggest, “To be effective, feedback 
must give physicians information that illuminates contingent relationships and causal 
consequences” (p. S32).  The research presented in this thesis provides empirical evidence that 
affective factors influence the diagnostic and case management trajectories of individual doctors 
and healthcare teams.  The findings in this research may help to inform health professionals of 
the complex psychological processes involved in the non-rational influences of diagnostic 
decision making and may go some way to helping shift the scepticism in the notion that 
decision making is anything other than a judgement based purely on a rational consideration of 
the options.  This work may contribute to a wider acceptance that affect has direct implications 
for diagnostic performance and the progress in knowledge may assist in improving the 
diagnostic decision making of healthcare professionals across a range of clinical contexts.  
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Recent reports on patient safety (Berwick et al., 2013; Francis et al., 2013) have emphasised the 
pivotal role that professionalism, responsibility and a culture of “openness” plays in the 
provision of optimal care.  With this comes a moral obligation to acknowledge and foster 
discussion about, and incorporate into clinical practice, new evidence of factors that may hinder 
or facilitate safe patient care.  This should include the role of affect in diagnostic decision 
making.  
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Appendix A 
Study 1, 2 and 3 - Case Presentations  
Instruction for medical students: 
When reading the case presentation, please imagine that you are an F1 doctor who will have to 
make decisions about the diagnosis and management of this patient.  
Instructions for doctors: 
Please read the following case presentation and answer the questions that follow. When reading 
the case presentation please imagine that you are the attending doctor.  
 
Positive affect versions 
 
Case 1 
At 12.30am a 36 year old woman is brought by taxi to the assessment unit of the emergency 
department after collapsing earlier while at home. The woman and the two friends who had 
brought her appear shocked and worried. They all smell of alcohol, and they tell you that they 
were having a quiet night in, watching a film with a couple of bottles of wine.   
 
Initial observations show that her temperature is 37.2°C, BP is 140/90, pulse is 108bpm, regular. 
The patient is very cooperative while you take her medical history, and is worried that she might 
be wasting your time and could just go home. She tells you that she has had some abdominal 
pain for a few days, but thinks this is because she is having her period. She says that just before 
collapsing, she felt a really bad pain in her stomach and when she came round she felt dizzy and 
thinks she was sick, but now feels better and maybe should just go home and sleep it off.  
 
She tells you that she is single, unemployed and lives with her mum and 5 year-old son. She 
says that she has not had a sexual relationship recently. When you ask her whether she uses 
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recreational drugs, she says she does not. She allows you to examine her, and is talkative and 
pleasant, and asks whether there is anything else you need to know. 
On checking hospital records you see that she has been in A&E 3 times this year with similar 
symptoms. 
 
Case 2 
On your first day on the surgical ward, you are called to see a 55 year old female inpatient, 2 
days following hemicolectomy, as she is complaining of sudden onset moderate tight central 
chest pain. She says that the pain doesn’t go anywhere else. She had some post operative nausea 
and vomiting, and you notice that urine output has been low. She has not opened her bowels 
since the operation. Epidural analgesia is in place. 
 
She is a moderate smoker, controlled hypertensive on treatment (which has not been given post 
op) no history of myocardial infarction nor angina. On examination she is sitting in bed in 
obvious pain and is pale and sweaty. There is no oxygen in place, no cyanosis and she is 
apyrexial. Her BP is 200/105, her heart rate is 96 bpm and regular. Chest auscultation is clear 
and heart sounds are normal. 
 
You are not sure what to do and on the advice of one of the surgical ward nurses, you page the 
surgeon who had performed the hemicolectomy. She immediately rings the ward and begins by 
telling you to stay calm and that you have done the right thing to consult a senior doctor. She 
expresses concern and asks you to present all of the patient’s symptoms. She listens carefully, 
and when you have finished she says that it does not appear to be a surgical matter, but that you 
have acted in the best interests of your patient, and that she is impressed that you showed 
initiative and consulted a senior doctor. She advises you that you should page the on-call 
anaesthetist, and suggests it would be appropriate to do so as a matter of urgency. 
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Whilst talking to the consultant anaesthetist he tells you that it could be that her pain is not 
being managed sufficiently, but that until he gets there in about an hour, he cannot be absolutely 
sure. He instructs you to try and manage her symptoms until he arrives. 
 
Case 3 
A 65 year old male, retired plumber, is found semi-conscious by his daughter at home. An 
ambulance is called and he arrives in A&E. His daughter provides most of the history as he is 
too breathless to talk. She tells you that he is a life-long heavy smoker, normally quite active 
and independent. She thinks he has been unwell for a week with fever, aching all over, 
complaining of a tight chest and occasionally coughing up blood. There is no history of chest 
pains, heart attacks or diabetes but a long history of high blood pressure. She mentions that he 
returned from a holiday in Tenerife about 4 weeks ago. There is uncertainty regarding current 
medications, but they seem to include Salbutamol, Beclomethasone inhalers, Ramipril, Aspirin 
and a statin. He has no allergies. The man reminds you of a previous patient who had a very 
similar presentation, and who later had greatly improved and was discharged the following day. 
The physical examination reveals further similarities. 
  
On brief examination you find no evidence of anaemia, temperature is 37.8C, and he is very 
thin, approximately 45 kg. His pulse rate appears fast and irregular and his BP is 100/45. You 
observe that the patient is drowsy, rousable to speech, and speaking in single words. He is 
peripherally cyanosed and his respiratory rate is 30 shallow with the use of accessory muscles. 
His chest is barrel shaped. 
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Negative affect versions 
 
Case 1 
At 12.30am a 36 year old woman is brought by taxi to the assessment unit of the emergency 
department after collapsing earlier while inside a nightclub. The woman and the two friends 
who had brought her are loud, obnoxious and slurring their words. They all smell heavily of 
alcohol boasting, ‘They’ve had a right good night’.   
 
Initial observations show that her temperature is 37.2°C, BP is 140/90, pulse is 108bpm, regular. 
The patient is uncooperative while you try to take her medical history complaining that she is 
‘sick of waiting around this dump’ and wants to go back out. She tells you that she has had 
some abdominal pain for a few days, but thinks this is because she is having her period. She 
says that just before collapsing, she felt a really bad pain in her stomach and when she came 
round she felt dizzy and thinks she was sick, but now feels better and demands to go home to 
sleep it off.  
 
She tells you that she is single, unemployed and lives with her mum and 5 year-old son. She 
says that she has not had a sexual relationship recently. When you ask her whether she uses 
recreational drugs, she laughs raucously and shouts ‘No!’. She will not allow you to examine 
her, and becomes rude and abusive, telling you to leave her alone and to ‘**** off!’ 
 
On checking hospital records you see that she has been in A&E 3 times this year with similar 
symptoms. 
 
Case 2 
On your first day on the surgical ward, you are called to see a 55 year old female inpatient, 2 
days following hemicolectomy, as she is complaining of sudden onset moderate tight central 
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chest pain. She says that the pain doesn’t go anywhere else. She had some post operative nausea 
and vomiting, and you notice that urine output has been low. She has not opened her bowels 
since the operation. Epidural analgesia is in place. 
 
She is a moderate smoker, controlled hypertensive on treatment (which has not been given post 
op) no history of myocardial infarction nor angina. On examination she is sitting in bed in 
obvious pain and is pale and sweaty. There is no oxygen in place, no cyanosis and she is 
apyrexial. Her BP is 200/105, her heart rate is 96 bpm and regular. Chest auscultation is clear 
and heart sounds are normal. 
 
You are not sure what to do and on the advice of one of the surgical ward nurses, you page the 
surgeon who had performed the hemicolectomy. She immediately rings the ward and begins by 
telling you that this isn’t the most convenient time as she is in the middle of very complex 
surgery. She is impatient and abrupt and asks you to present the patient’s symptoms quickly. 
She interrupts you before you have finished, and insists that it is quite obviously not a surgical 
matter. She tells you that she is not at all impressed and that instead of wasting everyone’s time 
and putting both her and your patient at risk, you should have had much more sense and paged 
the on-call anaesthetist, which she suggests you do as a matter of urgency. 
 
Whilst talking to the consultant anaesthetist he tells you that it could be that her pain is not 
being managed sufficiently, but that until he gets there in about an hour, he cannot be absolutely 
sure. He instructs you to try and manage her symptoms until he arrives. 
 
Case 3 
A 65 year old male, retired plumber, is found semi-conscious by his daughter at home. An 
ambulance is called and he arrives in A&E. His daughter provides most of the history as he is 
too breathless to talk. She tells you that he is a life-long heavy smoker, normally quite active 
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and independent. She thinks he has been unwell for a week with fever, aching all over, 
complaining of a tight chest and occasionally coughing up blood. There is no history of chest 
pains, heart attacks or diabetes but a long history of high blood pressure. She mentions that he 
returned from a holiday in Tenerife about 4 weeks ago. There is uncertainty regarding current 
medications, but they seem to include Salbutamol, Beclomethasone inhalers, Ramipril, Aspirin 
and a statin. He has no allergies. The man reminds you of a previous patient who had a very 
similar presentation, and who later had rapidly deteriorated and died the following day. The 
physical examination reveals further similarities. 
  
On brief examination you find no evidence of anaemia, temperature is 37.8C, and he is very 
thin, approximately 45 kg. His pulse rate appears fast and irregular and his BP is 100/45. You 
observe that the patient is drowsy, rousable to speech, and speaking in single words. He is 
peripherally cyanosed and his respiratory rate is 30 shallow with the use of accessory muscles. 
His chest is barrel shaped.  
 
Neutral affect versions 
 
Case 1 
At 12.30am a 36 year old woman is brought by taxi to the assessment unit of the emergency 
department after collapsing earlier. The woman has been brought by two friends. They all smell 
of alcohol.   
 
Initial observations show that her temperature is 37.2°C, BP is 140/90, pulse is 108bpm, regular. 
You take the patient’s medical history. She tells you that she has had some abdominal pain for a 
few days, but thinks this is because she is having her period. She says that just before 
collapsing, she felt a really bad pain in her stomach and when she came round she felt dizzy and 
thinks she was sick, but now feels better.  
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She tells you that she is single, unemployed and lives with her mum and 5 year-old son. She 
says that she has not had a sexual relationship recently and doesn’t use recreational drugs. You 
begin to examine her. 
 
On checking hospital records you see that she has been in A&E 3 times this year with similar 
symptoms. 
 
Case 2 
On your first day on the surgical ward, you are called to see a 55 year old female inpatient, 2 
days following hemicolectomy, as she is complaining of sudden onset moderate tight central 
chest pain. She says that the pain doesn’t go anywhere else. She had some post operative nausea 
and vomiting, and you notice that urine output has been low. She has not opened her bowels 
since the operation. Epidural analgesia is in place. 
 
She is a moderate smoker, controlled hypertensive on treatment (which has not been given post 
op) no history of myocardial infarction nor angina. On examination she is sitting in bed in 
obvious pain and is pale and sweaty. There is no oxygen in place, no cyanosis and she is 
apyrexial. Her BP is 200/105, her heart rate is 96 bpm and regular. Chest auscultation is clear 
and heart sounds are normal. 
 
Whilst talking to the consultant anaesthetist he tells you that it could be that her pain is not 
being managed sufficiently, but that until he gets there in about an hour, he cannot be absolutely 
sure. He instructs you to try and manage her symptoms until he arrives. 
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Case 3 
A 65 year old male, retired plumber is found semi-conscious by his daughter at home. An 
ambulance is called and he arrives in A&E. His daughter provides most of the history as he is 
too breathless to talk. She tells you that he is a life-long heavy smoker, normally quite active 
and independent. She thinks he has been unwell for a week with fever, aching all over, 
complaining of a tight chest and occasionally coughing up blood. There is no history of chest 
pains, heart attacks or diabetes but a long history of high blood pressure. She mentions that he 
returned from a holiday in Tenerife about 4 weeks ago. There is uncertainty regarding current 
medications, but they seem to include Salbutamol, Beclomethasone inhalers, Ramipril, Aspirin 
and a statin. He has no allergies. The man reminds you of a previous patient who had a very 
similar presentation. The physical examination reveals further similarities. 
 
On brief examination you find no evidence of anaemia, temperature is 37.8C, and he is very 
thin, approximately 45 kg. His pulse rate appears fast and irregular and his BP is 100/45. You 
observe that the patient is drowsy, rousable to speech, and speaking in single words. He is 
peripherally cyanosed and his respiratory rate is 30 shallow with the use of accessory muscles. 
His chest is barrel shaped. 
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 Appendix B  
Study 2 - Expert Panel Important facts 
Case presentation 1 
Facts Consultant 1 Consultant 2 Consultant 3 Consultant 3 
Additional 
Information 
1 Female Acute abdominal 
pain 
Abdominal pain for 
a few days 
 
Has been in A&E 3 
times this year with 
similar symptoms. 
Likely abdominal 
pathology. Fact that it 
has happened several 
times makes things like 
appendicitis or ectopic 
pregnancy unlikely. 
Ongoing gynae problem 
like endometriosis or 
ovarian cysts are 
possible. As would be 
intestinal pathology like 
irritable bowel 
syndrome 
 
2 Acute abdominal 
pain (presenting 
history) 
Fast pulse and 
history of collapse 
– raises concern of 
serious pathology 
Just before 
collapsing, she felt 
a really bad pain in 
her stomach 
This needs to be taken 
seriously. If she really 
did ‘collapse’ and lose 
consciousness we need 
to find a definitive 
diagnosis 
 
3 Chronic problem 
(been to A&E 3 
times) 
Age and sex – rules 
out certain 
pathologies 
Not had a sexual 
relationship 
recently 
If we believe her then 
pregnancy related 
causes can be ruled out. 
Could still have pelvic 
infection (ie STD) as 
has clearly been 
sexually active in past 
 
4 Age – 36 years 
old 
Previous chronic 
symptoms 
 
Menstruation 
 
No sexual 
relationship - 
Reduces likelihood 
of some diagnoses 
37.2°C On high side of normal. 
Not definite acute 
infection but worth 
bearing in mind 
 
 
5 Pulse rate – 108 
tachycardic 
 
No sexual 
relationship 
 
Menstruating 
 
 BP is 140/90, pulse 
is 108bpm 
Not acutely shocked but 
has got tachycardia. If it 
doesn’t settle would 
point to degree of shock 
which would raise 
urgency of treatment 
and investigation 
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Case presentation 2 
Facts Consultant 1 Consultant 2 Consultant 3 Consultant 3 
Additional 
Information 
1 2 days post op Chest pain Sudden onset 
moderate tight 
central chest pain 
Cardiac until 
proved otherwise 
 
2 Chest pain Pale & sweaty – 
raises concern of 
serious pathology 
pale and sweaty Suggests cardiac or 
shock (but BP 
raised, not low) 
 
3 Epidural in place Post-op – helps 
likelihood of 
differentials, but 
chest pain still most 
important factor to 
trigger differentials 
urine output has 
been low 
Suggests poor 
perfusion. Either 
dehydration, poor 
cardiac output or 
renal dysfunction 
 
4 BP raised Epidural – makes 
you think of other 
differentials 
moderate smoker, 
controlled 
hypertensive 
Risk factors for 
cardiac disease 
 
5 Known 
hypertensive  
 
Age – 55 years 
 
Age 
 
High BP (on 
background of high 
BP) 
Epidural analgesia 
is in place 
May mask 
abdominal signs 
and symptoms i.e. 
may have 
abdominal pain but 
can’t feel it 
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Case presentation 3  
Facts Consultant 1 Consultant 2 Consultant 3 Consultant 3 
Additional 
Information 
1 smoker Symptoms & signs 
(fever, SOB, 
cough, high resp 
rate, high pulse) – 
makes you consider 
chest infection as 
top differential but 
not just chest 
infection – these 
are the ‘hard facts’ 
whereas others 
below just help 
formulate 
likelihood of 
differentials 
Breathless This narrows it 
down to either a 
respiratory problem 
or shock. 
(circulatory failure) 
 
2 Signs of chronic 
COPD (e.g. use of 
inhalers) 
Recent travel Fever This makes it highly 
likely to be an 
infective cause 
 
3 Age – 65 years 
 
COPD 
Age 
Smoker 
Weight 
Tight chest and 
occasionally 
coughing up blood 
This points to a 
respiratory source 
for the infection 
 
4 Signs of acute chest 
infection (e.g. 
coughing up blood, 
chest tightness, 
breathlessness, 
peripherally 
cyanosed, shallow 
respiratory rate, 
chest barrel shaped) 
 Pulse rate appears 
fast and irregular 
and his BP is 
100/45 
This indicates the 
degree of severity 
 
5 Weight 
Recently travelled 
 Life-long heavy 
smoker 
 
Very thin, 
approximately 45 
kg 
Suggests a possible 
malignancy as an 
underlying cause 
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Appendix C 
Study 2 – Word unit criteria 
 
1. Words separated by a hyphen or forward slash counted individually  
     e.g. post-op = 2 words 
 
2. Numbers = 1 word 
 
3. Abbreviations for medical terms and tests etc. counted as one word 
    e.g. CT,  IV, FBC, A&E = 1 word 
 
4. Two words that have been added together separated and counted as 2 individual  
     words 
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Appendix D 
Study 3 - Recruitment advert 
 
  
DOCTORS REQUIRED FOR DECISION MAKING STUDY 
COGNITION AND FEELINGS: DO THEY IMPACT DIAGNOSIS IN 
EMERGENCY CARE? 
                                              (Phase 2)                                   
I am a PhD student at the Institute of Psychological Sciences, University of 
Leeds. I am looking to recruit doctors across all grades and specialties who 
work in an acute care setting to take part in research examining how doctors’ 
thoughts and feelings influence the clinical decisions they make for diagnosis in 
emergency care. The study is completed online and requires you to complete a 
questionnaire in response to one clinical scenario. This should take 
approximately 10 minutes to complete.   
 
If you think that you may be interested in taking part in this research and would 
like more information, or to access the online questionnaire, please click on the 
link http://www.psyc.leeds.ac.uk/q/clinicaldecisionmaking2 
 
This research is sponsored by the University of Leeds, and has received ethical 
approval from Bradford and University of Leeds Research Ethics 
Committee (Ref: 10/H1302/65). 
 
Thank you very much for your interest in this study. 
Jane Heyhoe  
psc4jeh@leeds.ac.uk 
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Appendix E 
Study 3 - Participant Information Sheet 
                                                                                                                                                                                                                  
 PARTICIPANT INFORMATION SHEET 
 
                                                         RESEARCH TITLE 
Cognition and feelings: do they impact diagnosis in emergency care? (Phase 2) 
 
                                                          Researcher: Jane Heyhoe 
                                                    
I would like to invite you to take part in a research study. Before you decide, you need to 
understand why the research is being done and what it would involve for you. Please take time 
to read the following information carefully. Talk to others about the study if you wish. 
 
Part 1 explains the purpose of this study and what will happen to you if you take part. Part 2 
provides you with more detailed information about the conduct of the study. This sheet will 
hopefully provide you with enough information about the study to allow you to make an 
informed decision about participation. However, if there is anything that is not clear or if you 
would like more information, please let me know.   
PART 1 
 
What is the purpose of the study? 
I am a postgraduate research student at the Institute of Psychological Sciences at the University 
of Leeds conducting research in order to satisfy the requirements of a PhD.  
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Research suggests that judgement and decision-making in situations involving risk and 
uncertainty may be influenced by a number of cognitive factors. I am therefore interested in 
investigating how the way doctors think and feel impacts their clinical decision-making. 
 
Why am I being invited to take part? 
You are being invited to take part in this study as I am looking to recruit doctors across all 
grades and specialties who work in an acute NHS Trust setting. Your colleague may have also 
discussed this research with you and identified you as someone who may be interested in taking 
part in this study.  All doctors in your hospital will have the opportunity to take part. 
 
Do I have to take part? 
Whether or not you take part is entirely your decision. The study will be described to you in this 
information sheet and in answering any questions that you may have. If you decide to 
participate, you will be asked to complete an online consent form before you begin the study, to 
show that you have agreed to take part. You may however, withdraw your consent and 
participation at any time without giving a reason by contacting Jane Heyhoe using the details 
below. You will need to provide your anonymous participant code to enable the correct 
questionnaire responses to be withdrawn from the study.  
                                                                                                                                                                                                                           
What will I have to do if I take part? 
Participation will involve you reading one clinical scenario, and responding to a number of 
questions before and after the scenario. The questionnaire concerns the clinical decisions that 
you make in response to clinical scenarios. Participation in the study will take place entirely 
online. It is estimated that the study will take approximately 10 minutes to complete. This online 
study can be accessed and completed at a time and place that is convenient to you. However, the 
study must be completed in one session. It cannot be paused and saved to return to at a later 
time. 
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You will be asked to generate your own anonymous participant code. No-one should be able to 
identify you from this code. You are only being asked to generate this to enable you to 
withdraw from the study should you wish to at a later date. This code will enable the correct 
questionnaire responses to be removed from the study should you decide to withdraw. It will not 
be matched to any data for the purpose of analysis.  
 
Once the study has been completed, an online summary of the study findings will be made 
available to you. The summary of the study results will include general feedback of the 
questionnaire responses given by participants and those provided by an expert panel. If you 
would like to be notified of how to access a summary of the study results, once they are 
available, you will be asked to provide an email address after you have completed the study. 
Again, your email address will not be matched to any data for the purpose of analysis. However, 
it is completely up to you whether or not you choose to provide an email address. If you decide 
not to provide an email address, this does not prevent you from participating in the study. 
  
Please note that all information collected about you for this research will be kept strictly 
confidential. If you participate in the study you will be asked to indicate that you have 
understood what is involved in this study by answering questions on the study consent form. 
These answers, and your completion of the study questionnaire, will indicate that you are happy 
to make an informed decision about participation in this research.   
 
What are the possible disadvantages and risks of taking part? 
You will have to give up some of your time to take part in this study and you may feel upset or 
stressed by the nature of the scenario. The scenario has been made as realistic as possible, and 
as a result, it is possible that you may feel embarrassed or offended by the sensitive nature of 
some of the language used in the scenario. 
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What are the possible benefits of taking part? 
I cannot promise that this study will help you, but the information from studies such as this may 
assist in improving diagnostic performance across a range of healthcare professionals and 
clinical contexts.  
 
The summary of the study results will include general feedback of the questionnaire responses 
given by other participants as well as those provided by an expert panel. This will incorporate a 
valuable educative component. 
 
What if there is a problem? 
Any complaint about the way you have been dealt with during the study or any possible harm 
you might suffer will be addressed. The detailed information on this is given in Part 2. 
 
Will my taking part in the study be kept confidential? 
Yes. Strict ethical and legal guidelines will be followed at all times and any information about 
you will be handled in confidence. The details are included in Part 2. 
 
This completes Part 1. 
 
If the information in Part 1 has interested you and you are considering participation, please read 
the additional information in Part 2 before making any decision. 
                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                              
                                                                     PART 2 
What will happen if I do not want to carry on with the study? 
If you withdraw from the study any information collected from you will be destroyed and will 
not be used in any way in the research. 
What if there is a problem? 
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Complaints 
If you have a concern about any aspect of this study, you should ask to speak to the researcher 
who will do their best to answer your questions. The contact telephone number is 0113 
3439195. If you remain unhappy and wish to complain formally, you can do this through the 
University of Leeds Research Complaints Procedure. 
 
Harm 
In the event that something does go wrong and you are harmed during the research and this is 
due to someone’s negligence, then you have grounds for a legal action for compensation against 
the University of Leeds, but you may have to pay legal costs. 
 
Will my taking part in this study be kept confidential? 
This research uses ethical guidelines set out by the British Psychological Society. These 
guidelines include rules of conduct such as obtaining your informed consent before research 
starts, notifying you of your right to withdraw at any point during the study, and the protection 
of your confidentiality and anonymity. The procedures used for handling, processing, storage 
and destruction of any information you supply conform to the principles of the Data Protection 
Act 1998. 
 
The information gathered from you will only be used in a report of this research which may 
include presentations at academic conferences and articles in academic journals. Some of the 
information collected for the study may be looked at by authorised persons at the University of 
Leeds in order to check that the study is being carried out correctly. All will have a duty of 
confidentiality to you as a research participant. However, as your participation is anonymous, 
no-one should be able to identify you, and at no point will your identity be revealed. 
                                                                                                                                                                                                         
After the study has been completed, all information gathered from this study will be stored 
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securely at the Institute of Psychological Sciences at the University of Leeds for 5 years. After 
this time, it will be disposed of securely. 
                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                             
What will happen to the results of the research study?  
The results of this research study will appear in a report of this research and in my PhD thesis. 
The report of the study could be included in presentations at academic conferences and articles 
in academic journals. It is important for you to note that you will not be identified in any report 
or publication. Although it will not be possible for me to give you individual feedback, a 
summary detailing the overall outcome of the study will be made available online.  
 
Who is sponsoring this research? 
The University of Leeds is sponsoring this research.  
 
Who has reviewed this study? 
All research in the NHS is looked at by an independent group of people called a Research Ethics 
Committee to protect your safety, rights, wellbeing and dignity. This study has been reviewed 
and given favourable opinion by Bradford Research Ethics Committee and University of Leeds 
Research Ethics Committee (Ref: 10/H1302/65). 
 
Further information and contact details 
 
For specific information about this research project, please contact Jane Heyhoe: 
Telephone: 0113 3439195 
Email: psc4jeh@leeds.ac.uk 
 
Advice about whether you should participate in this study: 
You could discuss this with your friends or colleagues. 
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If you feel in distress about any aspect of this study: 
You could discuss your concerns with your colleagues. Alternatively, if you feel that you need 
more support then you could contact the staff counselling service in the Trust. 
 
Thank you very much for taking the time to read this information. 
This completes Part 2. 
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Appendix F 
Study 4 - Post simulation questionnaire 
                                                                                                                       
 
 
    Features of Communication and Decision Making in Critical Incidents 
 
                                        POST-SIMULATION QUESTIONNAIRE 
 
 
 
 
 
Please insert your participant number in the box provided:             
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UNIQUE PARTICIPANT CODE:        
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For each word below, tick the answer which best describes how you felt during the 
simulation that you have just participated in. 
 very slightly  
or not at all    
    a little    moderately    quite a bit                                extremely
 
upset 
         
        ○ 
       
        ○ 
        
        ○ 
      
        ○ 
     
        ○ 
 
hostile 
        
        ○ 
        
        ○ 
        
         ○ 
        
        ○ 
      
        ○ 
 
alert 
        
        ○ 
         
        ○ 
       
         ○ 
      
        ○ 
     
        ○ 
 
ashamed 
 
         
        ○ 
         
        ○ 
        
         ○ 
     
        ○ 
       
        ○ 
 
inspired 
 
        
        ○ 
        
        ○ 
     
         ○ 
     
        ○ 
       
        ○ 
 
nervous 
 
        
        ○ 
        
        ○ 
      
         ○ 
    
        ○ 
        
        ○ 
 
determined 
 
        
         ○ 
      
         ○ 
       
         ○ 
      
         ○ 
      
        ○ 
 
attentive 
 
       
         ○ 
         
         ○ 
      
         ○ 
       
         ○ 
    
        ○ 
 
afraid 
 
        
         ○ 
      
         ○ 
     
         ○ 
       
         ○ 
        
        ○ 
 
active 
         
         ○ 
       
         ○ 
        
         ○ 
     
         ○ 
    
        ○ 
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For each statement please circle the number which best indicates the rating you would give the entire 
team for their performance during the simulation. If you feel the behaviour or action was not 
appropriate or necessary, please circle ‘NA’ (not applicable) where available: 
 
 Did team members seem engaged (e.g. interested, attentive, alert) or disengaged (e.g. bored, 
inattentive, distracted) throughout the simulation? 
             disengaged                1         2         3         4         5                 engaged 
 
 
 For what was happening in the case during the simulation, were the team: 
 
             inappropriately tense          1         2         3         4        5         appropriately tense     
 
 
 Was there a tone of collaboration and information sharing in the team which created an 
atmosphere of safety to speak up? 
 
             not at all                     1         2         3         4        5                    very much so                NA 
 
 
 Did the team talk openly about ideas, plans and concerns and discuss important clinical 
information so that they had a shared understanding of how to manage the case and were clear 
about what each team member needed to do? 
 
            not at all                        1         2         3         4        5                    very much so               NA 
 
 
 Did the team use verbal responses to requests so that team members were confident that 
requests had been heard correctly and were being acted upon? 
 
            not at all                         1         2         3         4        5                     very much so             NA 
 
   
 Did all team members assert their ideas and escalate concerns?  
 
            not at all                          1         2         3         4        5                     very much so             NA 
 
 
 Were conflicts within the team appropriately negotiated and resolved? 
 
            not at all                          1          2         3         4        5                     very much so            NA 
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For each statement please circle the number which best indicates the rating you would give 
for your own individual performance during the simulation. If you feel the behaviour or 
action was not appropriate or necessary, please circle ‘NA’ (not applicable) where available: 
  
 
 Were you engaged (e.g. interested, attentive, alert) or disengaged (e.g. bored, inattentive, 
distracted) throughout the simulation? 
             disengaged                       1         2         3         4         5                   engaged 
 
 
 For what was happening in the case during the simulation, were you: 
 
             inappropriately tense        1         2         3         4        5          appropriately tense  
    
 
 Did you contribute to creating a tone of collaboration and information sharing in the team 
which created an atmosphere of safety to speak up? 
 
            not at all                           1         2         3         4        5                  very much so             NA 
 
 
 Did you talk openly about ideas, plans and concerns and discuss important clinical information 
so that the team had a shared understanding of how to manage the case and were clear about 
what each team member needed to do? 
 
            not at all                           1         2         3         4        5                  very much so             NA   
    
 
 Did you use verbal responses to requests so that team members were confident that 
requests had been heard correctly by you and were being acted upon? 
 
             not at all                           1         2         3         4        5                  very much so            NA 
 
 
 Did you contribute to all team members being able to assert their ideas and escalate 
concerns?  
 
            not at all                            1         2         3         4        5                   very much so            NA 
 
 
 Did you help to ensure that any conflicts within the team were appropriately 
negotiated and resolved? 
 
             not at all                           1         2         3         4        5                   very much so            NA 
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For each statement please circle the number which best indicates your own thoughts and 
feelings following your participation in the simulation: 
 
 Did your team’s overall performance meet your expectations?                
             
             not at all met               1        2          3         4        5               completely met 
 
             
 Were you satisfied with your experience as a team member? 
    
            not at all satisfied        1         2         3         4        5        extremely satisfied 
 
 
 How do you feel about your experience? 
 
                     negative                1         2         3         4        5               positive  
 
 Would you be willing to work on a similar team in the future? 
 
             not at all willing           1         2         3         4        5        extremely willing 
 
 
 Was there a co-operative climate in the team during the simulation? 
 
              not at all                         1          2         3         4        5                  very much so 
 
 Was there a competitive climate in the team during the simulation? 
 
              not at all                           1         2         3         4        5                  very much so 
 
 How well do you know any members of the team? 
       not at all                           1         2         3         4        5                  extremely well 
 
 How often do you work with any members of the team? 
never                                 1         2         3         4        5                  all the time 
 
You have now completed the questionnaire. Please check that you have indicated a 
response to all questions.  Thank you very much for your participation. 
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Appendix G 
Study 5 – Study Invitation letter 
                                                  Please address correspondence to: 
                                                                         Jane Heyhoe 
                                                                         Institute of  Psychological Sciences 
                                                                         University of Leeds    
                                                                         Leeds , LS2 9JT      
                                                                         Telephone: 0113 3439195 
                                                                          Email: psc4jeh@leeds.ac.uk                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                              
Dr  
Anaesthetics Department 
27th May 2011 
 
Dear Dr , 
 
Re:  Invitation to participate in a study: Features of diagnostic decision  
       making in emergency care.  
 
I am a PhD research student at the Institute if Psychological Sciences, University of 
Leeds. I am writing to invite you to take part in a research study exploring the 
features of diagnostic decision making in emergency care.   
 
The study aims to explore thought processes and key influences in the diagnostic 
decisions made by doctors in an emergency care setting through an in-depth 
interview in which you will be asked to talk about an incident that was challenging and 
involved diagnostic and case management decisions.  
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You have been invited to take part in an interview because you are a doctor who has 
experience of making decisions in emergency care in an acute hospital setting.  If you 
consent to participate in the study, this will involve you being interviewed and 
completing a questionnaire in order to gain a deeper understanding of the features 
of diagnostic and case management decision making in emergency care. The interview 
and completion of the questionnaire will take approximately 1 hour and must be 
conducted in your free time. If you are a junior doctor you must have completed 3 
months in the department before you are eligible to take part in this study.  
  
If you do consent to participation, you are still free to withdraw from the study at 
any time. Any information you provide in the interview will be kept confidential and 
the data anonymised.  
 
I enclose a participant information sheet for your information. If you decide that 
you would like to participate, please contact me using the contact detail above by 18th 
July, 2011. I will then contact you to arrange a convenient time to conduct the 
interview.  If you have any further questions about this study, please contact me 
using the contact details above. 
 
Yours sincerely,      
Jane Heyhoe 
PhD Research Student 
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Appendix H 
Study 5 - Interview Schedule 
 
Features of Diagnostic Decision Making in Emergency Care 
INTERVIEW SCHEDULE 
 
Step 1 - Select incident: 
Please select an emergency care incident that was challenging and involved diagnostic and case 
management decisions.  
 
Probe: 
If no one case identified, briefly screen a number of possible cases and ask the participant to 
pick the one deemed most interesting. Those only memorable due to death or an unusual 
episode will be avoided.  
  
Step 2 - Obtaining unstructured incident account: 
Please describe this incident from the time you became aware of the case OR became the 
attending doctor/anaesthetist to the time when the incident was judged to be under control. 
 
Step 3 - Construct incident timeline: 
Using the unstructured account you have provided, I will now repeat the main events which 
took place so that we can construct an accurate incident timeline of the sequence and duration of 
the facts of the case.  
 
 
 
                                                                                                                 
268 
 
 
 
Step 4 – Decision point identification: 
 
Using the timeline we have constructed, can you now identify specific and key decisions. In 
particular I would like you to: 
 
a). identify obvious decisions (e.g. verbal cues were used: ‘I had to decide whether...’) 
b). Where there may not be a clear indication that a specific decision was made by you, but: 
 
      - you were taking one of a number of possible actions 
      - you were making a judgement that affected the outcome, but yet there is no clear  
         indication of you actually ‘making a decision’ at that time point.  
 
and you are able to agree that other reasonable courses of action were possible, or that another 
doctor (perhaps with less or greater expertise) might have chosen differently.      
 
Step 5 – Decision point probing 
 
For each of the decision points identified I would like you to answer the following questions: 
 
1. Cues 
What were you seeing at this decision point? 
What were you hearing at this decision point? 
What were you smelling at this decision point? 
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2. Knowledge 
What information did you use in making this decision, and how was it obtained? 
 
3. Analogues 
Did this decision remind you of any previous experience?  
 
4. Goals 
What were your specific goals at this decision point? 
 
5. Options 
What other courses of action were considered by or available to you at this decision point? 
 
6. Basis 
At this decision point, how was this option selected/other options rejected? What rule was being 
followed? 
 
7. Experience 
What specific training, support received (if any), or experience was necessary or helpful in 
making this decision? 
 
8. Aiding 
If the decision at this point was not the best, what training, other support, knowledge, or 
information could have helped? 
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9. Time pressure 
How much time pressure was involved in making this decision? 
 
10. Situation assessment 
Imagine that you were asked to describe the situation to another doctor at handover at this point, 
how would you summarize the situation? 
 
11. Hypotheticals 
If a key feature of the situation had been different, what difference would it have made in your 
decision?    
 
12. Emotions 
a). Can you recall exactly how you were feeling at this point?  
 
b). Were you aware of how you were feeling at the time, and if so, how did you know you were  
      feeling this way? 
 
c). What do you think caused you to have these feelings? 
 
d). Did you think about how you might feel in the future, at this point? 
 
e). Did these emotions affect the decisions you made? 
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Appendix I 
Transformation of codes to themes 
Sources of affect 
Theme 1 - Knowing yourself 
 
Codes Codes Sub-themes Theme 
Own likes and dislikes 
Treatment Preferences 
Clinical experience 
Clinical Knowledge 
Own response 
Own interests 
Own personality 
Training 
Own busyness 
Own behaviour 
Effect on self 
Appropriate response 
Previous life experience 
Belief system 
Own thought processes 
Clinical ability 
Clinical experience 
Clinical knowledge 
Training 
Own busyness 
Clinical ability 
 
Professional 
competence 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Knowing 
yourself 
Own likes and dislikes 
Treatment Preferences 
Own response 
Own interests 
Own personality 
Own behaviour 
Effect on self 
Appropriate response 
Previous life experience 
Belief system 
Own thought processes 
 
 
 
Intrapersonal 
Self-awareness 
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Theme 2 - Interpersonal factors 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Codes Codes Sub-themes Theme 
Patient 
Team 
Other patients 
Uncertainty of other’s 
reaction 
Effect on colleagues 
Patient’s family/friends 
How regarded by others 
Effect on patient 
Isolation 
Effect on patient’s family 
and friends 
Circumstance of case 
Patient’s circumstance 
Effect of treatment 
 
 
 
 
 
 
- 
 
Reaction to 
others 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Interpersonal 
factors 
 
 
 
Reaction of  
others 
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Theme 3 - Professional ethos 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Codes Codes Sub-themes Theme 
Professional role 
Sense of ownership 
Responsibility 
Sense of control 
Approach to management 
Clinical performance 
Ethics 
 
 
 
- 
 
 
- 
                    
 
 
Professional 
ethos 
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Theme 4 - Clinical environment 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Codes Codes Sub-themes Theme 
Noise of monitors 
Blood 
Commotion 
Sound around 
Movement around 
Resources 
Familiarity 
Availability of equipment 
Monitor leads 
Different environment 
Safety 
Unusuality 
Smell 
 
 
 
 
 
 
- 
 
 
 
 
- 
                    
 
 
 
 
 
Clinical 
environment 
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Theme 5 - Risk and uncertainty 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Codes Codes Sub-themes Theme 
Not having an answer 
Probability of outcome 
Outcome possibilities 
Decision to be made 
Risk of preventable death 
Uncertainty of outcome 
Prospect of bad outcome 
Presentation phase 
Diagnostic conundrum 
Complexity 
 
 
 
 
- 
 
 
 
- 
                    
 
 
 
Risk and 
uncertainty 
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Theme 6 - Narrowing of focus 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Codes Codes Sub-themes Theme 
Time 
Task 
Aspect of presentation 
 
- 
 
- 
                    
Narrowing of 
focus 
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Theme 7 - Getting an answer 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Codes Codes Sub-themes Theme 
Information 
Test results 
Having an answer 
Decision made 
Patient records 
Scans 
Making diagnosis 
 
 
 
- 
 
 
- 
                    
 
 
Getting an 
answer 
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Theme 8 - Organizational or statutory drivers 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Codes Codes Sub-themes Theme 
Guidelines 
Policy 
Achieving targets 
Threat of litigation 
 
 
- 
 
 
- 
 
                    
 
Organizational or 
statutory drivers 
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Types of affect 
Themes 1, 4 and 5 – Anticipatory affect, Anticipated affect and Reflective mood 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Codes Codes Sub-themes Theme 
 
 
Physical expression of 
emotion 
Visceral response 
Discrete emotion 
Arousal 
Valence 
Emotional idiom  
Relational emotion 
 
Physical expression of 
emotion 
Visceral response 
Discrete emotion 
Arousal 
Valence 
Emotional idiom 
Relational emotion 
 
Anticipatory 
affect 
 
Anticipatory 
affect 
 
Reflective mood 
 
Reflective mood 
Discrete emotion 
Arousal 
Relational emotion 
 
Anticipated affect 
 
Anticipated affect 
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Appendix J 
Study 5 - List of discrete emotions 
 
 
Emotion 
 
Total 
calm/relaxed/comfortable 7 
anxiety/nervous/uneasy 7 
stressed/pressured 5 
in control 3 
satisfied/contentment 3 
anger/cross/irritation 3 
worried/concern 2 
fatigued/exhausted 2 
sad 2 
letting down 2 
relief 1 
assertive 1 
confident 1 
sorry 1 
upset 1 
on guard 1 
frustration 1 
 
 
